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Civil society and Anglophone Cameroon’s
agro-industrial crisis and reforms
Introduction
Anglophone Cameroon is somewhat exceptional in the West and
Central African region in the sense that a plantation economy was
established there during the German colonial era (1884-1916) and
has remained as a dominant feature of the regional economy ever
since. Two agro-industrial enterprises have dominated the plantation
sector: one is a huge parastatal enterprise, the Cameroon
Development Corporation (CDC), and the other is a private
company, Plantations Pamol du Cameroun Ltd, or Pamol as it is
popularly known, a subsidiary of  Unilever.
Most of  the estates are located in the present South West
Province of Anglophone Cameroon. Since 1977, however, the CDC
has extended its activities beyond the South West Province to other
provinces by creating four additional estates. It took over the Ndu
Tea Estate from a Lipton subsidiary, Estates and Agency Company
Ltd, in the Anglophone North West Province, and acquired land to
set up three new estates in the Francophone area, namely the
Kompina and Penda Mboko Rubber Estates in the Littoral Province
and the Djuttitsa Tea Estate near Dschang in the West Province.
The acquisition of these new estates demonstrated not only the
Cameroonian government’s persistent faith in the CDC management
and its development potential but also its intention to transform
the corporation from a regional into a national agro-industrial
enterprise.
There are different theories on plantation agriculture but all seem
to agree that this form of  production is more likely to meet the
imperatives of increased agricultural output and capital
accumulation than smallholder production can. Existing studies on
the CDC and Pamol mostly maintain that such agro-industrial
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enterprises have contributed greatly to regional development. They
are seen as the lifeline of the Anglophone region in general, and the
South West Province in particular.
The economic and financial crisis that befell the Cameroonian
agro-industrial sector in the 1980s has however brought both
companies to the verge of collapse. This crisis, which caused great
commotion in Anglophone Cameroon, presented a serious challenge
to existing theories on plantation production and capital
accumulation and led to the implementation of a number of
neoliberal economic reforms in an attempt to revive Anglophone
Cameroon’s ailing plantation economy and set it on the road to
renewed capital accumulation. Such reform measures included the
withdrawal of  state intervention and state subsidies from the
regional agro-industrial sector and the restructuring, liquidation and
privatisation of existing agro-industrial enterprises with a view to
enhancing their efficiency, cost effectiveness and international
competitiveness as well as to attracting foreign investment. The
Cameroonian state refused to assist Pamol during its deep crisis
and, as a result, the company was put into voluntary liquidation in
October 1987 and has been up for sale ever since. The CDC was
first denied public grants and subsidies, then restructured, and set
for privatisation in 1994.
The neoliberal reform measures had severe consequences for
civil-society groups that had a direct stake in these agro-industrial
enterprises, notably the ethno-regional elite and their associations,
regional chiefs and their organisations, plantation workers and their
trade unions, and contract farmers and their cooperatives. This study
shows that these civil-society groups have never resigned themselves
to their fate but have been actively involved in a variety of  formal
and informal methods of  resistance. In this connection, it is important
to observe that the introduction of  various neoliberal political
reforms in the early 1990s, as in other African states, created more
political space for civil-society organisations (Bratton 1989, 1994;
van de Walle 1993; Konings 2009b). Following political
liberalisation, several associations of the regional elite and chiefs
emerged (Nyamnjoh & Rowlands 1998), and older organisations
like trade unions and smallholder cooperatives regained a large
measure of  autonomy, allowing them to represent their members’
interests more effectively against management and the state.
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In the first section of this introductory chapter, I discuss some
of the major theories on plantation production that have influenced
previous studies on the CDC and Pamol. In the second section, I
first show how the regional agro-industrial crisis and reforms have
seriously threatened the interests of various civil-society groups
and organisations and then introduce the prominent ones.
Major theories on plantation production
A review of the literature reveals an apparent lack of consensus
among specialists on the essence of plantation production. A
number of definitions are in circulation (cf. Pryor 1982; Graham &
Floering 1984; Rote 1986; Kurian 1989), yet they are little more
than attempts to describe some of the specific characteristics of
plantation production. One of the most frequently quoted definitions
is the following:
A plantation is an economic unit producing agricultural commodities
(field-crops or horticultural products but not livestock) for sale and
employing relatively large numbers of unskilled labourers whose
activities are closely supervised. Plantations usually employ a year-
round labour crew of some size and they usually specialise in the
production of  only one or two marketable products. They differ
from other kinds of  farms in the way in which factors of  production,
primarily management and labour are combined. (Jones 1968)
What this definition has in common with some of the others is
that it identifies the establishment of managerial control over a
large labour force as a basic element in plantation production.
Beckford (1972: 9) and Wolf  (1982: 315), following Thompson
(1975), went as far as comparing rigid managerial control in
plantation production with military regimentation and, therefore,
refer to plantation production as ‘military’ agriculture. Other
specialists, on the contrary, tend to underline the similarities in
managerial control between modern plantations and industrial
enterprises and thus speak of ‘industrial’ plantations (cf. Courtenay
1965).
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Such descriptive definitions undoubtedly have a certain merit
but also some fundamental weaknesses. First, they appear unable
to include all the existing types of  plantations. For instance, Jones’s
definition quoted above does not account for the emergence of
modern, highly capitalised sugar plantations that only employ a
relatively small number of (skilled) workers (cf. Graves & Richardson
1980). Secondly, they lack analytical rigour as they do not allow
differentiation between the varied relations of production in
plantation agriculture, e.g. slave labour, indentured labour, squatter
labour, free wage-labour, and so on (cf. Bernstein & Pritt 1974).
And thirdly, they are essentially timeless definitions because they
do not reflect the constant changes that occur in plantation
production as a result of modifications in the conditions of land
and capital ownership, labour supplies and control, technology and
market structures.
In the absence of  any satisfactory definition, Kurian suggests
studying plantations in their specific social and historical context:
In many ways, therefore, generalisation on the nature of plantations
appears problematic and perhaps unwarranted. The range of
literature casts no doubts on the existence of the phenomenon of
plantations, nor on the rigid character of their labour-management
relations and their historical significance in many Third World
countries. Yet comparisons give rise to strong differences which
only underscore the importance of a specific social and historical
context (Kurian 1989: 4)
Close study of the existing literature reveals that the major
theories on plantation production, such as modernisation,
dependency and the articulation of modes of production schools,
have tried to evaluate the role of plantation production in processes
of capital accumulation as well as its relationship with peasant
production and societies. A short discussion of  these theories might
contribute to our understanding of the dominant role of the agro-
industrial sector in Cameroon’s political economy.
The modernisation school has always advocated the diffusion of
western capital, know-how, technology and values as a necessary
prerequisite for development and capital accumulation in developing
countries (Long 1977; Varma 1980). It claims that plantations are
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economically efficient units of production that benefit from
considerable economies of scale and technical progress, and should
be seen as significant agents of development and capital
accumulation (cf. Courtenay 1965; Jones 1968; Graham & Floering
1984; Goldthorpe 1985). It should be noted that these claims have
often been disputed. For example, de Silva (1982) and Rote (1986)
have convincingly demonstrated that most plantations have barely
undergone any technological innovations and have largely preserved
their labour-intensive production techniques to date.
Of considerable importance to the study of plantations was the
so-called dual society and dual economy theory, a well-known variant of
the modernisation theory (cf. Boeke 1953; Lewis 1954). It defends
the near absence of any linkages between a dynamic/western/
capitalist sector and a backward/domestic/pre-capitalist sector.
Some of these theorists did not, however, exclude the possibility
of a ‘demonstration effect’ of the modern plantation sector on the
traditional peasant sector. This theory has been severely attacked
by the dependency and articulation of modes of production schools
(see below).
Most studies of  the Anglophone Cameroon’s plantations have been
either implicitly or explicitly written from a modernisation point of
view (cf. Bederman 1968; DeLancey 1973; Epale 1985). Epale’s
book on the history of plantation production and the CDC in
Anglophone Cameroon was clearly inspired by the dual economy theory:
It will be shown in this study that in the special circumstances of
Western Cameroon, the introduction of  a modern plantation enclave
in the relatively backward and inarticulate economy of the region at
the turn of the last century and the development of that enclave to
its present-day state, had, in balance, a salutary effect on the economy.
(Epale 1985: 7)
Unlike the modernisation theory, the dependency theory argues that
the promotion of capitalist plantation production in the ‘periphery’
inevitably leads to growing underdevelopment and dependency on
western ‘metropoles’ (cf. Frank 1967, 1969; Amin 1974, 1976; Leys
1975). This dependency perspective of plantations as agents of
underdevelopment and exploitation has been elaborated on in specialist
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studies of plantation production in Latin America (cf. Oxaal 1975;
Benn 1974), Asia (cf. de Silva 1982; Bagchi 1982) and Africa (cf.
Brett 1973; van Zwanenberg 1975; Leys 1975). The most influential
work in this school of  thought has undoubtedly been Beckford’s
Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies of the Third
World (1972). He characterises plantations as ‘enclaves’ due to:
• their domination by external forces – metropolitan capital and
management – interested in the drain of capital from the
periphery to the metropole;
• their exclusive specialisation in export commodities, resulting
in monocultural cropping patterns, neglected food production
and a dangerous dependence on world market prices;
• their lack of linkages with other sectors of the economy as
exemplified by their dependence on the import of various
inputs and machinery; and
• their calling into being of societies of their own, alien and
inward-looking, and cut off from the outside world, societies
marked by ‘total’ management control over labour inside and
outside the labour process, cultural and racial differences, and
large income inequalities.
According to Beckford (1972: 215), this enclave nature of
plantations causes a number of underdevelopment biases in the
domestic economy and society and also creates a ‘chronic
dependency syndrome’ that manifests itself as a value system
characterised by dependency and low motivation as well as by strong
authoritarian traditions. Strikingly, several studies of  plantation
production in Anglophone Cameroon have tended to support his
negative assessment of the consequences of plantation systems for
local societies and economies and the development of a chronic
dependency syndrome among the local population (cf. Ardener 1970;
Epale 1978, 1985; Courade 1978, 1981/82; Molua 1985).
The dependency school’s perspective on plantations seems to
be able to overcome some of the shortcomings of the modernisation
theory. It helps us to situate the study of  plantation production in a
historical and international context, with its introduction during the
colonial period as an important locus of metropolitan capital
accumulation, its (former) domination by foreign capital and
management, and its vulnerable dependence on world market
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commodity prices. However, the dependency theory has not paid
sufficient attention to the changes that have occurred in plantation
production in the wake of  transformations in the world capitalist
system and the independence of  colonial states. On the one hand,
multinational corporations now control the capitalist world market
and trade in plantation products. They also control much of  the
necessary processing, though they have tended to disinvest in the
(risky) production of plantation crops per se (cf. Dinham & Hines
1983; Barker 1984; Marcussen & Torp 1982; Kemp & Little 1987).
On the other hand, post-colonial states have attempted to establish
a larger measure of  control over their national economies. They
increasingly intervene in the control, regulation and stimulation of
plantations and are trying to integrate smallholders further into the
plantation system, thus challenging the dependency school’s thesis
of the existence of a comprador political class in newly independent
states and the impossibility of a more autonomous capitalist
development on the periphery (cf. von Muralt & Sajhau 1987; Sajhau
& von Muralt 1987). In some cases, post-colonial states have taken
measures that have led to either complete or partial nationalisation
(cf. Bolton 1985), while in other cases, they have acted as partners
in joint ventures with foreign or local private capital.
A third school of thought that has made a significant contribution
to the study of the role of plantation production in capital
accumulation and its relationship to peasant production and societies
has been the so-called theory of  the articulation of  modes of  production
as propagated by scholars such as Laclau (1971), Meillassoux (1972,
1975, 1977), Rey (1971, 1973, 1976, 1979), Terray (1969, 1975,
1979), Wolpe (1972, 1980) and van Binsbergen & Geschiere (1985).
They do not accept the dependency view that pre-capitalist societies
have been destroyed or fully transformed following incorporation
into the world capitalist system. Instead they argue that pre-capitalist
modes of  production have at least been partially preserved since
colonial rule, albeit in subordination to the dominant capitalist mode
of production. Some of them, particularly Meillassoux (1975) and
Wolpe (1972, 1980), have emphasised that this (partial) preservation
of pre-capitalist modes of production might be functional to
dominant capitalist sectors such as mining and plantations. Capital
accumulation by plantations is dependent on, and safeguarded by,
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the domestic community’s supply of  cheap land, labour and
commodities. Plantation owners can shift the costs of  reproducing
their labour force onto domestic communities and in this way lower
their costs of production.
Most of these scholars claim that the establishment of capitalist
domination and the subordination of pre-capitalist modes of
production have not always been easy or automatic processes in
African social formations. Rey in particular asserts that the ‘lineage
mode of production’ may offer (initial) resistance to capitalist
domination in defence of its own autonomy and that capitalism
may face considerable obstacles in its attempt to take root in pre-
capitalist modes of production. He tries to demonstrate the existence
of a variety of mechanisms for integrating pre-capitalist modes of
production into the capitalist system, mechanisms that may occur
in different forms and combinations and account for the huge
variations in the processes of articulation in Africa: (initial) state
violence, class contradictions within pre-capitalist mode(s) of
production, the establishment of alliances between the dominant
classes within the capitalist and pre-capitalist sectors, and the
(gradual) operation of market forces (cf. Geschiere 1978, 1985).
Of particular importance to the ‘freeing of labour’ from the non-
capitalist sector to the capitalist sector is, according to Rey, the
existence of specific relations of exploitation between the elders
and young men and women within the ‘lineage mode of production’.
The dominant position of the elders and their control over the labour
power of the young is usually based on their control of processes
of  reproduction and bridal goods. Rey claims that the monetarisation
of bride wealth in lineage societies after capitalist penetration had
effects similar to those of  the transformation of  feudal land rent in
Europe: both developments helped solve the capitalist labour
problem, as they forced producers to leave their communities and
work as wage labourers on the capitalist market.
Contrary to the modernisation and dependency schools, the
articulation of modes of production school has been able to
demonstrate the problems that accompany the subordination of
autonomous pre-capitalist societies to the imperatives of capital
accumulation and to provide a more detailed picture of the varied
impact of capitalist plantation production on the surrounding
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domestic communities. By moving from the level of  exchange to
that of production, it has been able to explain the continuing
existence of pre-capitalist modes of production which, rather than
being destroyed, are reshaped and subordinated to capitalist modes
of production. By exploring pre-capitalist mode(s) of production,
it has been able to show that beneath the apparently socially
integrative façade of kinship there are relations of exploitation and
dominance that serve in the aftermath of  capitalist penetration as
major mechanisms of regular labour supplies to dominant capitalist
sectors, like plantations. Such regular supplies of  labour have always
been an essential prerequisite for capital accumulation. Although
they appear to disagree with a number of the tenets of the
articulation of modes of production school, studies of Anglophone
Cameroon’s plantation labour by Ardener et al. (1960) and Konings
(1993a, 1995a, 1996c, 1998a) still reflect some of  its insights.
These three schools of thought provide a useful starting point
for explaining the continuing interest of some post-colonial states
in plantation production. The agro-industrial sector in Cameroon
has become one of  the main pillars of  the post-colonial state’s
agricultural policies. Courade (1984) and Konings (1993a) have
convincingly demonstrated that the Cameroonian post-colonial state
has continued to allocate a substantial proportion of its agricultural
budget to the expansion of the agro-industrial sector, in particular
to the creation and expansion of agro-industrial parastatals, which
accounted for nearly 60% of its agricultural budget during the
country’s third and fourth five-year plans (1971-1981).
Modernisation theorists see the Cameroonian post-colonial state’s
support of agro-industrial expansion as a clear expression of the
political elite’s selfless and detached commitment to the
modernisation of  agricultural production. The latter’s promotion
of plantation production is more likely to contribute to increased
output and capital accumulation than ‘archaic’ peasant production.
The dependency theorists, on the contrary, argue that the
Cameroonian post-colonial state’s encouragement of  agro-industrial
expansion reflects the political elite’s class interests. They allege
that the ruling class is collaborating closely with foreign capital in
stimulating agro-industrial expansion as it has its own stake in a
project that will inevitably lead to deepening dependency and
underdevelopment.
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The theory of the articulation of modes of production is also
potentially able to help explain the Cameroonian post-colonial state’s
interest in agro-industrial expansion. This school has often assumed
that state intervention was only required in the initial process of
the articulation of modes of production (cf. Rey 1971, 1973;
Meillassoux 1972, 1975). Initial state intervention would help to
establish the supremacy of the capitalist mode of production and
the ultimate subordination of pre-capitalist modes to the imperatives
of colonial capital accumulation: the supply of land, labour and
agricultural commodities to the capitalist sectors, especially the
plantation sector. It seems to have overlooked the possibility that
the post-colonial state’s interest in expanded production and capital
accumulation might lead to renewed state intervention so as to
incorporate the relatively autonomous domestic communities further
into the capitalist mode of production (cf. Hyden 1980; Konings
1986a).
From the point of view of the political elite (and their interests),
an extension of  the modern agro-industrial sector into the rural
areas is of utmost importance to national development: agro-
industrial expansion seems to be not only a more reliable trajectory
for maximising capital accumulation in the short term than peasant
agriculture but also a major tool in integrating the relatively
autonomous domestic communities further into the capitalist system.
Agro-industry is capable of  playing a significant intermediary role
in these efforts at incorporation. Of late, it has become increasingly
evident that agro-industrial expansion in Cameroon is oriented
towards two ways of proletarianising the domestic communities’
labour power (Konings 1986b):
• the transformation of  domestic communities into suppliers
of  a regular and adequate wage-labour force to the plantations.
This has become the most common form of  proletarianisation
in Cameroon.
• the introduction of  contract farming schemes into villages
close to agro-industrial plantations. This is a new way of
subsuming domestic communities’ labour power to the agro-
industrial imperatives of increased output and capital
accumulation. These schemes entrust agro-industrial
enterprises with the responsibility of modernising and
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supervising participants’ production as well as processing and
marketing their output. They usually aim at a virtually total
destruction of  the local peasantry’s autonomy and its
subordination to management authority over the labour
process: its substantial loss of control over the means of
production and the processes of production and exchange
tends to result in a peculiar form of  proletarianisation (cf.
Amin & Vergopoulos 1974; Banaji 1977; Bernstein 1979;
Boesen 1979). These and similar schemes are becoming
increasingly popular in developing countries as they appear
to have the potential to raise the local peasantry’s productivity
and improve its standard of living (cf. Glover 1984; Barker
1984; Goldsmith 1985; Konings 1986a). The growing
importance that governments in developing countries are
attaching to this peculiar form of  proletarianisation constitutes
a serious challenge to unilinear models of agrarian transition
in developing countries that predict that increased capitalist
penetration into the rural areas will result in a progressive
transformation of  the local peasantry into a wage-labour force
(cf. Goodman & Redclift 1981).
These three major theories help to explain the role of plantation
production in processes of capital accumulation, its relationship
with pre-capitalist societies and the continuing interest of some
post-colonial states, like Cameroon, in its expansion. However, they
also have shortcomings, and I have criticised them elsewhere in
some detail on both empirical and theoretical terms (Konings 1993a).
One of their main limitations is their failure to explore what Marx
strikingly called the ‘hidden abode of [capitalist] production’. That
is why they have never been able to underscore the economic and
political significance of  the continuous struggles between labour
and management regarding control over the labour process. It is
evident that the subordination of labour to management authority
in the labour process is one of the most essential preconditions for
capital accumulation in plantation production.
Studies of the labour process in western capitalist countries
provide substantial evidence that the constantly renewed managerial
strategies of labour control have failed to eliminate labour autonomy
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completely within the labour process and fully subordinate labour
to the commands of  capital (cf. Braverman 1974; Friedman 1977;
Edwards 1979; Burawoy 1979, 1985; Thompson 1983). In the case
of Africa, the chances of controlling labour would seem to be even
more reduced in view of the incomplete character of capitalist
penetration, workers’ close links with non-capitalist social
organisation and value systems, and the remaining (though probably
declining) possibilities of workers’ withdrawal from the capitalist
mode of production to non-capitalist modes of production (cf.
Hyden 1980; Cooper 1981). African labour is, therefore, inclined
to defy management’s authority within the labour process and to
assert the autonomy of  the worker.
In previous studies on plantation labour in Anglophone Cameroon
(Konings 1993a, 1995a, 1998a), I have shown that the establishment
of control over the labour process was a persistent source of worry
to the Cameroonian state and plantation management. Anglophone
plantation workers have always tried to preserve a certain degree
of autonomy within the labour process and studies covering the
early period of regional agro-industrial enterprises show that the
CDC and Pamol management experienced difficulties controlling
their workers, who often preserved close links with pre-capitalist
modes of  production. Workers tended to accept only short spells
of work and to return to their home communities once they had
achieved their ‘targets’ (cf. Ardener et al. 1960; Wells & Warmington
1962). Temporary work and target work were, in fact, significant
manifestations of labour autonomy since they enabled workers to
earn money according to the rhythms they themselves chose (cf.
Cooper 1986). It is therefore not surprising that the CDC and Pamol
management soon became keen to stabilise labour as stability helps
to reduce labour autonomy and also raises productivity. CDC and
Pamol workers have always felt exploited in the labour process and,
like other African plantation workers, have continued to receive
relatively low remuneration for their hard labour (cf. Ardener et al.
1960; Konings 1993a, 1995a, 1998a; Leitner 1976; Clarke 1977;
Vail & White 1980; Bolton 1985; Sajhau 1986; Collier & Lal 1986).
And their feelings of exploitation have been reinforced as a result
of being confronted with the unequal distribution of income at the
workplace on a daily basis.
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From the outset, the CDC and Pamol management and the state
devised a number of strategies to subordinate labour to management
authority. These included the establishment of  a hierarchical and
military style of organisation of production (Konings 1993a, 1998a;
Courade 1978), disciplinary measures, incentive schemes and social
welfare services, the propagation of  ideologies such as paternalism
and ‘national interest’, attempts to form alliances with certain groups
of workers and especially the educated and better paid workers,
the prohibition of  labour engagement in (disruptive) political
activities and, as a last resort, the use of the forces of law and
order. It is striking that these strategies of  labour control have
intensified since independence. There was growing intervention by
the post-colonial state in the labour process, which is reflected in
the political elite’s efforts to regulate and centralise almost every
aspect of industrial relations, including strikes and union activities
(cf. Kendrick 1979). This intervention stems not only from the
political elite’s interest in achieving harmonious relations between
employers and workers and in the maximisation of capital
accumulation but is also, as Bayart (1979) rightly observed, a clear
expression of the total control that the Cameroonian post-colonial
state is trying to establish over civil society as part of its hegemonic
project. And secondly, the CDC’s management could only acquire
substantial loans for its post-colonial expansion programme from
international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, if  labour
control and labour productivity were enhanced.
Remarkably, CDC and Pamol workers have continued to oppose
public and managerial efforts at control and have engaged in several,
often hidden, forms of  resistance against control and exploitation
in the labour process (cf. Cohen 1980). Crisp (1984: 5-7) identified
three broad types of labour resistance that are relevant to labour
action in the CDC and Pamol. On the basis of three main criteria,
namely visibility, inclusiveness or scale of  resistance, and duration,
he distinguishes between:
1. Informal modes of  resistance. Informal action is usually pursued
on an individual or small-scale basis, intermittently and in a
covert manner. ‘It is not normally part of  a deliberate strategy
to remedy the source of grievance; indeed it may well derive
from a generalised sense of dissatisfaction rather than
consciousness of a specific grievance, and so may not be
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conceived as industrial conflict at all.’ Since the publication
of  van Onselen’s 1976 book on labour protest in the mining
compounds of Rhodesia, there has been growing attention in
African labour studies to the wide variety of  informal modes
of  labour resistance within and outside the labour process.
These range from desertion, absenteeism, malingering,
sabotage, theft, the smoking of hemp and the excessive use
of alcohol to more positive examples such as the creation of
individual, anti-employer work cultures and the adoption of
religious beliefs as forms of  resistance to the demands of  the
capitalist mode (cf. Gordon 1977; Perrings 1979; Cohen 1980;
Crisp 1984; Lubeck 1986; Cooper 1986; Agier et al. 1987).
2. Collective modes of resistance. Collective action, such as strikes,
riots, demonstrations and go-slows, is more inclusive, overt
and of  specific duration. It ‘normally involves a deliberate
attempt to change the situation which gives rise to conflict; it
is purposeful activity designed to achieve some concrete
improvement’. Collective actions such as strikes often give
workers a feeling of power and control over their own lives
(Shadeed 1979) and the history (and often the myths) of past
militant collective action may shape the consciousness and
actions of  current workers.
3. Institutional modes of labour resistance. Institutional action such
as union action is collective, normally overt and requires
continuous commitment. Trade unions are supposed to be
organisations that defend and protect their members’ interests
against the employers and the state. However, one should
not overlook the contradictory tendencies within the unions
(cf. Hyman 1971; Sandbrook 1982; Southall 1988). On the
one hand, they articulate their members’ common grievances
and coordinate their actions, while on the other, they can
control their members’ activities and assist in their integration
into the capitalist mode of production. State and management
have, in fact, always tried to emasculate the threat inherent
in trade unionism, especially by co-opting union leaders into
the control structures over labour. The state’s efforts to control
organised labour in Africa go back to the latter’s origins during
the colonial period. Almost all post-colonial regimes tried to
extend and refine the existing panoply of labour controls and
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sanctions within a few years of independence and to
incorporate trade unions into the state structure (cf. Sandbrook
1982; Freund 1984, 1988).
Like the Ghanaian miners (Crisp 1984), CDC and Pamol workers
have constantly taken the initiative against management and the
state, shifting between informal, collective and institutional modes
of resistance according to the perceived economic and political
environment, forcing management and the state to respond with
new strategies of control.
Although these various forms of  resistance are often motivated
by industrial and economic objectives, especially an improvement
in workers’ conditions of  service, they inevitably become political
struggles in the process. They tend to challenge the unequal
distribution of power and income within the labour process as well
as the determined efforts of  the political elite to accumulate capital
in the agro-industrial sector. In this respect, Burawoy’s attempt
(1985) to link ‘politics in production’ with ‘global politics’ is relevant
here. Of course, collective and institutional modes of labour
resistance are more serious threats to post-colonial regimes than
informal modes of  labour resistance but Bayart (1979, 1981) points
out that even the most elusive forms of  popular action tend to
acquire political meaning in Cameroon. ‘Overpoliticisation’ is a
characteristic feature of Cameroonian society and is obviously a
direct consequence of  the Cameroonian post-colonial state’s pursuit
of  hegemony in all spheres of  civil society.
The analysis in this book extends from labour and trade unions
to other civil-society groups and organisations. Some have had a
long-standing role in agro-industrial development while others
started or intensified their activities during the crisis and reforms in
Anglophone Cameroon’s agro-industrial sector.
Civil society, the agro-industrial crisis and reforms
The serious economic and financial crisis in the Anglophone
Cameroonian plantation economy since the early 1980s has
threatened not only capital accumulation by agro-industrial
enterprises but also the interests of  regional civil-society groups.
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The latter started organising and mobilising their members during
the crisis and the subsequent neoliberal reforms. Political
liberalisation in the early 1990s enhanced the capacity of these
groups to organise. Legislative changes permitted more freedom of
expression and association, which led to the emergence of new
organisations and a larger measure of autonomy for already-existing
state-controlled organisations.
Civil society and empowerment have become buzz words in
neoliberal development discourse. Typically, neoliberals perceive
civil-society groups as a vital intermediary channel between the
citizens and the state for the successful implementation of economic
and political reforms. I have recently criticised such neoliberal views
in some detail (Konings 2009b) and so will mention here only two
major shortcomings that are relevant to the discussion in this book.
First, as in some previous studies (cf. Abrahamsen 2000; Konings
2004b), this book offers evidence that the prescribed empowerment
of civil society could constitute an important means not only of
realising neoliberal reforms but also of  challenging neoliberal
orthodoxies. Second, neoliberals tend to base their argumentation
on western notions of civil society and have been inclined to define
civil society in terms that are too narrow for the African context,
and to demand too much of it. Although there may be differences
of  opinion on the exact definition of  civil society, they usually agree
that the core of civil society consists of modern, largely urban
middle-class professional associations, organisations of workers,
women, students and churches and non-governmental organisations
with external links, such as groups advocating human rights and
civil liberties. Strikingly, they often exclude ethno-regional groups
and associations from their definitions of  civil society, mainly
because they are thought not to function according to neoliberal
norms and to present an obstacle to democracy.
In sharp contrast to such neoliberal definitions, I have argued
that ethno-regional associations may be of even greater significance
to the ordinary people in Africa than conventional civil-society
organisations that are based on horizontal bonds and solidarities.
This is due not only to the largely underdeveloped nature of most
African economies, which have delayed the crystallisation of class
differentiation and professional groups, but to an even larger extent
to the power of  ethno-regional identity in Africa too.
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Both ethno-regional and conventional civil-society groups have
played a prominent role during the crisis and reforms in the
Anglophone Cameroonian agro-industrial enterprises. I will now
briefly discuss the most important ones.
Ethno-regional elite associations
The Pamol estates and most of those of the CDC are in the present
South West Province. The history of  these estates is closely
connected to the complicated political developments in this region
since European occupation (cf. Mbuagbaw et al. 1987). What is
even more significant for this study, however, is that the crisis and
reforms on these estates took place in an era of  both growing
regionalism and divide between the South West and North West
elites in Anglophone Cameroon (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003).
The region where the Pamol and CDC estates are located
belonged to the German Kamerun Protectorate (1884-1916). After
the First World War, this erstwhile German Kamerun Protectorate
was divided between the French and the British, and the region
first became a British Mandate and subsequently a British Trust
Territory until it gained independence in 1961. Being part of  what
was variously called the ‘Cameroons Province’ or ‘Southern
Cameroons’ during the British era, it was then integrated into the
administrative system of Nigeria. The 1954 Nigerian Constitution,
which outlined the framework for a Federal Nigeria, gave it a quasi-
regional status and a limited degree of self-government within the
Federation of  Nigeria (Chiabi 1982). It obtained full regional status
in 1958, which placed it on a par with the other regions in the
federation. It is beyond doubt that the administration of the
Southern Cameroons as an appendage of Nigeria (which led to the
blatant neglect of  the region’s development) and the dominant
position of Nigerian (mainly Igbo and Efik-Ibibio) migrants in the
Southern Cameroons economy were key factors in the decision of
the majority of the Southern Cameroons population to vote for
reunification with Francophone Cameroon rather than for integration
into Nigeria in the 1961 United Nations plebiscite (Chem-Langhëë
1976, 1995; Konings 2005). At the same time, it is clear that the
British-Nigerian colonial experience has had a lasting role in the
construction of  an Anglophone identity among the Southern
Cameroons elite.
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Reunification on 1 October 1961 signalled the start of a unique
experiment in Africa whereby the political elites of two regions
with different colonial legacies – one French, the other British –
agreed to form a federal state (Ardener 1967; Johnson 1970; Le
Vine 1971; Benjamin 1972; Forge 1981). With the creation of  the
Federal Republic of  Cameroon, the Southern Cameroons was
renamed the Federated State of  West Cameroon and French
Cameroon was renamed the Federated State of  East Cameroon.
Stark (1976) convincingly argued that from its inception,
federalism in Cameroon was ‘more shadow than reality’. During
negotiations on the federal constitution, notably at the Foumban
Conference from 17 to 22 July 1961, it was already evident that the
bargaining power of the Francophone delegation was far greater
than that of  the Anglophones. Compared to the Francophone region,
the size and population of the Anglophone region was small,
comprising only 9% of  the area and about 25% of  the federation’s
total population. Even more importantly, the former French Trust
Territory of  Cameroon was already an independent state, the
Republic of Cameroon, by the time negotiations were held. The
British Trust Territory of  Southern Cameroons was, under the terms
of the 1961 United Nations plebiscite, still to achieve independence
by joining the sovereign Republic of Cameroon.
Capitalising on his territory’s ‘senior’ status, Ahmadou Ahidjo,
the then prime minister of the Republic of Cameroon and leader of
the Francophone delegation, was able to dictate the terms of
federation. Although John Ngu Foncha, prime minister of  Southern
Cameroons and the leader of the Anglophone delegation, had
proposed a loose form of  federalism that he regarded as guaranteeing
the preservation of  the cultural heritage and identity of  the
Anglophone minority, Ahidjo eventually forced him to accept a
highly centralised form of  federalism. Ahidjo, who would become
the president of  the Federal Republic of  Cameroon, saw federalism
as no more than an unavoidable but transitory phase in the total
integration of the Anglophone minority into a strongly centralised
unitary state. He employed several tactics to achieve this objective
(DeLancey 1989: 52-65; Bayart 1979). One was to play off
Anglophone political factions against each other and eventually
integrate them into a single party, the Cameroon National Union
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(CNU). Another was to remove any Anglophone leaders who
remained committed to federalism from their positions of power,
replacing them with others who favoured a unitary state. Yet another
tactic was to create ‘clients’ among the Anglophone elite. By granting
top posts in federal institutions and in the single party to
representatives of significant ethnic and regional groups in the
Anglophone region, Ahidjo tried to control these groups. Finally,
he did not shrink from repressing opposition. Through these and
other tactics, he succeeded in abolishing the federation on 20 May
1972. His justification for this ‘glorious revolution’ was that
federalism fostered regionalism and impeded economic development
(Stark 1976).
A growing number of the Anglophone elite, however, were
inclined to attribute the emergence of regionalism and lack of
economic development not to federalism per se but to the hegemonic
tendencies of the Francophone-dominated state. They began
complaining about the loss of regional autonomy and the
subordinate position of the Anglophone minority in the unitary state.
Their numerous grievances were mainly political, economic and
cultural, particularly concerning their under-representation and
inferior role in national decision-making councils, their region’s
neglected infrastructure and the exploitation of  its rich economic
resources, especially oil, and attempts at ‘Frenchification’.1
To reduce any danger of  united Anglophone action against the
Francophone-dominated state, Ahidjo decided to divide the
Anglophone territory into two provinces, the South West and the
North West Provinces, after the glorious revolution in May 1972.
This decision, masterfully informed by the internal contradictions
within the Anglophone community between the coastal/forest
people (South West Province) and the Grassfields people (North
West Province), exacerbated divisions that would later be the
Achilles heel in most attempts at Anglophone identity and
organisation.
One of the major reasons for these internal conflicts was the
loss of  hegemony by the South West elite. The coastal population
had been exposed to early contact with Western trade, religion and
education, giving it a head start over the Grassfields population.
An intelligentsia had subsequently emerged in the coastal area,
20
Crisis and Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
notably among the Bakweri, and it quickly rose to the forefront in
the nationalist struggle and continued to dominate the Anglophone
political scene until the end of  the 1950s. The transfer of  power
from the South Westerner, Emmanuel Endeley, to the North
Westerner, John Ngu Foncha, was a political event that had
significant repercussions for South West-North West relations.
Following this transfer, the North West elite began to assert itself
and soon became ubiquitous in the higher levels of government
and in senior non-governmental positions. By keeping the top jobs
as well as the best lands in the South West for its members, it
provoked strong resentment among South Westerners to North West
domination (Kofele-Kale 1981). South West sentiments were
intensified because the entrepreneurial North Westerners gradually
succeeded in dominating most sectors of  the South West economy,
particularly trade, transport and housing (Rowlands 1993). Another
reason for the South West-North West divide was the 1961 United
Nations plebiscite in which the South West had shown considerable
sympathy for alignment with Nigeria, although the choice for
Cameroon prevailed, mainly on the strength of  North West votes.
A final source of tension was the massive migration from the North
West to southwestern plantations and the subsequent settlement
of  northwestern workers in the South West (Konings 1993a, 2001).
Political liberalisation in the early 1990s not only created political
space for organisational efforts in Anglophone Cameroon but also
fanned the rivalry between the South West and North West elites in
their struggle for power at the regional and national level. The South
West elite became alarmed when political liberalisation resulted in
the rapid growth of  both the North West-based opposition party,
the Social Democratic Front (SDF), and several Anglophone
associations operating under an umbrella organisation, the Southern
Cameroons National Council (SCNC), which contested Francophone
domination and demanded first a return to the federal state and later
outright secession (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003; Takougang & Krieger
1998). The growing popularity of these organisations immediately
raised suspicions of  renewed North West domination.
From a South West point of  view, such suspicions were not
without foundation. The SDF was clearly a party organised and
controlled by the North West elite and although the party enjoyed
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less popularity among the autochthonous population in the South
West Province than in the North West Province, it could nevertheless
count on massive support from northwestern workers and settlers
in the region. In addition, it soon became clear that the SDF’s
frequent, and often violent, confrontations with the regime, which
were turning the Anglophone region into a veritable hotbed of
rebellion, were having the paradoxical effect of advancing the
political careers of  northwestern politicians. The year 1992
witnessed first the appointment of  a North Westerner, Simon Achidi
Achu, as prime minister in an apparently desperate attempt by the
regime to contain the enormous popularity of  the SDF in the North
West, and later an impressive performance by the charismatic SDF
chairman, John Fru Ndi, in the presidential elections (Konings 2004a).
Understandably, southwestern memories of  northwestern
domination in the Federated State of  West Cameroon created
resistance among the South West elite to the Anglophone movements’
advocacy for a return to a two-state (Anglophone/Francophone)
federal arrangement. They were therefore inclined to champion a ten-
state federal system based on the existing ten provinces in Cameroon,
which would retain the separation between the South West and the
North West Provinces, thus safeguarding the former’s autonomy.
Furthermore, although South Westerners dominated the leadership
of the most important Anglophone associations, the vast majority
of  the members appeared to be SDF members. Little wonder then
that the South-West elite was inclined to perceive Anglophone
associations as auxiliary organisations of  the SDF.
Given their repeated failure to form a party of  the same standing
as the SDF, the South West elite started to create regional
associations to represent and defend South West interests. The most
prominent were the South West Elites Association (SWELA) and
the South West Chiefs’ Conference (SWECC). There is some overlap
between these organisations, with some of the important South
West chiefs also being members of  SWELA (Nyamnjoh & Rowlands
1998; Eyoh 1998; Konings 2001; Nkwi 2006).
SWELA was an attempt to unite all the existing elite associations
in the South West into one single organisation. Its leadership
continually claimed that it was a non-political pressure group whose
main objective was to promote the socio-economic development
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and cultural revival of  the South West Province. The South West
was to be restored to its former glory after having been marginalised
by the Francophone-dominated state and subjected to Grassfields
imperialism. Although SWELA supported most of the Anglophone
grievances about Francophone domination, it equally claimed that
the South West had been more disadvantaged than the North West
in the post-colonial state. Clearly, fear of  renewed North West
domination was one of the underlying motives for its foundation as
it came into existence after the launch of  the SDF and the latter’s
subsequent expansion into the South West Province. On several
occasions, SWELA leaders, especially those closely allied to the
ruling regime, issued public statements blaming the SDF for acts
of  violence and anti-government activities in the South West
(Nyamnjoh & Rowlands 1998; Nkwi 2006).
Given the intensification of  the power struggle between the
South West and North West elites during the political liberalisation
process, the Biya government felt it increasingly lucrative and
politically expedient to tempt the peaceful and conciliatory South
West elite away from Anglophone solidarity with strategic
appointments and the idea that their real enemy was the unpatriotic,
ungrateful and power-mongering North West elite. Government
divide-and-rule tactics culminated in the 1996 Constitution. While
the previous (1972) constitution had emphasised national
integration and equal rights for all citizens, including the right ‘to
settle in any place and to move about freely’, the new constitution
promised special state protection for autochthonous minorities
(Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 2000; Konings 2001). Not unexpectedly,
the new constitution boosted South West feelings of  identity and
fuelled existing tensions between South Westerners and North
Westerners. The South West elite immediately demanded state
protection for the autochthonous southwestern minority against the
dominant and exploitative Grassfielders. Appeals to the state for
protection were often accompanied by threats of ethnic cleansing
and the removal of Grassfields ‘strangers’ (Konings 2009b).
The crisis and reforms on the Pamol and CDC estates quickly
sparked regional sentiments. They brought to the fore existing
contradictions not only between the Francophone-dominated state
and the Anglophone community but also between the South West
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and North West elite. The Anglophones’ great fear was that their
regional agro-industrial enterprises would be sold to Francophone
or French business interests. Although the South West elite
entertained similar fears, they were equally opposed to a North West
takeover as this might result in renewed North West domination
over the South West.
Chiefs and their organisations
As elsewhere in Africa, chieftaincy in Anglophone Cameroon has
played a varied role in agro-industrial development. One of the
most significant has been mediation between capital and labour in
the realisation of two major prerequisites for capital accumulation
in agro-industrial enterprises, namely the procurement of a regular
and adequate supply of labour and the establishment of managerial
control over the labour process in order to raise labour productivity.
Realising these objectives may be particularly problematic in areas
where the capitalist mode of production has not yet deeply
penetrated and where the majority of the population has not been
completely severed from the means of production and have not
internalised the norms and values of  capitalism (Konings 1996c).
Regarding the establishment of capitalist control over labour
supplies, there is now abundant literature on the intermediary role
of chiefs in the supply of local male labour to capitalist enterprises,
particularly in the early colonial period. Despite some initial
resistance, the chiefs were soon forced to assist in meeting the
growing capitalist demand for male labour, and many eventually
capitalised on their intermediary role. Unfortunately, far less attention
has been paid to the chiefs’ concomitant widespread opposition to
female migration and proletarianisation. They opposed migration
by women on the grounds of their vital productive and reproductive
labour and their subordination to ‘patriarchal’ controls in many
African societies (Stichter & Parpart 1988).
Chiefs in Africa have frequently tried to safeguard male control
over women’s productive and reproductive labour in their local
communities, arguing that it is an essential part of African tradition.
Women who succeeded in escaping from patriarchal controls and
migrated to towns had to endure social ostracism as alleged
prostitutes for the rest of their lives (Obbo 1980). The chiefs
repeatedly appealed to the colonial authorities to use state power
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to help keep women under control and because they relied on the
chiefs to maintain order in the rural areas, the authorities were
inclined to side with them, taking legislative and administrative
measures to strengthen patriarchal dominance (Chauncey 1981).
From time to time, single women living in colonial towns were
rounded up by the police and forcibly returned to their villages
(Obbo 1980; Ruel 1960; Walker 1982).
Articulation theorists, like Meillassoux (1975) and Wolpe (1980),
have argued that the supply of exclusively male labour to capitalist
enterprises was functional to capital accumulation as women’s
continual productive and reproductive responsibilities in the non-
capitalist sector served to lower labour costs in the capitalist sector.
While these theories often assume the joint interest of chiefs and
employers in keeping women confined to the non-capitalist sector,
the actual situation may have been more complex, and it was
certainly more dynamic. Studies on the copper mines in Zambia
(Chauncey 1981; Parpart 1986) and the plantations in Anglophone
Cameroon (Konings 1993a) note that employers initially favoured
the employment of single men but gradually came to agree that
married men’s greater stability and productivity more than compensated
for the extra costs of housing and feeding their wives and children.
They therefore became increasingly committed to married labour.
In this book I argue that tea estates were among the rare capitalist
enterprises during colonial rule that gave preference to female labour
over male labour. Managerial attempts to recruit female pluckers
on the newly created Ndu Tea Estate in the Bamenda Grassfields
immediately gave rise to serious confrontations with the local chief,
who feared female employment on the estate would endanger
traditional patriarchal control and insisted on recruiting local male
labour exclusively.
Concerning the establishment of capitalist control over the labour
process, it would appear that attempts by management and the state
to co-opt chiefs, tribal elders and representatives into the hierarchy
and grant them authority over the labour process have been
insufficiently studied.
The first such attempt in the British African colonies was
apparently made in the early 1930s. It must, however, be situated
in the context of growing concern at the British Colonial Office
regarding massive labour migration, poor working and living
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conditions among labourers, and the first waves of strikes in Africa.
Various solutions to the ‘labour problem’ were put forward including
the institutionalisation of channels of communication between
workers, management and the colonial administration. On 17
September 1930, Sydney Webb (Lord Passfield) circulated a dispatch
to all colonial governors urging the legalisation of ‘sympathetically
supervised and guided’ trade unions and the creation of  labour
departments in the different colonies (Meebelo 1986: 191-92;
Freund 1981: 174). Most colonial officials and employers were,
however, openly opposed to the development of trade unions and
postponed their introduction. They argued that the necessary
conditions for their emergence were not in place: most workers were
illiterate and were still firmly encapsulated in their tribal
organisations and cultures. It was therefore believed that traditional,
ethnically based channels of communication would be more suitable
in the African context than modern, class-based channels of
communication such as trade unions.
Epstein (1958) and Crisp (1984), among others, described the
tribal elders or heads who played a key role in the Zambian and
Ghanaian mines as brokers between workers, management and
(local) government.  However unlike Epstein and Crisp, who viewed
the role of these tribal elders as manifestations of control strategies
by corporate capital and the colonial administration, Lentz &
Erlmann (1989) stressed the ambiguous position of brokers in the
relationship between workers and management. On the one hand,
tribal heads tended to be part of the mine management and as such
functioned as controllers of labour but on the other hand, they often
defended the interests of members of their own ethnic group and
provided them with a wide range of  services: accommodation and
job opportunities for new migrants; the settlement of internal
disputes; support in emergencies such as sickness, accident and
death; and mediation in conflicts with management, local authorities
and other ethnic groups.
The tribal elders, representatives or heads in the Zambian and
Ghanaian mines were more or less managerial creations. Their
authority had no basis in tradition and their mediating role between
labour and capital rested ultimately on managerial recognition.
Interestingly, both Epstein and Lentz & Erlmann note that most of
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them tried to establish or claimed already to have close relationships
with the royal families in the rural areas. In fact, they owed their
prestige to the fact that they were often close kinsmen of the chiefs,
and often described themselves as chiefs. To legitimise their authority
among the people, they tried to traditionalise their appointment by
adopting chiefly ceremonies, rituals and attributes. All this indicates
the persistence of traditional political values among ethnic
communities in industrial milieus.
The strategy by management and state to involve ‘real’ chiefs in
labour control, especially in critical situations such as strike actions,
is frequently referred to in the literature. They were usually
paramount or other prominent chiefs who wielded considerable
power over the workers, but they tended to side with management
and the state, and helped put down strikes (cf. Crisp 1984).
What these authors have in common is that they assume that
the mediating role of chieftaincy between labour and capital has
either come to an end or been seriously eroded in Africa. In my
study of tea estates in Anglophone Cameroon (Konings 1995a), I
found that the chief of Ndu in the Bamenda Grassfields continued
to play an important intermediary role between capital and labour
on the Ndu Tea Estate. This seems to be particularly because
capitalism had not yet penetrated this area deeply and chieftaincy
still occupied a powerful, even sacred, position in society (cf. Fisyi
1995; Warnier 2009). In these circumstances, estate management
relied on the local chief for both the supply of land and labour, and
control of workers at the workplace.
This explanation is supported by my previous research on the
role of chieftaincy in capitalist development in Ghana and
Cameroon. In northern Ghana, where circumstances are similar to
those in the Bamenda Grassfields, I found that local chiefs also
played a key intermediary role in the supply and control of  labour
on newly created public irrigation projects and capitalist rice farms
(Konings 1986a). In coastal areas of Anglophone Cameroon, by
contrast, where the plantation economy introduced during German
colonial rule (1884-1916) extensively undermined local institutions
and value systems and where chieftaincy was generally weak
(Ardener 1962; Geschiere 1993), I found that local chiefs played a
less significant intermediary role in the supply and control of  labour
than they did in the Bamenda Grassfields.
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Like the tribal heads in the Ghanaian mines (Lentz & Erlmann
1989), chieftaincy in Ndu was never solely instrumental in labour
control and functional to the demands of capital (Konings 1995a).
While the chief was generally a reliable partner in development and
often sided with the management, he also distinguished himself as
the custodian of tradition and the champion of the interests of his
(Ndu) subjects. As a consequence, he firmly resisted the management
preference for female labour and was inclined to endorse his subjects’
persistent loyalty to certain traditional norms and values that
conflicted with the capitalist work ethic. He was also inclined to
put pressure on management to advance the careers of Ndu men
on the estate, a practice that led to frequent conflict between Ndu
and other workers. This defence of  traditional values and local
interests in development projects in their local communities was
also manifest in northern Ghana (Konings 1986a).
There is, nevertheless, sufficient evidence to support the view
of  Lentz & Erlmann that the intermediary role of  the chieftaincy
weakened over the course of time (Konings 1995a). First, the
developing trade unionism on the Ndu Tea Estate attempted to
transcend ethnic allegiances and defend the class interests of all
workers against the state and management. The Ndu chief ’s keen
opposition to the union, undoubtedly arising from the desire to
preserve the traditional authority and values, eventually proved futile
as he was accused of being a management stooge and the union
leaders were hailed as the true representatives of  workers’ interests.
Second, new power-holders emerged who could serve as ethnic
brokers on the Ndu Tea Estate, as well as several ethnic associations
that promoted ethnic solidarity and assistance. As a result, the chief ’s
intermediary role has become marginalised and at present his
assistance in labour control on the estate is needed by management,
state and the union alike in critical situations, such as when workers
engage in collective modes of resistance against control and
exploitation. With the failure of the union and the Labour
Department – as the modern brokers between capital and labour –
to settle labour disputes, a final appeal is being made to the
traditional broker to use his religious and moral authority over the
workers to help reassert managerial control over the labour process.
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Finally, my research appears to confirm the remarkable resilience
of the chieftaincy and its capacity to adapt to changing conditions
(van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1987). The present chief of Ndu is
an excellent example of the tendency in the Bamenda Grassfields
and elsewhere in Africa to enthrone well-educated youth capable
of  modernising traditional value systems. Soon after his installation
in 1982, the current chief  allowed women to work on a permanent
basis on the estate, which can be seen as a significant contribution
to women’s emancipation in the Bamenda Grassfields. He has also
established a cordial relationship with the union leadership and holds
regular consultations. In fact, he has been able to integrate this
potentially rival source of power into both the modern and traditional
structures of  authority in the local community. Some union leaders
are members of the elite Development Committee and others have
been co-opted as non-hereditary title-holders into the local
community’s traditional hierarchy of  authority.
Chiefs also played an important role in a third prerequisite for
agro-industrial development, namely the provision of land. Some
chiefs, like the chief of Ndu, allocated vast amounts of land to
agro-industrial enterprises for the construction of  plantation estates
(Konings 1995a). Others in Anglophone Cameroon either provided
land for the CDC and Pamol smallholders or participated
themselves, as land owners, in the CDC and Pamol smallholder
schemes (Konings 1993a, 1998a).
Other chiefs in Anglophone Cameroon, in particular the Bakweri
chiefs, refused to cooperate with the state and agro-industrial
enterprises and firmly opposed the large-scale expropriation of  their
ancestral lands for plantation production during the German colonial
period. Before and following the creation of the CDC on these lands
in 1946/47, they were engaged in a relentless struggle to regain
their lands and set up the Bakweri Land Committee (BLC) with the
Bakweri modern elite (Molua 1985; Konings 2003a).
I will show in this book that the Bakweri chiefs and the modern
Bakweri elite were engaged in various modes of resistance against
the announced privatisation of the CDC on 15 July 1994. They
claimed ownership of CDC lands, felt betrayed at not having been
previously consulted about the CDC’s privatisation and warned the
government that the corporation could not be sold to non-natives
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without Bakweri consent and compensation. They often received
solid support from other chiefs and the modern elite in the South
West Province, notably the South West Chiefs’ Conference
(SWECC), which was formally constituted in 1990 (Eyoh 1998),
and SWELA. However, it would appear that other Anglophone
chiefs and organisations also supported their claims.
Workers and trade unions
Agro-industrial enterprises in Anglophone Cameroon have always
relied on wage labour for plantation production. Regional plantation
agriculture was labour intensive and German planters needed about
18,000 workers by 1914. Pamol’s labour force rose gradually from
1,200 to 3,500 and the CDC, the second largest employer in the
country (being surpassed only by the government), initially employed
between 20,000 and 25,000 labourers. Today, it employs
approximately 14,000 workers (Konings 1993a, 1998a). Establishing
a regular supply of labour was a major problem for plantation
production for a long time. German planters experienced almost
insurmountable problems procuring sufficient labour from local
communities that were not only sparsely populated but also hated
working for the expropriators of their land. This compelled the
planters to import a considerable number of labourers from outside
Cameroon, in particular from other West African countries (Rudin
1938; Rüger 1960). This imported labour, however, could not solve
the acute labour shortage and also turned out to be expensive, which
was a major reason why the scheme was quickly abandoned. The
gradual opening up and pacification of the more densely populated
areas of  the interior revealed their enormous potential for solving
the labour problem. Most of the people in the interior, however,
were not ready to accept voluntary labour contracts. So various
forms of  coercion were employed during the entire German period
to ‘free’ labour from the interior for the plantations. Initially large
numbers of men from rebellious areas were simply seized and sent
to the plantations for up to six years as a kind of penal labour force,
sometimes receiving no pay at all. Later on, a labour-recruitment
system was developed based on the continuous coercive pressure
of  private recruiters, local officials and suitably bribed African chiefs
(Halldén 1968; Chilver 1971; Clarence-Smith 1989). Towards the
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end of  German colonial rule, head taxes and hut taxes were imposed,
which encouraged Africans to work on the plantations. Those unable
to pay taxes in cash would be turned over to private employers who
paid the tax and the fee of 10 Marks per head.
The most important inland recruitment areas were the Yaoundé
region and the Grassfields area, both in the present Francophone
West Province that was mainly occupied by the Bamileke, and the
Anglophone North West Province that was occupied by various
ethnic groups closely related to the Bamileke. During the British
Mandate period there was a gradual transition from forced to
voluntary labour migration that was facilitated by people’s growing
need for cash, improved conditions of  service, the provision of
land for food cultivation, the so-called ‘chop farms’, and active
recruitment through ethnic, community and family networks. There
were notable differences at first between the CDC and Pamol
concerning labour-recruitment areas (Konings 1993a, 1998a).
When the CDC was established in 1946/47, it faced a serious
problem with the supply of labour from Francophone Cameroon.
Labour mobility from this area used to be encouraged by forms of
forced labour imposed by the French (Kaptue 1986). By 1926 52%
of the plantation labour force came from the French Mandate area
(Table 1.1). This figure declined to only 1% in the 1980s. The
determined efforts by the French Mandate Authority to prevent
workers from leaving the area greatly contributed to this decline.
Increased remunerative employment opportunities in Francophone
Cameroon and the rising cost of living in Anglophone Cameroon in
the aftermath of  independence and reunification in 1961 led to a
further reduction in labour migration from Francophone to
Anglophone Cameroon (Ndongko 1975). Apart from a temporary
influx of labour from neighbouring eastern Nigeria (Ardener et al.
1960) and a steady supply of  labour from South West Province,
this decline was largely compensated for by an increasing number
of  labour migrants from North West Province. It had a higher
population density, developed cash-crop production much later and
lacked job opportunities outside the traditional sector.
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Table 1.1 Regional composition of  the CDC and Pamol labour forces (%)
Source: Konings (1993a and 1998a)
Pamol faced greater problems than the CDC in recruiting
sufficient labour. Its main estates are in one of  the most marginalised
areas of Cameroon where the cost of living is extremely high because
of  regular food shortages. Cameroonian workers were thus more
inclined to seek employment on CDC estates, and neighbouring
eastern Nigeria became the main supplier of labour to the Pamol
estates. In 1961, eastern Nigerians accounted for 80% of  the total
Pamol labour force (Table 1.1) but after reunification, the dominant
position of Nigerian workers rapidly declined. However,
managerial failure to recruit sufficient labour in Anglophone
Cameroon formed an insurmountable obstacle to the complete
realisation of  the government’s Cameroonisation policy and by
1970 Nigerian workers still accounted for 25% of  Pamol’s total
labour force. From the 1970s onwards, a stabilisation in labour
recruitment from Nigeria was seen at around 12%. Under constant
pressure to ‘Cameroonise’, management staged a renewed
1926 1941 1950 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
CDC
North West Province 14.0 37.0 32.5 43.5 54.5 73.5 71.0
South West Province 33.0 27.5 33.0 25.0 38.0 24.5 27.0
Francophone Cameroon 52.0 25.0 13.0   4.5   5.0   1.0   1.0
Eastern Nigeria   1.0 10.5 21.5 27.0   2.5   1.0   1.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pamol
North West Province n.a n.a. n.a.   5.0 27.0 41.8 54.0
South West Province n.a. n.a. n.a. 13.0 47.0 44.4 33.5
Francophone Cameroon n.a. n.a. n.a.   1.7   1.7   1.3   1.0
Eastern Nigeria n.a. n.a. n.a. 80.3 24.3 12.5 11.5
Total n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 100 100 100
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recruiting drive in Anglophone Cameroon, first in the nearby Ndian
and Manyu Divisions of  South West Province and later in North
West Province. As at the CDC, northwestern workers today form
the majority on the Pamol estates (54 %).
It is striking that there have been few serious clashes between
autochthonous and ‘stranger’ ethnic groups on the southwestern
estates. Tensions between autochthons and allochthons are most
likely to arise when stranger ethno-regional groups appear to occupy
a dominant position.
The dominant position of eastern Nigerian workers at the CDC
and particularly on the Pamol estates in the nationalist climate after
the Second World War gave rise to serious friction between
autochthonous Anglophone Cameroonian workers and eastern
Nigerian strangers. Between 1947 and 1960, Anglophone
Cameroonian workers on both companies’ estates undertook a series
of  collective and informal actions aimed at removing Igbo and Ibibio
supervisory and managerial staff  (Konings 1993a: 69, 1998a: 80),
repeatedly calling on management and the government to promote
a rapid Cameroonisation of the labour force and management. After
reunification, past animosities between Anglophone Cameroonian
and Nigerian workers largely subsided, probably because the
Nigerians became a relatively small, stranger minority group on the
estates and were no longer perceived as a threat by Anglophone
Cameroonians. Nigerian workers claimed that their best strategy
was to assume a low profile so as not to generate envy and tensions
(cf. Kleis 1975). Although conflicts did not totally disappear, the
social distance between Nigerian and Cameroonian workers
diminished (DeLancey 1973).
After this conflict between Anglophone Cameroonian and
Nigerian workers, a new potential source of friction could have
been expected in relations between the ‘autochthonous’
southwestern minority and the northwestern majority on the estates.
Remarkably, extensive clashes between these two groups have not
yet occurred. On the contrary, all researchers on estate labour agree
that southwestern and northwestern workers usually manage to live
and work peacefully together (Ardener et al. 1960; DeLancey 1973;
Kofele-Kale 1981; Konings 1993a, 1998a). Both groups tend to
organise not only on an ethnic but also on an inter-ethnic basis, as
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can be seen in the membership of churches and trade unions, and
have engaged from time to time in common struggles against
managerial control and exploitation in the workplace. One reason
for this unexpected phenomenon is the consistent policy of the
management, as well as church and union leaders, in mobilising
and organising workers along multiethnic lines. This policy seems
to have created a certain degree of understanding and tolerance
among the workers for the other’s socio-cultural background, thus
fostering bonds of companionship and friendship across ethno-
regional boundaries. Another reason is the widespread use of  Pidgin
English that has helped minimise communication problems between
the various ethnic groups. A third reason is the marked preference
of workers themselves for ethnically mixed living and working
arrangements, which partly stems from their belief that witchcraft
is most likely to occur among close relatives and tribesmen (Ardener
et al. 1960; Konings 1993a). The most important reason, however,
appears to be the shared living and working conditions on the estates,
which are classic examples of  occupational communities.2
 Studies of such communities of miners, dockers and
railwaymen in Africa confirm the solidarity and militancy of  these
workers (cf. Jeffries 1978; Sandbrook 1982; Parpart 1983;
Waterman 1983; Crisp 1984).
Solidarity among plantation workers has, of course, never been
total. There have always been cleavages within the CDC and Pamol
labour forces. In addition to vertical divisions, such as those between
local and migrant workers, manual and clerical workers, and
plantation and factory workers, there have also been the horizontal
cleavages of  age, skill, experience and status. So although workers
may have a common interest in resisting exploitation and
subordination, the precise objectives of the different workers and
their modes of resistance may well differ, or even collide.
Paige (1975) claimed that plantation workers tended to fight
for incremental changes within the status quo and improvements
in their living and working conditions. My previous studies of
Anglophone Cameroonian plantation workers substantiate his
claim to a large extent. CDC and Pamol workers have always
remained highly sceptical of engaging in any overtly political
action and their struggles have been primarily oriented at
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protecting their occupational interests within the status quo.
What is peculiar to Anglophone Cameroonian plantation
workers, however, is that they have constantly displayed a high
degree of militancy in the defence of their occupational interests,
as is shown by their numerous informal, collective and trade
union actions (Konings 1993a, 1998a). Hardly any research has
been carried out so far on the role of plantation workers during
the agro-industrial crisis and reforms in Africa in general, and in
Cameroon in particular. In this book I examine whether
Anglophone Cameroonian plantation workers continued to resort
to militantly oppositional actions during this period out of protest
at managerial  intensif ication of their exploitation and
subordination in the labour process.
Plantation workers in Anglophone Cameroon have a long history
of  trade unionism. The CDC Workers’ Union (CDCWU), for
example, was founded in 1947 and soon became one of the largest
and best organised trade unions in West Africa (Warmington 1960).
It more or less dominated the industrial-relations scene in Anglophone
Cameroon between 1947 and 1972, when it was dissolved during a
state-initiated reorganisation of trade unions (Konings 1993a).
Paige (1975) is inclined to assume an identity of interests,
ideological perceptions and actions between plantation unions and
workers. He appeared to accept that unions usually shape, broaden
and intensify their members’ consciousness and actions, and
represent and defend their interests. This is evident when he
maintains that labour movements on the plantations tended to be
‘reform labour movements’: they were inclined to refrain from
mobilising their members for (radical) political action but instead
championed the defence of their common occupational interests
against their employers.
However there are indications that Paige (1975: 22) was not
entirely unaware of the contradictory consequences of unions for
workers’ consciousness and actions. He sometimes seems to
acknowledge that unions could also function as agencies of control
over their members, offer assistance to the state and management
efforts to integrate them into the capitalist mode of production,
and stifle their initiatives and modes of resistance.
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My own review of trade unionism in Anglophone Cameroonian
agro-industrial enterprises tends to support Paige’s claim that labour
movements on the plantations are ‘reform labour movements’
(Konings 1993a, 1998a). However, it presents a more complex
picture of the impact of plantation unions on workers’
consciousness and actions than he does. It pays particular attention
to the possible changes in the role of unions over the course of
time and the contradictions that may arise between the union
leadership and the rank and file, as a result of the constantly renewed
efforts of  state and management to transform trade unionism from
a vehicle of  labour resistance into an instrument of  labour control.
The British Trusteeship Authority’s introduction of  a specific
union model, which I described as ‘free, but responsible trade
unionism’, resulted in the emergence of internal contradictions
within Anglophone Cameroonian plantation unions. On the one
hand, there were the skilled and clerical union leaders who realised
early on the potential of an industry-wide class organisation for the
protection of  the interests of  all plantation workers. Being moderate
in their political views and economic demands, they clung to the
ideals of union autonomy and responsibility that were impressed
upon them by the Labour Department and the international ‘free’
labour organisations. On the other hand, there was also the large
group of  unskilled and semi-skilled workers who, in view of  their
management’s recalcitrant attitudes, were less inclined than the
union leaders to have faith in the efficacy of the institutionalised
procedures of joint negotiation and collective bargaining, and were
also more committed to militant action. Their support of the union
leadership was highly conditional and instrumental: they expected
their union leaders to deliver on their promises. When such
expectations were not fulfilled, they tended to shift from the
institutional mode of resistance to alternative modes of resistance,
such as informal and collective actions. The attitude of  Anglophone
Cameroonian plantation workers towards their unions was clearly
not exceptional in Africa: Crisp (1984), for example, found the same
attitude among Ghanaian gold miners with basically similar
characteristics.
It was after the reorganisation of trade unionism in Cameroon in
1972, which led to the establishment of state control over the unions,
that the contradictions between the union leadership and the rank
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and file became increasingly obvious. Co-opted in the control
structure over labour, the union leadership rapidly lost popular
support. Even more significantly, it proved to be incapable of
containing the rank and file’s traditional militancy, as was reflected
in the large-scale participation of Anglophone Cameroonian
plantation workers in several illegal strike actions after 1972
(Konings 1993a, 1998a). I will show in this volume that these
contractions became particularly visible during the agro-industrial
crisis and reforms. The latter tended to weaken even further the
bargaining position of the plantation unions despite the fact that
Cameroonian trade unions were able to achieve a limited degree of
autonomy in the political liberalisation process that started in 1990
(Konings 2009a).
Smallholders and cooperatives
Contract farming is a growing phenomenon on the African continent.
Generally speaking, it is a way of organising agricultural production
whereby smallholders are forced to supply produce to agro-industrial
enterprises in accordance with the conditions specified in written or
oral contracts. These enterprises, in turn, have to provide access to
critical productive resources such as credit, inputs and technical
assistance, as well as to processing facilities and an assured market outlet.
Contract farming by large agro-industrial corporations has
remained a controversial subject in the literature. It has been
advanced by its advocates as a key strategy for rural transformation
based on a dynamic partnership between smallholders and agro-
industrial enterprises, and is said to offer opportunities for both
parties. It provides agro-industrial enterprises with a regular supply
of agricultural commodities at lower cost and risk than estate
production does, and allows enterprises to present themselves as
champions of regional development. At the same time, it enables
participants to benefit from modern technology, marketing facilities
and other services, and to boost their incomes. Significantly, it has
found a prominent place in the IMF- and World Bank-inspired
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) for its potential to
promote private-sector-oriented development and increase and
diversify agricultural exports (Glover & Kusterer 1990; Little &
Watts 1994; Grosh 1994).
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Others are less convinced about the benefits of  contract farming
to smallholders. They reject the idea of  equal partnership in these
schemes, arguing that contract farming may subjugate the peasantry
to increased control and exploitation by capital, leading to a peculiar
form of  proletarianisation (Feder 1977a, 1977b; Payer 1980). One
of the most recent exponents of this theoretical tradition is Michael
Watts. Drawing parallels between contract farming and the rise of
flexible accumulation and subcontracting in advanced capitalist
industrial organisation, Watts (1994: 64) concluded that contract
farming transforms peasants into de facto piece workers, ‘often
labouring more intensively (i.e. longer hours) and extensively (i.e.
using children and other nonpaid household labour) to increase
output and quality’. In a similar vein, Clapp (1994: 81) refers to
contract farming as ‘a form of  disguised proletarianisation: it
secures the farmer’s land and labour, while leaving him with formal
title to both’.
What these opposing views have in common is that they ignore
the great diversity in types of  contract farming relations. Their
arguments are based mainly on schemes with more or less
homogeneous peasant participation, while contract farming schemes
often show a considerable measure of social differentiation, with
the various strata of participants differing widely in their relationship
with management, their recruitment of  labour, their access to the
company’s inputs and services, and their share in the incomes and
benefits derived from these schemes. Moreover, contracts may vary
from being exceedingly loose to very tight, resulting in different
intensities of managerial control over participants’ production and
exchange. As a consequence, participants could more realistically
be placed on a continuum ranging from autonomous producers to
de facto proletarians (Gibbon 1997: 62-63).
Given this huge diversity, Little (1994: 217-18) suggested that
it would be more useful to focus on the actual content of contracting
relations and the motives and power relationships of the contracting
parties rather than seeking blanket conclusions about contract
farming as a generic institution. In addition to general market
instability, he perceived the highly unequal power relationships in
most of  the existing schemes as a major threat to their long-term
sustainability. He showed (Ibid.: 230) how autocratic managerial
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control gives rise to various forms of  resistance by the contract
farmers, including withdrawal from the scheme, a search for
alternative markets, and even violent demonstrations and strikes,
all of  which jeopardise the scheme’s viability. He therefore urged
the introduction of  intermediary organisations, such as farmers’
cooperatives, which could represent the interests of  producers. Such
organisations have been generally weak or absent in contracting
schemes in Africa and elsewhere and contract farmers have proved
even more difficult to organise than plantation workers. Plantation
workers work and live together and are thus more likely to discuss
their common interests than contract farmers who work and live
more in isolation (Paige 1975). Moreover, contract farmers are
inclined to maintain good individual relationships with management
and expect certain favours in return, rather than organising with
other growers (Glover 1984). Little & Watts (1994) found that
multinational agro-industrial enterprises, such as British American
Tobacco (BAT), strongly opposed official grower representation and
threatened to withdraw from local production if  contract farmers
attempted to organise into cooperatives. However, even when
contract farmers are able to overcome obstacles to organisation,
they usually lack the necessary power and autonomy to influence
decision making (Clapp 1994: 82; Porter & Phillips-Howard 1997).
Several contract farming schemes have been created in
Cameroon over time and the CDC and Pamol played a pioneering
role in the establishment of  contract farming schemes in Anglophone
Cameroon. The ‘old’ CDC scheme and the Pamol scheme were both
characterised by weak management control and supervision over
the labour process and a large measure of social differentiation.
Becoming increasingly dissatisfied with managerial lack of control
over the processes of production and exchange, the CDC
management introduced a ‘new’ scheme in 1977 that was devised
and sponsored by the World Bank and other foreign financiers. This
aimed at establishing a more homogeneous farming group, focusing
on low-income rural groups rather than the richer, more progressive
smallholders, with strict managerial control over participants’
production and exchange.
The CDC and Pamol contract farmers demonstrated their ability
to organise in defence of their interests against management and the
state. Dissatisfied with the allegedly low producer price offered by
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the CDC, the participants in the ‘old’ CDC contract farming scheme
were the first to organise into a cooperative. In 1986, during the serious
crisis in the agro-industrial sector, they were followed by the Pamol
contract farmers, with both cooperatives being created and dominated
by larger farmers. While the latter claimed that the newly created
cooperatives would defend the interests of  all contract farmers, they
were primarily concerned with guarding their own interests. Strikingly,
the participants in the newer CDC contract farming scheme were
precluded by management from forming a cooperative.
As in most other African countries, the performance of  the
Anglophone Cameroonian contract farmers’ cooperatives has
proved to be disappointing. The unprecedented crisis in the agro-
industrial sector revealed the cooperatives’ weaknesses and unequal
bargaining position. Contract farmers were highly dependent on the
large agro-industrial enterprises for the delivery of inputs and
transport, as well as for the purchase and marketing of their produce.
When management was no longer able to render these services
during the crisis, the cooperative executive lacked the power to
force them to stick to the terms of  the contract. Even petitioning
the state for intervention on the behalf  of  contract farmers proved
futile in a situation where agro-industrial enterprises faced serious
marketing and liquidity problems.
Disillusioned with the performance of  their leadership,
cooperative members have, like unorganised contract farmers, been
inclined to resort to collective and informal modes of  resistance.
Some refused to adhere strictly to the scheme’s regulations and to
maintain their farms properly, while others even abandoned the
scheme altogether. Most, however, tried to sell their produce on
alternative markets where they were paid more promptly. Such
informal actions by contract farmers were widespread in Africa and
elsewhere (Konings 1993b; Little & Watts 1994). More conspicuous
displays of displeasure included political strikes, demonstrations
and other collective forms of  resistance by contract farmers, such
as the violent confrontations that took place in the Bakolori scheme
in Nigeria (Beckman 1985).
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Organisation of  the book and research methodology
Having set out the most important themes I will be exploring, I will
now explain how the book is organised and how I arrived at the
research findings it is based on.
The book consists of eight essays that examine the role of civil-
society groups and organisations during the agro-industrial crisis
and reforms in Anglophone Cameroon. Chapter 2 assesses the role
of ethno-regional groups and associations, while Chapters 3 and 4
deal with the role of workers and trade unions during the agro-
industrial crisis and the subsequent liquidation of Pamol. Chapters
5 and 6 study the protest actions of chiefs and workers against
externally imposed attempts to privatise the CDC, and Chapters 7
and 8 focus on the role of the CDC and Pamol smallholders and
their cooperatives during the crisis and the reform period.
The present study is based on several fieldwork periods
undertaken in Anglophone Cameroon between 1985 and 2005.
Various research methods were employed. First of  all, I consulted
primary and secondary sources in libraries, archives, departments
and ministerial offices. The valuable material on regional agro-
industrial enterprises and civil-society groups that is kept at the
National Archives at Buea (BNA), the Provincial and Divisional
Labour Offices in Buea, Limbe (Victoria) and Mundemba, and the
CDC archives in Limbe-Bota was particularly useful. The CDC and
Pamol managerial staff were usually cooperative and provided me
with any statistical data and recent documents I requested. Secondly,
I interviewed considerable numbers of  workers, contract farmers,
union leaders, cooperative leaders, managerial staff, government
officials, chiefs, leaders of regional elite groups and associations,
and other relevant informants. Most of  these interviews were in
English or Pidgin English, the lingua franca in Anglophone Cameroon.
And thirdly, I observed the daily activities taking place on the CDC
and Pamol estates over a period of  some months.
During my fieldwork, I was assisted by various local research
assistants who were familiar with the research areas and proved to
be extremely helpful in gaining the confidence of relevant
informants.
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Notes
  1. For the numerous Anglophone complaints, see All Anglophone
Conference (1993).
  2. Unlike on the CDC and Pamol estates in Anglophone Cameroon,
serious clashes between autochthonous and stranger workers reportedly
occurred at agro-industrial enterprises in the southern part of
Francophone Cameroon, especially on the SOSUCAM sugar estates
in Mbandjock (Barbier et al. 1980; Ngend 1982). Two factors seem to
be responsible for the violence between southern and northern workers
on the latter enterprise in 1976. First of all, occupational and ethno-
regional overlapping has always constituted a potentially explosive
situation at SOSUCAM: the higher-paid positions are held by the
better-educated and skilled workers from the south and the less well-
paid jobs by the uneducated and unskilled workers from the north.
And secondly, the unskilled sugar-cane cutters from the north tend to
oppose any efforts at integration, preferring to live separately. These
factors continue to create problems in ensuring a peaceful coexistence
between the two ethno-regional groups and do not encourage
solidarity.
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Ethno-regional groups and associations
in the South West Province and
the agro-industrial crisis
Introduction
The agro-industrial crisis, which started in the early 1980s, has had
serious consequences for the CDC and Pamol and brought them
both to the verge of collapse. Pamol was put into voluntary
liquidation by its mother company, Unilever, in October 1987 and
has been up for sale ever since. The CDC was first denied public
grants and subsidies, and has been preparing for privatisation since
1994. Both have been influential in regional development and
control of the companies is an emotive issue that raises regional
sentiments and has highlighted divisions between the Anglophone
community and the Francophone-dominated state, as well as those
between the South West and the North West elites. It was during
political liberalisation that the Anglophone elite in general, and the
South West elite in particular, started organising to defend regional
interests surrounding the sale of  the two companies.
The liquidation and sale of  Pamol
The Plantations Pamol du Cameroun Ltd (Pamol) was previously a
subsidiary of the Unilever giant (cf. Wilson 1954, 1968; Fieldhouse
1978, 1994; Dinham & Hines 1983). Founded in the 1920s, it is
one of the oldest agro-industrial enterprises in Cameroon. Its main
estates produce palm oil and are in the Ndian Division of the South
West Province that borders eastern Nigeria (Courade 1978).
Economically, the Ndian Division is one of  the most important
areas in the country: it has large oil deposits at Idabato around Rio
del Rey, as well as timber and oil palms. Paradoxically, it continues
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to be one of the most isolated and marginalised regions in the
country despite its natural riches. For a long time it was deprived of
basic infrastructural provisions: it had no road connections with
other parts of Cameroon and transport was only possible via a
network of waterways (rivers, creeks, and the sea). When a road
was finally constructed between Ndian and Kumba in the 1970s,
it was badly maintained during the dry season and barely passable
in the rainy season. The area appears to have closer links with
Nigeria than with Cameroon itself, with many Nigerian fishermen,
traders and peasants living in the area. The Nigerian currency is
widely accepted and Efik is the lingua franca in the maritime areas
of the division. Legal and illegal trade with Nigeria provides
lucrative income opportunities for some of the local population
(Konings 2005).
The main reason for the area’s marginalisation seems to be
political. During the inter-war period it was a no-man’s land, in
which the British authorities showed little interest. From 1945
onwards, it was an integral part of Kumba Division but being far
from Kumba, it continued to be neglected by the district authorities.
It was not until 1967 that it was separated from Kumba Division
and declared an autonomous division by presidential decree. Even
then hardly any development funds were allocated to the new
division, as if it were still being penalised for the fact that during
the 1961 plebiscite about 95% of the local population voted for
integration into Nigeria rather than reunification with Francophone
Cameroon. A few months before the plebiscite, one of  the region’s
principal leaders, Mr N.N. Mbile, declared that his people were
‘irrevocably [decided] never to accept union with the Cameroon
Republic. .... If on this we shall have to be killed to the last man, it
should be better that history records how a race of men died to the
man fighting for their freedom’ (cited in Johnson 1970: 166).1
Following reunification, Ndian Division was never honoured with
a ministerial seat in the federal government and its lack of national
integration was also manifest in the low profile of  the single ruling
party in the area. A few months before the promulgation of the
unitary state in 1972, the District Officer for the Ekondo Titi
Subdivision reported:
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The response to the call for buying and owning the party card is still
slow. Meetings of  cells and branches around the headquarters have
not been held and I have no reason to believe that the organs in the
remote villages are more effective. I called up some of the people
and asked whether they owned the party cards and the answer they
gave was amazing. They said since they do not travel they see no
need to own the cards. Only people who are mobile need the cards
because their kits are being inspected by the forces of  law and order.2
For the local population, Pamol has always been the area’s lifeline.
They feel that the company has realised what political rulers and
regional barons have persistently failed to do, namely to promote
regional development. Pamol is the only private enterprise in the area
that employs a sizeable labour force, with 3,000-3,500 workers in its
heyday (see Table 1.1). It is responsible for 90% of  Ndian Division’s
tax revenues. It has constructed labour camps with adequate water
and electricity supplies, hospitals, schools and roads, and provides
transport services for its workers and the local population. Local people
still remember how a company launch, the M.V. Rio with a capacity
of 45 passengers, used to ply the Ndian-Lobe route three times a
week. And last, but not least, the company has always promoted
smallholder schemes around its oil-palm estates since the 1960s.
Given its significant role in regional development over many
decades, the Anglophone population and Ndian Division’s
population in particular were alarmed when the news spread that
Pamol was in a deep crisis. For those familiar with the multitude of
problems that were besetting the agro-industrial palm-oil sector,
the crisis did not come as a complete surprise as agro-industrial
enterprises engaged in local palm-oil production have always been
plagued by chronically low productivity and high production costs
(Konings 1989). Rising costs forced them to petition the state
regularly to demand increased domestic palm-oil prices. A series of
decrees between 1980 and 1985 ordering substantial wage increases
throughout the country was a particular source of conflict between
the state and agro-industry, as increases in wages were not
(immediately) followed by increases in domestic palm-oil prices. Agro-
industrial enterprises were often obliged simply to sell their produce
at prices that did not even cover production costs. The severe
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drought in 1983, which slashed Pamol’s output by over 30%,
exacerbated the company’s grave financial situation and forced
management to put its development and rehabilitation plans on hold,
borrow heavily from banks and resort to mass layoffs. For the first
time, Unilever began to contemplate ceasing operations in Cameroon.
The crisis in the domestic agro-industrial sector was aggravated
by two additional factors. First, government expansion of  the sector
had led to a staggering increase in output. In particular the massive
expansion of the two parastatals that dominated the sector, the
CDC and the Société Camerounaise de Palmeraies (SOCAPALM), had
given rise to the unprecedented situation whereby locally produced
palm oil exceeded domestic demand by about 40%. Second, the
government’s inability or unwillingness to control imports of  cheap
oil, notably of refined oil from Malaysia, led to a further drop in
domestic demand for locally produced palm oil.
These two factors inevitably sparked keen competition that
culminated in a price war between Cameroonian agro-industrial
enterprises and forced prices down far below production costs and
the government-recommended price. In the end, most companies
could no longer avoid selling their palm oil on the world market.
However, such exports were being made at a time when a 40%
increase in the value of  the CFA franc against the US dollar made
locally produced oil even less competitive globally, while world
market prices were sinking to their lowest level in forty years. In a
desperate attempt to rid themselves of growing stocks of perishable
palm oil, Cameroonian agro-industrial enterprises had to dump their
produce onto the world market and suffered major financial losses
in the process.
For private companies like Pamol, survival was even more
difficult than for public and para-public enterprises. Public
enterprises enjoyed substantial annual subsidies from the state,
irrespective of  their performance. They were exempt from paying
certain taxes, were entitled to low-interest loans from the Central
Bank and their plants were usually accessible by tarred road (Tedga
1990; Konings 1993a). This enabled them to proceed with expanding
and modernising their estates, undercut prices on the domestic
market and attract new customers. Thus, while sales of  the two
major palm-oil-producing parastatals doubled between 1984 and
1986, Pamol’s sales plummeted.
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In late 1985, Pamol’s management decided to tackle its financial
problems by cutting production costs as far as possible and seeking
government assistance along with other agro-industrial producers.
It also drew up a restructuring plan that proposed a series of  cost-
cutting measures including cultivating exclusively the best and flattest
lands; promoting labour-saving cultivation methods such as a more
extensive use of machinery and draft animals; closing one of its two
mills to save major refurbishment costs and concentrate all its
processing activities in one single mill; ceasing all its rubber operations
in the country as they had proved uneconomic due to their limited
scale and the dramatic fall in world rubber prices; and reducing its
labour force. The plan also recommended the construction of  a
refinery. Producing refined oil had increased Unilever’s market
share in Ivory Coast and Pamol’s management expected a similar
effect in Cameroon (Sellers 1984). Unfortunately, the restructuring
plan ended in failure. And some of the proposals, such as the closure
of one of the mills, even resulted in higher costs, since the hiring of
extra lorries to transport company produce to the surviving mill proved
exceedingly expensive along Ndian Division’s bad roads.
In December 1986, Unilever briefed the Biya government on
the company’s deteriorating financial position and urged it to
immediately implement a series of protective measures for the ailing
agro-industrial palm-oil sector, in particular an increase in domestic
palm-oil prices, a special tax on all imports of edible oils and a ban
on imports of  heavy oil by the Cameroonian soap industry, and the
granting of  export subsidies. It repeated its complaint that Pamol
was unable to compete with state-subsidised parastatals even though
it was more productive and supplied higher-quality oil. It asked the
government to end the situation of unequal competition by granting
Pamol similar low-interest loan facilities to those the parastatals
enjoyed, improving the roads to its estates and mill, and rendering
all possible assistance in the construction of  a refinery.
Pamol had previously been able to extract major concessions
from the Cameroonian state by capitalising on its crucial role in the
regional and national economy. But by 1987 the economic and
political environment had changed to such an extent that the then
Minister of Industrial Development and Commerce Nomo Ongolo
rejected Unilever’s request out of  hand. He bluntly told the Unilever
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delegation that the severe economic crisis no longer justified the
government allocating extra funds to the agro-industrial sector.
Moreover, he felt that a multinational like Unilever should not call
on government for assistance but instead make its own contribution
to Pamol’s recovery by reinvesting some of  the substantial profits
it had made in the country. Interestingly, Anglophones were quick
to interpret the government’s denial of  support to one of  their
region’s leading enterprises as a renewed attempt by the
Francophone-dominated state to destroy their regional economic
heritage. Some Anglophones even alleged that one of the hidden
motives for denying support was that Ngomo Ongolo and other
senior members of  the corrupt Biya regime were personally keen to
acquire a stake in Pamol. They knew very well that Unilever would
decline to subsidise a company that had incurred a loss of  FCFA
1.3 billion between 1984 and 1987, and would choose instead to
wind up its activities in Cameroon.3
In July 1987, Unilever informed the government of  its plan to
sell Pamol. The government, in turn, told Unilever in no uncertain
terms that the state would not be taking over the company. Already
burdened with the massive losses incurred by the agro-industrial
parastatals, it could not afford to buy out Pamol as well, especially
since the company’s debts amounted to some FCFA 4.2 billion and
its neglected estates and mills were in need of costly modernisation.
In view of the economic crisis, the government no longer wished
to expand the state’s investment in the agro-industrial sector.
Instead, it adopted a policy to encourage the existing agro-industrial
parastatals to become self-sufficient and profitable and, in the
event of  failure, either to go into liquidation or be privatised (Tedga
1990; Konings 1996b). It ended by strongly advising Unilever to
sell the company to any Cameroonian businessmen interested in
purchasing it. Such a transaction would be a major contribution
to the realisation of one of the principal objectives of the
government’s ‘New Deal’ policies: encouraging sections of  the
Cameroonian elite to set up medium- and large-scale plantations
(Konings 1993b; Takougang 1993).
Unilever accepted the advice and promptly began secret
negotiations with a small group of  well-known North West
businessmen, including Mr Nangah, Mr Ngufor, Mr Buyo, Mr Kilo,
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Mr Nuiouat and Mr Acha. This consortium was given legal advice
by Mr Sendze, a prominent lawyer in Bamenda. Unilever had come
into contact with this group through the mediation process of
Pamol’s management staff, which was mainly made up of  North
Westerners. Having personal interests in an eventual North West
takeover of  the company, some of  these senior managers continued
to act as brokers between Unilever and the North West business
consortium and to provide the latter with vital information about
the company’s situation.
The North West group was well aware that any substantial
investment in the domestic agro-industrial palm-oil sector was a
risky undertaking. It justified its resolve to take over Pamol as
follows:
• It was motivated in the first place by regional sentiments rather
than (short-term) financial considerations. The group was
keen to safeguard the employment of  the company’s labour
force, the majority of  whom originated from the North West
Province (see Table 1.1).
• The group was convinced that the company’s precarious
financial position could be redressed in the long term provided
the company was thoroughly reorganised and the government
implemented forthwith all the protective measures for the
agro-industrial sector previously proposed by Unilever.
Unilever eventually decided to sell the company to the North
West group after the latter agreed to take over Pamol’s liabilities in
the form of  long-term loans and to guarantee payment of  the
workers’ wages and terminal benefits. A contract was then signed
by the two parties but it was this contract that kindled regionalist
sentiments among the South West elite.
As soon as the secret deal between Unilever and the North West
group became known, the South West elite began agitating against
the North West takeover of  Pamol, appealing to the state to intervene
on its behalf. In a strongly worded petition presented to the head of
state by the highest-ranking southwestern army officer, General
James Tataw, the South West elite declared categorically that it
would never allow its ancestral lands, which had been occupied by
Unilever for decades, to be colonised and exploited by North
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Westerners. It claimed that a North West takeover of  Pamol would
inevitably strengthen North West domination over the South West.
It therefore urgently appealed to the state to cancel the contract
between Unilever and the North West group and support a South
West takeover of  Pamol.
This regional conflict painfully exposed the fragility of the post-
colonial state’s hegemonic project of  national integration (Bayart
1979). In addition, the South West elite’s request forced the Biya
government to take a stand on this politically delicate issue, and
thus risk accusations of  serving regional rather than national interests.
Initially there appeared to be ample reason for government support
of  a North West takeover of  Pamol. The North West group had taken
considerable risks in deciding to buy Pamol given the enterprise’s
precarious financial position and the generally unhealthy situation
of  the domestic agro-industrial palm-oil sector. Despite the deep
national economic crisis, the group had succeeded in raising the
huge capital resources required for the takeover of the company and
its liabilities. It undoubtedly possessed the entrepreneurial and
managerial qualities needed to run the company. The takeover was
also in line with the state policy of encouraging the various elite
groups – whatever their ethnic or regional origin – to invest in medium-
sized and large-scale agricultural plantations in any part of  the country.
There initially seemed to be no convincing reason for the
government to agree to the South West’s appeal to call off  the deal,
especially since the opposition was based largely on regional
sentiments. Nor had the South West elite provided any proof  that it
would be capable of raising the funds necessary to take over Pamol.
The South West elite however launched a political offensive to
strengthen its bargaining position. It attempted to impress upon the
government that Unilever’s decision to sell the company to the North
West group was unfair. Since Pamol was operating on South West
ancestral lands, Unilever should have invited the South West group
to make the first bid for Pamol. The group also stressed the close
link between the company’s plantation activities and regional
development and the fact that this link was more likely to be
preserved by a South West takeover. Finally, the group warned that
a North West takeover would spark widespread regional and political
discontent in the South West.
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The effective mobilisation of the regional elite was clearly a
decisive factor in the ultimate success of  the South West’s political
offensive. In the face of such a demonstration of unity and
determination, the government did not dare to disappoint the South
West, a province of  vital importance to the national economy in
terms of  its rich oil, timber and agricultural resources (Ndzana
1987). When the government finally announced its decision to cancel
the contract between Unilever and the North West group, Unilever
decided to put the company into voluntary liquidation on 13 October
1987. Exasperated by government policies, it flatly refused to
renegotiate the sale of  the company.
Immediately after this, a liquidator and a committee of inspection
were nominated to represent the principal creditors, in particular
the state and several banks. The liquidator appointed was Mr C.G.
Mure, a Frenchman who owned a firm of  accountants in Douala
connected with Coopers and Lybrand. He seemed well qualified
for the job as he had already been involved in the bankruptcy
proceedings of several private and public enterprises in Cameroon.
At his first meeting with the creditors on 3 November 1987, he
presented a situation report on the company’s liquidation in which
he argued that a public auction of  the company’s assets would be a
disaster socially and economically for Ndian Division. He therefore
proposed running the company as an ongoing business and looking
for a solution to its long-standing problems before selling it to a
reliable buyer. He claimed that his unorthodox proposal was both
feasible and in line with the 1961 Companies Act of Anglophone
Cameroon, as the situation at Pamol had not yet deteriorated beyond
possible recovery. His proposal was approved by the creditors, which
was significant as it was the first time in Cameroonian history that
a company had chosen to remain in business while in the process
of liquidation.
The liquidator assumed the function of chief executive of the
company, being accountable for his actions only to the committee
of inspection that was headed by the general manager of Meridien
Bank International. He devised and implemented a series of
measures to restore the company’s finances, refusing to pay accruing
company and income tax owed to the Treasury, interest on bank
overdrafts and other liabilities on the grounds that the company
52
Crisis and Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
was in liquidation. Together with other agro-industrial companies,
he entered into negotiations with the government about revitalising
the ailing agro-industrial palm-oil sector. Eventually he succeeded
in persuading the government to raise domestic prices and impose
a surcharge on imported palm oil to protect domestic production,
measures that considerably enhanced Pamol’s chances of  survival.
The liquidator then started modernising the estates, redoubled
efforts to replant them, refurbished the mill, improved roads and
bought new lorries to transport produce. He also began to diversify
the company’s production with a view to the risks involved in
monoculture cropping, which had become evident in the continuing
crisis in the palm-oil sector. In addition to replanting rubber trees,
he had new crops introduced at Bai Estate, such as maize and a
medicinal plant called voacanga. All these investments would be
financed largely by the sale of  palm oil, the company’s main source
of income and investment.
Sales of palm oil, however, remained problematic. In 1988, the
liquidator signed an agreement with the management of the two
leading parastatals, CDC and SOCAPALM, to stop the domestic
price war but this covenant lasted less than two years. Renewed
undercutting of prices by the parastatals forced the average selling
price of  palm oil down to FCFA 210/kg by March 1990, as against
the government price of  FCFA 323/kg. The Minister of  Agriculture
at the time, Mr J.N. Ngu, was well acquainted with the problems
besetting the agro-industrial palm-oil sector since he had been the
CDC’s general manager for many years. In April 1991, he intervened
to save the palm-oil sector from total collapse and in an attempt to
stabilise the price, ordered that the two principal producers, CDC
and SOCAPALM, be placed in charge of  domestic sales of  palm
oil. Henceforth, Pamol’s produce was to be sold to the CDC, which
in turn would pay the company every two weeks for the palm oil it
had delivered. This arrangement failed to prevent SOCAPALM from
further undercutting prices and a renewed price war resulted in the
CDC being unable to pay Pamol. Pamol was therefore confronted
with an unprecedented liquidity crisis in the early 1990s and could
not even pay its workers on time. To solve these problems once
and for all, the liquidator was appointed president of a study
committee which was to recommend a new set-up for palm-oil sales.
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After a thorough investigation, the committee recommended
creating a palm-oil producers’ syndicate that would purchase all
produce and reimburse producers for their production every
fortnight. The syndicate became operational on 1 April 1993 and
has been functioning satisfactorily ever since. Its first director was
Mr Nyenku, a former Pamol manager.
From the very start, the liquidator carried out negotiations
surrounding the sale of Pamol. His three main objectives were to
sell the company for the highest possible price, to safeguard the
jobs of the existing labour force as far as possible, and to ensure
Cameroonian participation in the share capital of  the new company.
He announced that every section of the Cameroonian business
community, irrespective of  ethnic or regional origin, as well as
company workers and contract farmers could be shareholders.
Several business groups and companies showed interest in buying
Pamol. The most important were various southwestern groups,
companies and associations, the Commonwealth Development
Corporation (COMDEV), and the liquidator’s own group.
The South West group was the first consortium to inform the
liquidator of  its continued interest in buying the company. This
group, which was set up with the explicit aim of  taking over Pamol,
had formed a company, the so-called Cameroon Agro-Industrial
Company Ltd (CAMAGRIC), under Chief  Mosah Allen Misembe,
a businessman hailing from Ndian Division. Closely connected with
CAMAGRIC were long-established southwestern businessmen like
Michael Atabong and Monango Williams, and some politicians and
bureaucrats who had recently moved into business including Nerius
Namaso Mbile and Sylvestor Dioh. Its legal adviser was Dr Henry
Enonchong. The company began issuing shares at FCFA 25,000
each but, according to well-informed sources, CAMAGRIC was
initially unable to raise more than FCFA 50 million, which included
FCFA 10 million from the chairman himself. Obviously it was easier
to mobilise the South West elite for a protest action against a North
West takeover of  Pamol than for a risky capital investment in the
liquidated company.
CAMAGRIC’s purchase bid of  FCFA 500 million was
categorically rejected by the liquidator as not reflecting the true
value of  Pamol’s assets, which had been estimated by Hunting
Technical Service of  London at FCFA 5 billion. The liquidator in
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fact had misgivings about CAMAGRIC’s ability to raise the vast
capital resources needed to purchase the company, take on its
liabilities and refurbish its estates and mill. The group tried all sorts
of  campaigns including aggressive letters and interviews, requests
for political intervention and the spreading of  tendentious and
erroneous information to persuade the government to order the
closure of Pamol. This would then enable the group to buy the
company at the price it was offering. Such pressures yielded no
results and the government no longer seemed inclined to intervene
on behalf  of  the South West group. Represented on the committee
of inspection of the liquidation, the government appeared to fully
agree with the strategy of  the liquidator, namely to restore the
company to some degree of economic health before selling it to a
reliable and financially stronger buyer.
There is evidence that some high-ranking government officials
of  southwestern origin were also connected with the South West
group and CAMAGRIC, albeit mostly behind the scenes. In 1988 a
delegation from this group led by Ogork Ebot Ntui, the then Minister
with Special Duties at the Presidency, met with the liquidator,
informing him that they wanted to buy Pamol using a loan from the
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), a bank regularly
accused of  maintaining close ties with the drugs mafia. Ogork Ebot
Ntui was apparently interested in turning Pamol into an Indian hemp
company and asked the liquidator to accept the post of personnel
manager. When the liquidator refused, Ntui used his ministerial
powers to frustrate Pamol’s activities. Company lorries were held
up for long periods at customs posts and, with the complicity of a
bailiff in Kumba, a number were seized by the minister who later
offered them for sale at public auction.4
Since 1991 the newly created South West Elites Association
(SWELA) has made the purchase of Pamol one of its priorities in
development plans for the South West Province.5 It has continued
to pressurise the regional and national administration to hand the
company over to South Westerners and has also attempted to raise
the capital required. For example, it organised a series of  meetings
in 1993 to exhort its members to subscribe to shares costing FCFA
50,000 each in any eventual takeover of Pamol.6 This campaign
has not yet borne fruit.
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The Commonwealth Development Corporation (COMDEV) was
another serious candidate, offering FCFA 3.2 billion for Pamol. The
purchase was to be made through a proposed new company called
Société d’Exploitation de l’Entreprise Pamol (S.E.E. Pamol). COMDEV
was prepared to provide a loan of  FCFA 1.2 billion at 9% interest
repayable over ten years. The minimum capital of  the new company
would be FCFA 1 billion but COMDEV would subscribe to only
20% of the share capital. It committed itself to promoting contract
farming schemes that would place 60% of  palm-oil production in
the hands of  contract farmers by the year 2000. It also promised to
construct a refinery with a daily minimum capacity of  20 tons.
At one stage in the negotiations, the Meredien Bank
International, whose general manager was president of the inspection
committee for the liquidation, proposed a joint venture with
participating interests as follows: COMDEV 20%, Meredien Bank
International 40%, and Palma Limited Company 40%, the last being
a holding company with shares held by Pamol staff, contract farmers
interested in the future of Pamol and Cameroonian businessmen
from a variety of  sectors. This offer initially appeared attractive but
political pressure on the negotiations from the South West side
eventually blocked the deal with COMDEV. Subsequently,
Meredien Bank International also withdrew from the joint venture.7
In September 1993, Pamol workers and managerial staff
announced that they had more confidence in COMDEV than in
SWELA because of  COMDEV’s international reputation, proven
financial background and experience in managing companies and
plantations in Africa including Cameroon.8 That Pamol workers and
managers preferred COMDEV to SWELA is not altogether
surprising since most of  them hail from the North West Province.
However, I found that southwestern workers also had more faith in
COMDEV than in SWELA. Pamol workers and management staff
felt overwhelmingly that the English-speaking origins of COMDEV
were an additional reason to welcome its takeover of Pamol. Unlike
the French, the British were thought not to be out to dominate
Anglophone Cameroon. Moreover, the English-speaking business
culture fitted well in Anglophone Cameroon.
Apparently the liquidator too became interested in purchasing
the revitalised company under the same conditions as those spelt
out by COMDEV. To this end, he formed a consortium of
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Cameroonian investors with solid international backing. However
in September 1993, Pamol workers and managerial staff vehemently
rejected the presence of the liquidator in any group of prospective
buyers ‘in view of his gross mismanagement of the company in
liquidation’.9 This is a graphic example of their marked change of
attitude towards the liquidator during his time in office. He was
once hailed as the ‘saviour of  Pamol’ and commanded enormous
respect among the workers10 but when the initial euphoria over the
company’s possible survival was over and Pamol started to face
liquidity problems, workers and managers alike became increasingly
disgruntled with him.
The liquidator turned out to be extremely arrogant and
authoritarian. Contrary to the Unilever style of management, he
was in the habit of treating even the most senior managers with
disdain bordering on contempt. For example after renewed
deterioration in the company’s situation, he refused to consult any
of  them. His French nationality, too, came to be increasingly
problematic after the Biya regime fuelled existing animosity between
Francophones and Anglophones (Gaillard 1992). His appointment
was perceived retroactively as yet another example of Francophone
domination of the Anglophone region. Pamol workers and managers
deeply resented his poor command of English and were infuriated
when he created the impression that he preferred Francophone to
Anglophone workers and managers. He recruited a dozen
Francophone graduates to understudy the Anglophone managers
with an eye to eventually taking over their duties. This led to
considerable confusion in the existing chain of command and fierce
conflicts between the Anglophone managers, the liquidator and his
Francophone graduates.
There was general consensus within the company that the salary
being paid to the liquidator was too high as it was far in excess of
the incomes of  even the most senior managers. Without consulting
anyone, Christian Mure appears to have rewarded himself with fees
and allowances amounting to FCFA 430 million during his five-
and-a-half years in office (October 1987-May 1993) even though
he spent most of  his time in Douala where he lived and ran his firm
of  accountants. He commuted between Douala and the Pamol
Headquarters in Lobe once or twice a week by chartered plane,
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which cost the company more than FCFA 1 million per trip. Little
wonder then that many people both within and outside the company
believed he was not keen to sell the company because of his vested
interest in continuing the liquidation process.
There is no doubt that Christian Mure’s close contact with the
corrupt and authoritarian Biya regime (van de Walle 1993; Jua 1991)
was widely resented within the company. Several informants told
me that the liquidator was given to boasting about his connections
with high-ranking officials right up to the presidency. They also
alleged that he dipped into company coffers to aid Biya’s re-election
in the 1992 presidential elections, providing South West Minister
John Ebong Ngolle, a close friend, with a new Pajero and a
substantial sum of  money to campaign for Biya in the South West
Province. Understandably, his contacts with the Biya regime did
not endear him to the workers and managerial staff, the vast majority
of  whom supported the candidature of  John Fru Ndi, the chairman
of  the SDF, in the presidential elections. It is reported that after
Biya’s victory in the fraudulent elections, the liquidator led a group
of  Biya loyalists to the house of  Dr I.N. Timti, a northwestern
manager, on what he described as a mission of ‘condolence’. He is
reported to have remarked, ‘Please accept my sympathy that your
leader has lost the elections, as you will not replace me as the
company’s general manager’.11
These factors, together with the liquidator’s inability to pay staff
during the company’s severe cash-flow crisis in 1992/93, led the
workers to embark on a two-month strike starting on 10 March
1993. On that fateful day, the liquidator barely escaped a lynching
by workers and was rescued just in time from his hiding place on
the estate by the military.
On 26 April 1993, the committee of inspection resolved that it
would take over responsibility for the liquidation and justified its
action as follows:
• all attempts to obtain reliable information from the liquidator
had failed;
• the liquidator had persistently frustrated the committee’s
requests for regular auditing of the company;
• the company’s financial situation had deteriorated dramatically
without any plausible explanation although it was discovered
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afterwards that its liabilities had increased from FCFA 4.5
billion to FCFA 7.5 billion during the liquidator’s time in
office; and
• the liquidator was no longer in a position to proceed with the
company’s liquidation since the workers had warned him not
to return to the estate.12
The Mundemba High Court suspended the liquidator from duty
on 4 May 1993 and later officially dismissed him on 15 November
1993. He was ordered to refund FCFA 361 million of  the princely
FCFA 430 million he had received in fees and allowances during
his time in office. Reliable sources claim he appropriated over 3,000
tons of  palm oil and about FCFA 50 million after his suspension.13
The committee of inspection created a local management
committee led by Dr I.N. Timti to run the company on 8 May 1993.
It hoped that the company’s future would be rosy after Christian
Mure’s dismissal and that after being placed on a sound footing by
the local management committee, the company would then be sold
quickly. This would prove to be wishful thinking. The company’s
future appeared even bleaker after the newly appointed coordinator
of the local management committee, Dr Timti, started embezzling
the company’s meagre resources.
The company’s liquidation lasted until October 1996 when its
creditors agreed to buy the company through a debt equity swap as
settlement of  its outstanding debts. A new company called Pamol
Plantations Public Limited Company took over the assets of the
company under liquidation, and the creditors became shareholders.
The Cameroonian state then acquired majority shares in the new
company. Its new general manager was Moses Obenofunde, a former
general manager of the Meridien Bank in Douala, who had
previously served as the chairman of  the committee of  inspection
and one of  Pamol’s liquidators after Christian Mure’s dismissal.
The Cameroonian government, the major shareholder,
immediately made it clear that it was observing a hands-off  policy
towards the new company and that it was committed to its eventual
privatisation. The new company continued to face huge problems,
as noted by its general manager in 1998:
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Palm oil is currently coming into Cameroon from the big Malaysian
and Indonesian suppliers at low prices. We have had to drop our
prices by over 30 per cent and this has damaged our turnover. We
have a social duty to employ people but at the moment I have to
ask them to take a 20 per cent cut in salary, to become third-party
contractors working in our fields, or dismiss them.14
Mr Obenofunde and his successor in 2005, Obi-Okpun Wanobi
Osang, have tried to execute a carefully restructured programme
aimed at improving production and reducing costs.
State withdrawal and privatisation of the CDC
The CDC is the largest agro-industrial enterprise in Cameroon and
is the country’s second-largest employer, surpassed only by the
government. It used to employ 25,000 workers and at present has
about 15,000 permanent and casual workers (see Table 1.1). It is
one of the few agro-industrial enterprises in the world that specialises
in a variety of  crops: rubber, palm oil, tea and bananas are its four
major crops.
Founded in 1946, the CDC is one of  the oldest agro-industrial
enterprises in Cameroon but its roots can be traced back to the
German colonial period (1884-1916) (Ardener et al. 1960; Epale
1985; Konings 1993a). At its foundation, the CDC was charged by
the British administration with developing and managing estate lands
that had been expropriated from the local population, notably the
Bakweri during the German colonial period (see Chapter 5), for the
benefit of  the people of  the Trusteeship territory. It was also to
provide for the spiritual, educational and social welfare of its
employees. Any profit realised after the corporation had met its
statutory obligations, discharged its normal functions and placed in
reserve such sums as might be required for the effective running of
the enterprise was to be paid to the public authorities to develop
the Trusteeship territory (Konings 1993a).
Students of plantation agriculture, such as Beckford (1972), have
blamed the persistent poverty and underdevelopment of  Third World
economies on this mode of production. In the case of the CDC
however, this thesis finds little support as the corporation has been
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a major instrument of  modernisation and is largely credited with
whatever socioeconomic development has occurred in Anglophone
Cameroon. It has created employment for many men and women,
constructed numerous roads, ensured water and electricity supplies,
built and staffed schools and awarded a substantial number of
scholarships, provided medical care for a relatively large proportion
of the local population and stimulated the supply of goods and
services to itself  and its workers. In addition, it played an important
role in the commercialisation and modernisation of peasant
production as an intermediary in marketing the Bakweri peasantry’s
banana production during the 1950s (Ardener 1958; Geschiere 1995)
and in the establishment of  regional smallholder oil-palm and rubber
schemes since the early 1960s (Konings 1993b). As a result, the
CDC has often been seen as the economic lifeline of Anglophone
Cameroon.
In 1960, a year before Cameroonian reunification, an important
change took place in the corporation when COMDEV took over
the management and invested £1 million. It managed the corporation
until 1974 when a North Westerner, J.N. Ngu, was appointed general
manager. Following reunification, one can see increasing
intervention by the Francophone-dominated federal state in this
Anglophone corporation and the corporation’s increasing
dependence on foreign financial institutions for its modernisation
and expansion. Between 1967 and 1987, it expanded its area under
cultivation from about 20,000 to 40,000 ha using loans supplied by
several external financiers, including the World Bank, the
International Development Association (IDA), the European
Investment Fund (FED), COMDEV and the (French) Central Fund
for Economic Cooperation (CCCE). In compliance with the terms
of its external loans, the federal state in 1966 began contributing to
the corporation’s equity share capital, which had previously been
divided between the Federal State of  West Cameroon and the West
Cameroon Marketing Board. The Federal Minister of  Planning and
Territorial Development became the corporation’s supervisory
minister.
In the wake of the promulgation of the unitary state, Decree
No. 73/597 of  28 September 1973 charged the corporation with a
mission to contribute to national development and announced a
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new Moratorium and Articles of Association under which the CDC
had to operate. One article made the United Republic of Cameroon
and the National Produce Marketing Board (ONCPB) the exclusive
shareholders in the corporation. In 1977 the government ordered
the CDC management to expand outside the South West Province
in another attempt to transform the CDC from a regional to a national
corporation. As a result, the CDC now owns estates in the North
West, West and Littoral Provinces. Since 1982 the chairman and
the general manager are no longer appointed by the CDC’s Board
of Directors but by decree. Strikingly and despite these integrative
efforts, the people of Anglophone Cameroon have continued to
regard the CDC as ‘their’ corporation.
The CDC has been one of the few agro-industrial enterprises in
Cameroon that has had generally positive operating results, though
these have fluctuated over the years. As a public enterprise, it
continued to receive large annual government subsidies and grants,
irrespective of  performance. For example, between 1981 and 1987,
the CDC received approximately FCFA 93 million from the
government. Like other agro-industrial enterprises in Cameroon, it
has been suffering from the severe economic crisis since 1986
although in the three years prior to the crisis (1983/84-1985/86),
the corporation was still making substantial profits totalling FCFA
3.2 billion. The crisis, however, had a dramatic impact on the
corporation’s financial situation: during the period from 1986/87
to 1990/91 it suffered a loss of  about FCFA 19 billion (Konings
1995b). There is no doubt that the sharp fall in commodity prices
on the world market was principally responsible for the corporation’s
virtual bankruptcy. Nevertheless, there were other factors that also
contributed to the emergence and continuation of  the crisis. In
addition to the political elite’s apparent refusal to control imports
of cheap tea and palm oil, there have been frequent reports of the
managerial elite’s involvement in massive embezzlement, reckless
expenditure, waste, and power struggles based on ethnic and regional
considerations.
The South West-North West divide has, in fact, often paralysed
the corporation’s administration. Since reunification, the chairman
of  the CDC’s Board of  Directors has usually been a South Westerner.
Prominent SWELA members like Nfon Victor Mukete, Chief Samuel
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Endeley, John Ebong Ngolle and Nerius Namaso Mbile have also
held this position. The daily management of the corporation,
however, has been dominated by North Westerners. The
appointment of  North Westerner John Niba Ngu as general manager
was ‘advised’ by the corporation’s external financiers but was strongly
resented by the southwestern managerial elite. First, there were also
suitable southwestern candidates for this post, particularly Mr I.N.
Malafa who used to be senior to Mr Ngu in the corporation’s
hierarchy, having served as the deputy general manager during the
final years of the COMDEV management. Second, the southwestern
managerial elite feared that Ngu’s appointment would reinforce
North West domination of  the CDC management. Ngu’s thirteen
years in office were marked by strong anti-North West feelings and
he was regularly accused by the South Western managerial elite of
favouring his own countrymen. Ngu’s serious conflicts with two of
the southwestern chairmen of  the CDC, Nfon Victor Mukete and
Chief  Samuel Endeley, have become almost legendary.
When Biya started to appoint some South Westerners to key
positions in the South West to reduce North West domination and
achieve regional balance, his friend Ngu was replaced in 1988 by
Peter Mafany Musonge, a Bakweri. Ngu was then appointed Minister
of  Agriculture, a post which, incidentally, had meanwhile become
supervisory minister of  the CDC. In this capacity, Ngu continued
to interfere in the CDC, denying his successor the freedom to
discharge his duties. The southwestern managerial elite alleged that
Ngu was using his brothers on the management staff to pressurise
or even to get rid of  Musonge. Together with other sections of  the
southwestern elite, they put constant pressure on Musonge to reduce
North West influence in the corporation. Particularly after the
foundation of  the SDF, SWELA and the Bakweri elite urged
Musonge to sack those northwestern managers suspected of being
SDF supporters. In a strongly worded petition, the Bakweri Elite
Youth Wing declared in July 1991:
This is a reminder of an earlier letter to you this year in which we
requested you to support our fight against SDF and their ‘Graffi’
domination that has caused the Bakweri people to be deprived of
what belongs to them. Mola, you have to redundant the following
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‘grasslanders’ who are strong supporters of  the SDF. They are Mr
Ngeh F., Chie W., Tatani, Ndenesho, and Fomuso. Do this now. We
are behind you. You are also supported by Chief  Justice S.M.L.
Endeley and all Vikumas.15
Without doubt, these internal conflicts within the CDC
management impeded its capacity to combat the economic crisis.
Managerial problems were aggravated by the fact that the government
was no longer prepared to offer any financial assistance to the ailing
parastatal. To save the country from total collapse, the management
and the unions on the CDC estates agreed to adopt a series of
adjustment measures aimed at reducing costs and increasing
productivity (see Chapter 3). This managerial strategy, which was
aimed at economic recovery, was reinforced in 1989/90 when the
IMF and World-Bank-inspired SAP demanded a restructuring of  the
parastatal sector. The CDC management then had to sign a four-year
performance contract (1989/90-1993/94) with the government
(Tedga 1990), under which the corporation was expected to achieve
a set of objectives related to plantation development, production
costs, quantity and quality of  output, and staff  productivity. In return,
the government wrote off  some of  the corporation’s debts amounting
to FCFA 9 billion and exempted it from paying certain taxes.
The various adjustment measures brought some relief to the
company’s liquidity problems but owing to the continuing decline
in commodity prices, the company’s position remained precarious.
In June 1992, the Biya government, which was highly dependent
on French support and aid, managed to obtain a FCFA 7 billion
low-interest loan for the ailing company from the French CCCE.
Although this loan provided much-needed capital for investment
purposes, the increased control of France over the corporation was
strongly resented by CDC workers and managers, as well as by the
general public in Anglophone Cameroon. It was rumoured that the
CCCE was interested in taking over the management of the CDC
oil-palm estates and this again resulted in widespread protests in
Anglophone Cameroon.
This regional outcry against supposedly increasing French control
of the corporation was in sharp contrast to regional sentiments about
attempts to transfer the management of two major CDC crops to
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English-speaking companies. Few protests were voiced in
Anglophone Cameroon when the corporation entrusted management
of the banana sector to the American multinational Del Monte in
1987. Regional newspapers even praised the negotiations between
the CDC and COMDEV in late 1992 for a potential transfer of the
management of  the corporation’s three tea estates to COMDEV
for a period of  ten years.
From 1992 onwards, persistent rumours circulated in Anglophone
Cameroon that the Biya government was about to either sell, shut
down or privatise the CDC. While World Bank sources confirmed
that the external financiers were putting pressure on the government
to do so, the government continued to deny these rumours. On 15
July 1994 however, the government issued a decree announcing
the privatisation or liquidation of a first batch of 15 public
enterprises, notably in the transport and agro-industrial sectors. The
CDC was one of the most conspicuous victims of this decree and
the announcement caused commotion in Anglophone Cameroon.
All the existing parties, organisations and associations, among them
the SDF, SWELA, chiefs and Anglophone pressure groups, such as
the Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM) and the All
Anglophone Conference (AAC) (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003),
seemed to forget their differences as they rallied in protest against
what they perceived as ‘the attempt of the Biya government to sell
this sizable corporation, which has been for long the pride of
Anglophone Cameroon, to France’. Some also alleged that
privatisation was a ‘plan by Biya to compensate his “tribesmen”
and allies with a slice of the parastatal cake’. One local paper claimed
that the government was offering the CDC ‘at low cost to cronies’
(Konings 1996b: 212).
Protest marches were held in Anglophone towns. Protesters
carried banners with slogans such as ‘France: hands off Anglophones’
and ‘Hands off or we will burn the plantations’. CDC workers went
on strike as they thought privatisation would mean retrenchment.
A memorandum to Biya, co-signed by Anglophone pressure groups
including the newly created Southern Cameroons National Council
(SCNC), chiefs and prominent local landowners contended that the
CDC was not for sale as local landowners, in particular the Bakweri,
had neither relinquished ownership of CDC land nor received any
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royalties for its use since the corporation’s foundation in 1946, and
CDC workers had injected over FCFA 5.5 billion into the corporation
as compulsory savings during the crisis. In August 1994, the Biya
government sent a delegation of Anglophone ministers to the
capitals of the two Anglophone provinces to appease the population.
They were jeered, however, and accused of wanting to benefit from
the spoils. In Buea, the capital of  the South West Province, they
met an assembly of the powerful association of southwestern chiefs
that expressed to the delegation the region’s bewilderment at being
sacrificed on the altar of uncontrolled liberalisation. In Chapter 5, I
will show that the traditional and modern elite of the Bakweri has
continued to be the most prominent group in Anglophone resistance
against any government attempt to privatise the CDC.
The privatisation protest movement was one of the recent
developments in Anglophone Cameroon that made the Biya regime
painfully aware of  the growing unity and determination among
Anglophones in their struggle for redress of  the marginalisation
and subordination of their region within the Francophone-
dominated state.
Conclusion
This chapter has provided evidence of the argument put forward in
the previous chapter that the regional agro-industrial crisis and
reforms in Anglophone Cameroon have reinforced existing regional
sentiments among the South West elite. However these regional
sentiments appear ambivalent. This is manifest in the struggle for
control of the two major agro-industrial enterprises in the South
West Province. At times, they have tended to adopt an Anglophone
identity and resisted any attempt by the Francophone-dominated
state to dismantle the common Anglophone colonial legacy.
Consequently, when rumours started to spread that the Biya regime
intended to sell the few remaining Anglophone Cameroonian
companies to Francophone or French business interests, they rallied
behind the northwestern elite in defence of  Anglophone patrimony.
But as soon as they suspect the northwestern elite of being interested
in establishing control over economic resources in the South West,
they are inclined to adopt a South West identity for fear of  renewed
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North West domination over their province. Believing themselves
to have suffered greater disadvantage than North Westerners in the
Francophone-dominated post-colonial state, the South West elites
appear to be more inclined to adopt a South West identity than an
Anglophone identity.
Significantly, this study also provides evidence that, in the wake
of the introduction of multipartyism in late 1990, Anglophone
interests in general and South West interests in particular have been
represented first and foremost by the emerging non-political
associations and pressure groups of  the South West and Anglophone
elite rather than by the newly created political parties in the
Anglophone region. As Nyamnjoh & Rowlands (1998) acutely
observe, ethno-regional associations appear to have increasingly
become the prime movers in the regional political economy. While
personal animosities among southwestern political leaders prevented
them from founding a strong political party, even the popular North
West- based SDF gradually started losing its initial appeal in
Anglophone Cameroon. It still participated in Anglophone protest
marches against the privatisation of the CDC, mainly because the
majority of  CDC workers and managers are from the North West
and are strong SDF supporters. However, it was becoming
increasingly evident that the SDF was presenting itself as a national
rather than a regional party and was adopting an ambivalent, half-
hearted stand towards the Anglophone problem and Anglophone
demands for a return to the federal state (Krieger 1994; Konings &
Nyamnjoh 2003).
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CDC workers and the agro-industrial crisis
Introduction
Surprisingly, while it is now widely accepted that wage workers have
been among the most seriously affected by the economic crisis and
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in Africa, their responses
have hardly been studied. The existing literature tends to focus on
the actions of central labour organisations and their defence of
members’ interests. There seems to have been a large variation in
the role played by these organisations in African states: it is said to
have been ‘spectacular’ in Zambia (Simutanyi 1992), ‘considerable’
in Nigeria (Olukoshi & Aremu 1988), ‘unexpected[ly] low’ in Ghana
(Herbst 1991) and ‘absent’ in Cameroon (Mehler 1993; Konings
2007b). Although there are references to the responses of workers
themselves, these are seldom based on research at the local level.
This may give rise to easy generalisations and even to incomplete
or false interpretations of workers’ responses as numerous studies
of organised labour have highlighted the remarkable difference in
workers’ consciousness and actions between and within African
states, and the contradictions between the rank and file and the
union leadership (Jeffries 1978; Sandbrook & Cohen 1975).
Nigeria is one of the few countries in Africa for which empirical
studies on local workers’ responses to the economic crisis and SAPs
exist. These studies draw different conclusions. Oloyede (1992),
for example, claims that shop-floor workers in a local subsidiary of
a Dutch electronics multinational were more likely, on the basis of
a rational calculation of benefits and costs, to adopt an individual
survival orientation than a collective oppositional posture to
managerial adjustment measures, with the benefit in this case being
individual security or tenure, and the cost being the likely further
weakening of collectivism, which individual pursuit can bring about.
Some other case studies, however, do not support Oloyede’s claim:
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Bangura (1991) and Bangura & Beckman (1993), for example, argue
that Nigerian industrial workers have continued to oppose
managerial adjustment measures.
This chapter examines the response of plantation workers in
Nigeria’s neighbour, Cameroon. It focuses on CDC tea pluckers
who have had to cope with the severe crisis affecting the corporation
since 1986/87 and the subsequent structural adjustment measures
aimed at cost reduction and increases in productivity (see Chapter
2). Soon after the signing of  a four-year performance contract (1989/
90-1993/94) with the government, the CDC’s general manager
announced a managerial crusade against undisciplined and
unproductive workers:
In the Contract Plan drawn up and signed by the Government of
Cameroon and the Corporation, the corporation is required to meet
certain standards of efficiency and to be self-supporting and
profitable….. That is why we have to be generally very strict on
discipline and sanction any manifestation of laxity….. Maximum
efforts shall be required of employees so as to continuing producing
more at lower and lower cost; laxity and laissez faire which are
characterised by an alarming rate of  absenteeism and uncompleted
tasks shall not be tolerated.1
A study of tea pluckers’ responses to the crisis is all the more
interesting as the labour force on one of the two selected estates
was female-dominated. This enables an exploration of the possibility
of gender-related differences in pluckers’ responses, taking into
account the frequent assumption in managerial circles that female
workers are more docile and disciplined because of their persistent
subordination to patriarchal domination in society (cf. Elson &
Pearson 1984; Mies 1986; Ezumah & Fonsah 2004).
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first discusses the
role of CDC trade unions during the agro-industrial crisis and the
second part assesses the role of workers on CDC tea estates during
the agro-industrial crisis, showing their various modes of resistance
to the intensified control and exploitation in the labour process.
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Trade unionism in the CDC and the agro-industrial crisis
Trade unionism in the CDC has a long history. Immediately after
the corporation was established in 1946/47, a trade union was
organised on its estates and duly registered. This union, the
Cameroon Development Corporation Workers’ Union (CDCWU),
was soon to become one of  the largest and most powerful in West
Central Africa (Warmington 1960; Konings 1993a).
In contrast to the CDC management, the British Trusteeship
Authority was not opposed to the formation of  this union, if  only
as it offered a more sophisticated means of labour control. As in
other British colonies, the Labour Department was quite successful
in propagating a specific trade union model within the newly
established union, one that may be best described as ‘free, but
responsible’ trade unionism (Sandbrook 1975). This model actively
advised trade unionists to stay out of politics and solve conflicts
with their employers in a cordial manner through negotiations and
collective bargaining rather than through strikes. The strike weapon
was only to be used as a last resort if all other means of settling
disputes, including conciliation and arbitration, had failed.
I have demonstrated elsewhere that the introduction of this
type of trade union model resulted in the emergence of internal
contradictions between the moderate CDCWU union leaders,
who were mainly recruited from among the supervisory staff
and clerical workers, and the rank and file that comprised the
vast majority of  unskilled and semi-skilled workers. The latter
were less inclined than union leaders to have faith in the efficacy
of the institutionalised procedures of joint negotiation and
collective bargaining, and were more committed to militant action
(Konings 1993a; see also Chapter 1).
These contradictions in the relationship between the rank and
file and the union leadership were never fully worked out during
the CDCWU’s existence (1947-1972). This was mainly due to the
fact that the generally moderate union leadership was pressurised
by the rank and file into adopting an aggressive bargaining policy
with regard to the management and the government, employing the
strike option as a ‘tactical weapon’ (Paige 1975). Not only was strike
action frequently threatened, it was also regularly employed, with
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workers called out on strike if all peaceful means of settling a conflict
had been exhausted. As a result, union leaders tended to enjoy
massive support among the rank and file.
By the end of the 1960s however, the post-colonial state was
increasingly beginning to intervene in the system of  industrial
relations and to curtail union autonomy with a view to curbing labour
militancy and establishing ‘total’ control over civil society (Bayart
1979). The 1967 Federal Labour Code virtually outlawed strike
action in the country, seriously weakening the bargaining position
of  unions. Despite strong resistance on the part of  the CDCWU
leadership, trade unionism in the CDC came under state control in
1972. In a subsequent reorganisation, a single central labour
organisation was formed, first called the National Union of
Cameroon Workers (NUCW) but rechristened the Cameroon Trade
Union Congress (CTUC) in 1985. Existing unions, like the CDCWU,
were dissolved and new unions were created to organise workers
engaged in the same or related fields of activities within each
administrative division in the country.
This reorganisation had a number of disastrous consequences
for trade unionism at the CDC. First, it became subordinated to the
single party. Its primary responsibility was to turn workers into party
militants and educate them about the need for increased production
and constant dialogue with the employers. There were high
expectations among the party leadership that the new union model
was going to accomplish what the Trusteeship model of  autonomous
trade unionism had failed to achieve, namely the transformation of
trade unionism into an instrument of  labour control and a
responsible partner in national development.
The second major consequence was the fragmentation of the
union, which created serious obstacles to united trade union actions.
Since the reorganisation of trade unionism on a divisional basis,
CDC workers have belonged to five different agricultural workers’
unions, with membership depending on the administrative division
in which they are employed. As most CDC estates are in the Fako
Division of  the South West Province, the majority of  CDC workers
belong to the Fako Agricultural Workers’ Union (FAWU).
Thirdly, the union became paralysed by a lack of  funds. Through
the introduction of a new distribution system for contributions, the
divisional unions received no more than 50% of members’
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contributions. Moreover, a state-controlled National Committee for
Trade Union Contributions in Yaoundé was made responsible for
collecting and allocating the check-off contributions across the
whole country, resulting – unsurprisingly – in frequent and often
prolonged delays in the remittance of monies to the divisional unions
and in the large-scale misappropriation of  funds. This financial crisis
has prevented the divisional unions from employing more than a
few full-time officers and from organising any activities such as
educational courses.
Finally, the union was stripped of  any popular participation in
the decision-making process. Trade unionism became virtually a
one-man affair in the person of the president of the divisional union.
He owed his position more to the party’s selection than to workers’
support and was unlikely to be removed from office as long as he
enjoyed the party’s support. He ran the union without regularly
consulting the rank and file on policy matters or the allocation of
funds and Executive Committee, congress and mass meetings
became rare events. The union president also tried to control the
shop stewards who had been introduced in 1968. Rather like party
elections, union members were presented with a list of screened
candidates and all the workers could do was approve the union’s
nominees, leaving them with virtually no say in who would
represent them. In protest, workers sometimes refused to vote. Any
shop steward who caused the management trouble or opposed the
one-man rule of  the union ran the risk of  being victimised by the
president.
It was after the reorganisation of trade unionism in 1972 that
contradictions between the union leadership and the rank and file
became increasingly obvious. Co-opted in the control structure over
labour, the union’s leadership rapidly lost popular support. And even
more significantly, it proved to be incapable of  containing the rank
and file’s traditional militancy, as reflected in the large-scale
participation of CDC workers in several illegal strike actions after
1972 (Konings 1993a).
Interestingly, following the introduction of  a multi-party system
in the country in December 1990, CDC workers began to pressurise
the union leadership to fight for a return to union autonomy. Most
of  the CDC workers hail from the North West Province and are
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strong supporters of the Social Democratic Front (SDF), the major
opposition party based in Bamenda in the North West Province,
which started the fight against the one-party state (Mehler 1993).
Cornelius Vewessee, once chairman of  the CDCWU and, since 1974,
president of  the FAWU, also joined the opposition and soon became
one of  the most outspoken advocates of  trade union autonomy. In
February 1991, he declared:
The workers expect an independent and strong trade union
organisation that would be autonomous in relation to all political
parties and state bodies and institutions…. This will relieve the trade
union of  the rubber stamp element in the country’s political life. If
the trade union does not become more militant and resolute in its
demands, it will not be of  much help to the workers.2
Vewessee also dared to condemn the corrupt leadership of  the
Confederal Bureau of  the Cameroon Trade Union Congress (CTUC)
for its continuing alliance with the ruling party, the Cameroon
People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM), and its complete neglect
of the defence of workers’ interests during the economic crisis and
structural adjustment programme, a criticism that would have been
impossible before the introduction of multipartyism in 1991. His
relentless efforts yielded some success: on 2 April 1991, the CTUC
leadership publicly announced that union members were henceforth
free to join any party they chose. However during the executive
elections at the CTUC Congress in May 1992, which were clearly
manipulated by the ruling CPDM party, Vewessee failed to dissuade
most delegates from voting an alternative member of  the CPDM’s
Central Committee, Etame Ndidi, into the office of president of
the central labour organisation (Konings 2000, 2006, 2007b, 2009a).
Unfortunately, before the union leadership became involved in
the struggle for a return to trade union autonomy, it was already
being confronted with the unprecedented economic crisis in the
corporation (see Chapter 2). This further weakened the bargaining
position of the state-controlled unions vis-à-vis management. Their
principal strategy became to protect workers against retrenchment,
even if  this demanded curtailment of  past gains.
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In 1987, trade union presidents on the corporation’s estates were
approached by CDC management to assist in the planning and
implementation of  adjustment measures. Management had
apparently assumed that union assistance would be important in
controlling any anticipated resistance by workers to a painful
adjustment programme. This assumption was questionable as such
assistance on the part of the union leaders was just as likely to
enhance worker dissatisfaction with the union leadership and result
in their refusal to cooperate. However, the union presidents
eventually agreed to assist the management in its struggle for
economic recovery.3 There were a number of  factors behind this
decision including the fact that, since the reorganisation of trade
unionism in 1972, the union had become used to solving problems
with the management and the state through peaceful negotiation
rather than confrontation. In this particular case, union presidents
agreed with the management that, given the corporation’s inability
to secure any loans or public subsidies during the crisis, cost
reductions and productivity increases were necessary prerequisites
for economic recovery. Furthermore, they were assured by
management that nobody in the corporation would be exempt from
making sacrifices for the sake of  economic recovery. Finally, they
hoped that the implementation of an adjustment programme would
safeguard the jobs of the sizeable CDC labour force.
On 23 August 1987 the union presidents agreed to a substantial
increase in productivity by estate workers. For example, the daily
quota of green leaves expected of tea pluckers was raised from 26
kg to 32 kg. Union leaders assured management that they would
elicit workers’ support in this.4 As the corporation’s financial position
continued to deteriorate, management proposed further austerity
measures to the union presidents. After some negotiation, a new
agreement was signed on 6 January 1990 that entailed drastic cuts
of about 30-40% in the salaries and fringe benefits of workers and
managerial staff. The corporation used to supply workers with free
housing, water, electricity and medical facilities but now they were
obliged to make substantial contributions towards the supply of
these services themselves. The most draconian measure, however,
was the introduction of a compulsory savings scheme that forced
workers to save at least 15% of their wages to assist in the
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corporation’s recovery.5 It has been estimated that these compulsory
savings by workers and cuts in fringe benefits between February
1990 and February 1992 totalled about FCFA 2.9 billion.6
Following the achievement of  a degree of  trade union autonomy
in 1991, union presidents became somewhat more responsive to
the hardships their workers were facing and began to criticise the
adjustment programme they had previously supported. At their
urgent request, the CDC general manager organised a meeting to
reassess the January 1990 agreement and on 14 March 1992, the
FAWU president, Cornelius Vewessee, insisted on the termination
or modification of workers’ financial contributions to the
corporation’s recovery programme. He justified this remarkable
change in the unions’ position as follows:7
• The unions had expected that workers’ increased output and
financial sacrifices would have forestalled or at least minimised
any retrenchments. This had proved wishful thinking, and the
management had embarked on mass lay-offs. For example,
between 1986/87 and 1990/91, the labour force at the Tole
and Ndu Tea Estates was cut from 1546 to 974 and from
1750 to 1333 respectively.
• The unions had expected the government to take appropriate
measures to stabilise the prices of essential commodities and
standardise the wages of the agro-industrial parastatals but
this had not happened. Nor had the National Social Insurance
Fund continued to pay family allowances to workers. In fact,
prices had skyrocketed after the opposition’s ‘Ghost Town’
campaign,8 wages had been frozen since July 1985 and taxes
increased by 100%. As a result, CDC workers ‘would now
seem to be carrying out forced labour as a majority of the
labour force has no take-home wages at the end of the month’.
• The unions had supported the 6 January 1990 agreement
because the CDC was unable to obtain financial assistance at
that time. This situation, however, had recently changed with
a CCCE grant to the corporation of  FCFA 7 bn. As a result,
workers were no longer willing to make further sacrifices.
• The unions would no longer tolerate the fact that workers
were making sacrifices for economic recovery while the
political and managerial elite ‘continued to loot the
parastatals’.9
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Management refused to cancel the 6 January 1990 agreement.
The only concession it was willing to make was a 3% reduction in
the compulsory savings rate to partially compensate workers for
tax increases. This was unacceptable to the unions. As management
refused to reconsider its offer, FAWU president Cornelius Vewessee
declared a collective trade dispute on 13 May 1992, and when
management tried to employ delaying tactics, CDC workers in the
Fako Division went on strike (21 to 26 May 1992). Management
then agreed to various amendments of the 6 January 1990 agreement
including reintroducing free accommodation and water for the
workers and a 24% reduction in medical costs.10
Although there was a slight improvement in the relationship
between the union leadership and the management after these
amendments, tensions and conflicts have never completely
disappeared. The union presidents regularly complain about the
management’s lack of  consultation with them, while the
management, in turn, constantly stresses that the unions should
concentrate more on an increase in labour productivity in times of
crisis than on the representation of  workers’ interests.
Tea pluckers and the agro-industrial crisis
In 1991-92 in an attempt to understand CDC workers’ responses to
the adjustment measures, I carried out intensive research on two
regional CDC tea estates that had been set up during the 1950s
when the British Trusteeship Authority started to actively promote
local tea production (Konings 1995a, 1996c, 1998c, 2009b). The
first, the Tole Tea Estate, was created in the Fako Division of  the
South West Province in 1954. It is the only CDC estate to employ
predominantly female pluckers, the majority of whom come from
the North West Province, which is the traditional labour reserve
for the coastal plantations (DeLancey 1974). The second estate,
the Ndu Tea Estate, was started in 1957 and is in the Donga-Mantung
Division of  the North West Province. It was owned by a British-
Indian multinational, the Estates and Agency Company Ltd (EAC)
that had substantial tea interests in India and Sri Lanka, and was
taken over by the CDC in 1977. At present, it is the only CDC
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estate in the North West Province and one of  the few CDC estates
without labour camps. It employs almost exclusively local male
labour.
The gender difference in the labour forces employed on these
estates is by no means accidental (Konings 1995a). It is the outcome
of two potentially conflicting factors: the capitalist preference for
female pluckers and patriarchal control over female labour in the
local communities (Stichter & Parpart 1988). Tea estates, in fact,
were among the few capitalist enterprises during colonial rule that
gave preference to female labour and there has long been a demand
for female labour on tea estates throughout the world. The rationale
for this was the managerial belief that women tended to be more
productive than men in certain tasks (they had ‘nimble fingers’ and
were, therefore, naturally suited to plucking), as well as being more
docile and cheaper. This formed a direct threat to the customary
patriarchal control over female labour.
In 1952, just a few years before the two estates were set up,
Kaberry published her classic study of women in the present North
West Province in which she emphasises the contradictory position
of  women in society. On the one hand, there is a general recognition
that women play an indispensable role in society as child bearers
and food producers but on the other, they are subordinated to
patriarchal controls in society. These contradictions may not,
however, be as puzzling as they first appear. Control over women’s
vital productive and reproductive labour used to constitute the basis
of  men’s prestige, power and wealth in society. In a more recent
study of  women in the North West Province, Goheen (1993: 250)
observed:
Women grew the food crops and were expected to provide the
necessities of  daily life from their farms. Women’s productive labour
forced men to participate in (lucrative) trading networks; their
reproductive labour increased the size of the household and thus
the status and the labour force of the male head. Any surplus value
women produced over and above that required for household needs
and petty barter was in the hands of men, who retained all the
profits.
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Managerial demands for female pluckers proved to be more
successful on the Tole Tea Estate than on the Ndu Tea Estate
because capitalism had had a more disruptive effect on social
formations in the South West Province than in the North West
Province. Consequently, patriarchal opposition to female
employment on the newly established tea estates was less
pronounced in the former than the latter province. The introduction
of  plantation agriculture in the South West Province during German
colonial rule resulted in the large-scale expropriation of  land and a
regular flow of  migrant labour, especially from the North West
Province, to coastal estates. The CDC, which took over most of
the former German plantation lands, was not dependent on the
goodwill of the local chiefs for the supply of land and labour when
the Tole Tea Estate was created in 1954. Furthermore, chieftaincy
was a relatively weak institution in the segmentary societies of the
South West Province and was often a colonial creation (cf. Geschiere
1993). Despite the pervasive ideology of  patriarchal dominance in
their communities, these chiefs were in no position to contest
managerial decisions about employing female labour as they had no
authority on CDC estates. Moreover, when the Tole Tea Estate
was established, female employment on CDC estates was not a new
phenomenon and CDC management used to encourage workers’
wives to seek employment there (Konings 1993a).
In comparison with the South West Province, there was little
capitalist penetration in the North West Province. Determined to
create a tea estate at Ndu in 1956/57, the EAC management was
heavily dependent on the goodwill of the local chief and elders for
land and labour since chieftaincy continued to be a powerful
institution in the centralised states of  the North West Province
(Nkwi & Warnier 1982; Warnier 2009) and was still capable of
resisting any serious capitalist onslaught on local value systems and
patterns of  authority. During negotiations, the chief  of  Ndu strongly
opposed the managers’ proposals to employ female pluckers on the
estate, insisting instead on the employment of local male labour as
a prerequisite to the setting up of the estate in his area of jurisdiction.
This was a condition that would not only halt the migration of
local male labour to coastal areas but also forestall the construction
of  labour camps, common to the coastal estates. In this way, he
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hoped to safeguard not only traditional male control over women’s
productive and reproductive labour but also the continuous
integration of male workers into the local community and their
loyalty to the traditional code of  ethics and authority patterns.
In the end, he agreed that women could be employed on the
estate for specific activities, notably weeding, on a casual or
temporary basis and provided their employment did not affect their
productive and reproductive responsibilities in the local community.
The EAC negotiating team had no other choice but to comply with
the conditions set out by the local chief.
From the start, the labour force on these estates shared some
common characteristics (see Table 3.1). First, they tended to be
either illiterate or poorly educated, which is not surprising. For this
category of  workers, plantation labour forms a rare employment
opportunity in the capitalist sector. Second, workers are mainly men
and women who have tried to escape from the control of (male)
elders in their local communities and build an autonomous existence.
Table 3.1 shows that most of  the women employed on the Tole Tea
Estate tended to be ‘husbandless’ (cf. Bryceson 1980). Some were
young, single women who had no access to land but were expected
to work as unpaid labour on family farms. Most, however, were
older women who had lost relatively secure usufruct rights to land
as a result of the death of a husband or divorce. Rather than
becoming dependent on family elders for their survival, they preferred
to migrate to the tea estate where they could be sure of a regular
monthly wage income. Ndu workers, in contrast, tended to be local
men who had failed to become family heads and were thus eager to
escape from the control of those who had succeeded. They saw
plantation labour as a route to a relatively autonomous existence
and, above all, to social mobility in the local community. There was
often a specific sequence in the attainment of such social mobility
objectives: first to build a house and to marry one (or more) wives
who would be responsible for the cultivation of food; then to set
up a coffee farm and raise cattle; and eventually to invest in the
acquisition of honorific titles that give access to the same power
and wealth in the local community that is available to hereditary
office and title holders. These were not easy objectives for poorly
paid estate workers, and very few managed to accomplish them all.
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Table 3.1 Demographic characteristics of  tea estate workers in Cameroon (%)
_____________________________________________________________________
Tole women Ndu men
Age
15-24 years  7.5   3.5
25-34 years 32.5 25.0
35-44 years         41.0   38.5
45-54 years  17.0     28.0
55 years and over      2.0                           5.0
100                               100
Marital Status
single   9.0 8.0
married    32.0   90.5
widowed 27.0  1.0
divorced/separated 25.0    0.5
free union         7.0
    100    100
Educational Level
illiterate  78.0  56.5
primary education 20.5 39.5
post-primary education 1.5   4.0
100                            100
Religion
Christian 94.0  92.0
ancestral belief 6.0  7.0
Muslim 1.0
100         100
Years of  Service
0-5 years 17.0    12.5
5-10 years   19.5     24.5
10-15 years 39.0  17.5
15-25 years  19.5   31.5
25 years or more  5.0   14.0
100    100
___________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Data supplied by estate offices.
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Thirdly, the labour force on these estates tended to be highly
committed and became increasingly stable. Over 60% of  the Tole
and Ndu workers were employed on the estate for more than ten
years (see Table 3.1). In general, both groups had a high stake in
plantation labour. Tole female workers tended to be not only
husbandless but also household heads with children to support. They
were often highly dependent on plantation labour for the
reproduction of  their families, lacking both the time and energy to
engage in additional income-generating activities. Most had acquired
a small food farm for subsistence and trading purposes but
experienced difficulties in combining food production and trade with
their daily workload on the estate and in the household. Ndu workers,
too, worked for a long period on the estate, eager to realise their
social mobility goals. Although they became involved in a variety
of potentially lucrative economic activities, such as coffee
production, cattle rearing and trade during their careers, they would
retain their jobs on the estate. Plantation labour served as an
insurance against future misfortune in their expanding economic
activities and as a source of further investment.
Despite these common characteristics, there are also some
differences between the Tole female workers and the Ndu male
workers. One major difference is the degree of  contact with their
home towns. Unlike the Ndu male workers who remained firmly
integrated in their local community, Tole female workers maintained
very few close links with their region of origin. The single women
in particular seem to have largely severed their ties with their home
towns and villages and their escape from patriarchal control tended
to prevent them from maintaining contact with family members and
gaining access to land at home. Their ‘exit option’ from wage
employment is usually a switch to petty trade in urban centres rather
than a return home. Even married female workers on the Tole Tea
Estate seem to find it difficult to keep up intensive contact with
family members at home. Geographical distance and a six-day
working week present serious obstacles to regular communication.
Many female workers only visit their home towns in the annual period
of leave or for special occasions, such as funerals of close kin.
There are divisions within the labour force on the two estates
that are based mainly on education, occupation, gender and marital
status as well as ethnic and regional origin. There is a division, for
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instance, between the vast majority of illiterate and poorly educated
field workers and the tiny group of  better educated clerical workers.
The latter tend to look down on the field workers and to treat them
with little respect when they visit the estate offices. There is also a
division between male and female workers. The root of  this cleft is
the pervasive ideology of  male dominance. For example, male
workers expect the (male) management to give them preference
over female workers when there is an opportunity for further training
or promotion, and to fire female workers first when retrenchment is
required. They are reluctant to work under female supervision and
regularly harass their female colleagues. There is a persistent fear
among married men that wage employment will make their wives
too headstrong or independent. There is also a division between
married and unmarried female workers. Unmarried women tend to
be relatively free from patriarchal controls but are accorded very
little respect, being labelled as loose women or prostitutes. Married
female workers, on the other hand, are highly respected but are still
subordinated to male dominance. Some husbands insist that,
according to African tradition, women are responsible for the upkeep
of the family and they tend to make very little financial contribution
to their family’s upkeep, spending their wages as they choose.
Others, especially men from the North West Province, even claim
that they are traditionally entitled to their wives’ wage income.
Finally, there are divisions along ethnic and regional lines. There
is a greater ethnic and regional heterogeneity among the Tole female
workers than among the Ndu male workers. On the Tole Tea Estate,
there is a clear North West-South West divide: 67% of  Tole female
workers originate from ethnic groups in the North West Province
and 29% from ethnic groups in the South West Province. On the
Ndu Estate, almost all workers hail from two ethnic groups in the
North West Province: 73% belong to the local ethnic group, the
Wimbum (Jeffries 1962; Probst & Bühler 1990), and 23% come
from the neighbouring ethnic group, the Nso (Goheen 1996), most
of  whom live in villages near the estates. Although ethnic and
regional heterogeneity is a potential source of conflict, with rivalry
being sparked by suspicions of favouritism in hiring or promotion
or due to disagreements with supervisors or co-workers, there have
been few incidences of serious, protracted ethnic clashes on either
estate. Interestingly, although the labour force at the Ndu Tea Estate
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is ethnically less heterogeneous than at the Tole Tea Estate, it was
nevertheless the scene of more overt ethnic tensions and conflicts
in the 1960s. This was partly due to Ndu chauvinism: since the
estate was located on Ndu land, the chief and local people used to
claim that Ndu workers be given priority when vacancies occurred
for leading positions.
Generally speaking however, estate workers of different ethnic
groups and regions live and work peacefully together. It has been
the consistent policy of the management and church and union
leaders to mobilise and organise workers on a multi-ethnic basis, and
this seems to have created a certain degree of understanding and
tolerance among workers for each other’s sociocultural background
and to have fostered bonds of companionship and friendship across
ethnic boundaries. The general use of  Pidgin English has helped to
overcome barriers of communication between the various ethnic
groups. The most important reason for this relative harmony,
however, appears to be the sharing of similar living and working
conditions on the estates, which are classic examples of occupational
communities. The internal divisions that do exist have never
prevented tea pluckers from regularly engaging in common actions
to protect their interests. Estate workers display a rather ambivalent
attitude towards plantation labour: they appreciate it as it provides
them with a regular source of income but they have an acute sense
of  being exploited and of  subordination in the labour process.
As in other parts of the world (cf. Loewenson 1992), estate
workers in Cameroon receive relatively low remuneration for their
arduous work but, unlike in many places (cf. Kurian 1982), there is
no difference in the remuneration of male and female workers on
Cameroonian estates. Before the economic recession, tea pluckers
on CDC estates used to earn an average net monthly wage of  FCFA
20,000-25,000. However quite a number of pluckers were unable
to earn this much due to the link between the remuneration of
workers and the system of task work. Achieving the daily targets
set by management entitled a worker to a daily basic wage; while
non-completion of the allotted task was punished by a pro-rata
payment according to the work completed. While workers’ incomes
have seriously decreased during the economic crisis, managerial
controls over the labour process have intensified to improve labour
discipline and productivity.
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Since the first days of estate tea production, the union leadership
and the Labour Department have consistently instructed pluckers
that their union was the normal intermediary channel between
workers and management. As a result, workers have usually turned
to the union in the first instance for representation and defence of
their interests. Their support for their union has never been
unconditional however. They expected union leaders to act promptly
and actively during individual and collective disputes and to produce
results. When such expectations were not realised, workers began
to bypass the union and use alternative methods, such as informal
actions, pursued on an individual or small-scale basis, or collective
actions (Cohen 1980; Crisp 1984). This was particularly true of  the
period of state-controlled unionism. Loss of confidence in the union
seems to have been more evident at the Tole Tea Estate than at the
Ndu Tea Estate. The degree of  participation in union affairs has
always been conspicuously lower among female pluckers than among
their male counterparts because of  the patriarchal union structure
and women’s multiple productive and reproductive responsibilities
outside the labour process (cf. Parpart 1988; Pittin 1984).
Confronted with the (initially) close cooperation between the
union leadership and the management in the planning and
implementation of austere adjustment measures, the response of
the tea pluckers was complex and varied. Some workers opted for a
single strategy, others for several strategies, simultaneously or
consecutively. A growing number of  pluckers have become survival-
oriented in the climate of  insecurity. In the interest of  keeping their
jobs they are inclined to acquiesce in whatever stringent economic
recovery measures management may introduce. They try to impress
the management with above-average output and avoid conflicts with
their supervisors. This seems to be more marked among Tole female
pluckers than Ndu male pluckers, which is no doubt attributable to
the fact that the Ndu male pluckers are still strongly integrated in
the local community and enjoy an easier exit option than the Tole
female workers.
Some workers continue to rely on the unions to handle their
individual and collective grievances but a growing number are
bypassing the unions and lodging their complaints directly with the
Labour Department. It is overburdened with work, which results in
long delays in settling disputes. What is even more striking is the
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fact that the majority of  workers have clung to their informal and
collective resistance during the crisis. Since the corporation’s
foundation in 1946/47, such actions have usually been oriented at
combating managerial efforts such as attempts to increase labour
productivity, notably through an increase in task work; to strengthen
control over the labour process; and to minimise wages and other
conditions of  service. Such managerial efforts, which are obviously
crucial to capital accumulation, were intensified during the
economic crisis and became central to the corporation’s adjustment
measures. The workers’ persistent resistance to these efforts is
principally manifest in their informal actions, which is quite
understandable: collective actions are extremely risky in a situation
where strikes are virtually outlawed and are likely to elicit severe
managerial reprisals in the form of  summary dismissals. Collective
action is a last resort when other means of settling long-standing
disputes have failed. Significantly, however, the number and intensity
of  informal actions, which are difficult to control by the
management, have increased during the crisis in response to the
various adjustment measures introduced by the management.
Tea pluckers and managerial efforts to maximise
labour productivity
On 23 August 1987, union presidents informed pluckers on both
estates that they had agreed with the management to an increase in
the amount of  green leaves to be picked daily from 26 kg to 32 kg.
Most pluckers strongly resented this and told their union presidents
that the new norm was too high as many had already had difficulties
in reaching the old quota.
The Tole female pluckers continued to resist the implementation
of  the new norm on the estate. Eventually, the CDC’s general
manager had to call upon FAWU president Cornelius Vewessee to
make renewed attempts to persuade the women to accept the
agreement. At a mass meeting organised by the union on 23 October
1987, the women reluctantly agreed to accept the new norm on
condition that every worker in the corporation was obliged to
contribute to its economic recovery. The Ndu male pluckers could
not forestall the implementation of  the new norm on the estate but
soon started to express their dissatisfaction. During the executive
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elections of  the Donga-Mantung Agricultural Workers’ Union
(DUAW) in September 1987, they refused to re-elect their president,
Johnson Tanto Massa, and instead voted a non-estate worker, G.N.
Majam, into office. Then they started a go-slow in November 1987,
which resulted in all of them being paid pro-rata. It was only after
they had been given the opportunity to check upon the
implementation of  the new norm on the other CDC tea estates that
they were willing to call off  their actions.
A year later, on 3 October 1988, Tole female pluckers went on
strike alleging that they were unable to fulfil the new requirements
in spite of  working from 6.30 a.m. to 6 p.m. each day. They no
longer felt obliged to adhere to the agreement as their condition for
accepting the new norm – the contribution of  all workers to the
economic recovery programme – had not yet been met by the
management. The union president, Cornelius Vewessee, strongly
condemned the pluckers’ strike actions, pointing out that they were
illegal as they had not followed the prescribed procedures for settling
conflicts. He was booed and jeered by the angry pluckers. The CDC
general manager then threatened the strikers with dismissal if they
did not report for work the next day, with the result that most
pluckers decided to resume work. Seventy-nine remained on strike
but they were summarily dismissed by management. Many of them
stayed in the area surviving on farming and trading.
No further collective actions on this issue have been reported.
There is, however, evidence that pluckers are increasingly resorting
to informal actions to protest against managerial efforts to raise
labour productivity. Unexpectedly, the corporation’s statistical data
seem to suggest that there has been an increase rather than a decrease
in various forms of  informal resistance during the crisis, such as
arriving late at work, absenteeism, malingering and poor work
performance. The proportion of  the total days lost due to
uncompleted work rose from 7.22% in 1987/88 to 8.24% in 1989/
90, while those lost as a result of unauthorised absence rose from
5.27% in 1987/88 to 5.71% in 1989/90.11 Although this increase
might appear small, it is nevertheless significant if one takes into
account the intensification of managerial efforts to increase labour
discipline during the economic crisis. The rate of  absenteeism at
the Tole Tea Estate has certainly caused concern: the estate manager
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reported to the union that absenteeism was responsible for the loss
of over 1700 person-days during July and August 1992. He
estimated the corporation’s financial loss at about FCFA 11 million
and warned the union president that he would not hesitate to dismiss
more than a hundred workers if the union and shop stewards failed
to address the situation.12 The managerial crusade against
undisciplined and unproductive workers appears not to have been
successful.
Tea pluckers and managerial efforts to strengthen
control over the labour process
Supervisory staff  constitute an essential link between the estate
management and the workers in the labour process. They are
expected to communicate the orders of estate managers to the
workers and maintain discipline in the labour process.
Like other CDC workers, pluckers have always drawn a clear
line between ‘bad’ and ‘nice’ supervisors. Bad supervisors treat
workers as objects of production and are largely insensitive to their
plight. They may be differentiated into two types (see Adesina 1989):
supervisors who are notoriously authoritarian and bossy and who
command their subordinates without taking into account their
opinions and advice; and those who are over-zealous in their duties,
interested only in increasing output and who supervise their
subordinates closely and without compassion. Nice supervisors, by
contrast, are those who treat their subordinates as human beings in
the labour process and take their personal and domestic problems
into consideration when exercising their supervisory powers. They
are usually less strict and allow workers a certain measure of
autonomy in the execution of  their allotted tasks.
Since the start of the economic crisis, the management has put
enormous pressure on the supervisory staff  to exercise tight control
over their subordinates, to use their authority to the full and, if
necessary, to discipline workers without compassion. Increasingly
authoritarian supervision seems not to have had the desired effect of
strengthening managerial control over the labour process but rather
to have provoked workers, making them feel like slaves who are
constantly being pushed to increase production for no reward.
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Although there used to be numerous collective actions aimed at
the transfer or dismissal of  strict supervisors, such actions have
abated during the economic crisis. Workers seem to have realised that
not only are these actions risky but they will almost certainly be
ineffective, with the management actively backing exacting supervisors
and being unlikely to give in to collective demands for their removal.
However, there still seems to be widespread informal resistance
to intensified managerial control over the labour process, which
manifests itself  in the following forms.
• Insubordination. It is not uncommon for workers to simply
refuse to carry out orders, even if refusal might result in a
considerable loss of  output. For instance, some Ndu pluckers
refuse to work during heavy downpours in the cold, rainy
season. Others refuse to do overtime on Saturdays during the
peak plucking season as they see Saturday afternoons as a
time for resting, visiting friends and relatives or working on
their own coffee farms. Estate records suggest that
insubordination is increasingly being accompanied by insults
and abuse and even physical attacks on supervisory staff.
• Attempts to discredit supervisory staff. At times, pluckers play tricks
on supervisors and discredit them with their superiors. This
may include falsely accusing them of  bribery or corruption in
the hope that management will take action against them.
• The threat of using mystical powers. Pluckers sometimes threaten
to harm or kill a supervisor through sorcery and witchcraft. It
is difficult to know whether this is mere bluff or seen as a real
threat.
Tea pluckers and managerial efforts to minimise wages
and conditions of  service
Workers have always fought for improved living standards and
steadfastly resisted managerial efforts to curtail their wages and fringe
benefits. It is small wonder that they were furious about the 6 January
1990 agreement between the management and unions that introduced
a compulsory savings scheme and drastic cuts in their fringe benefits.
Their bitterness was reflected in various collective actions.
90
Crisis and Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
Directly after signing the agreement, the newly elected DUAW
president, Mr G.N. Majam, was accused by the shop stewards of
betraying workers’ interests. The shop stewards subsequently refused
to communicate the terms of  the agreement to the workers and
when Mr Majam himself tried to explain the agreement, he barely
escaped a severe beating by angry workers. Following Mr Majam’s
dismal failure to persuade workers to accept the agreement, the
CDC’s general manager decided to go to Ndu personally. At a mass
meeting, he threatened workers by claiming that non-acceptance
of the agreement would inevitably lead to the closure of the estate
because of  the corporation’s precarious financial position. This left
them with no other option but to comply.
A year later on 4 January 1991, Ndu workers went on strike without
informing the shop stewards or the union leadership. Faced with
serious financial problems after the drastic cuts in their incomes, they
were angry that their family allowances had not been paid for eighteen
months and that they, unlike other CDC workers, had not received
any Christmas advance. Attempts by the Labour Department and
the union to settle the strike failed and it was only after the payment
of family allowances on 9 January 1991 that work resumed.
In early 1992, all CDC workers in the Fako Division, including
the Tole female pluckers, started to agitate for the abrogation of  the
6 January 1990 agreement and the immediate payment of nearly two
years of  family-allowance arrears. Their demands were supported by
the FAWU president, Cornelius Vewessee. The workers went on
strike on 21 May 1992 and refused to negotiate with management
until Vewessee returned from the CTUC conference he was attending
in Yaoundé. On his return on 26 May, they called off  the strike and
authorised him to negotiate with the management, which eventually
resulted in an amendment of the 6 January 1990 agreement.
Besides sporadic collective actions, workers have engaged in a
variety of  informal actions in protest at reductions in income,
including output restrictions, sabotage and involvement in illegal
income-generating activities. Some pluckers do not abide by plucking
standards and mix bad leaves with good ones, a practice that enables
them to complete their task more quickly and achieve more weight
and income. Others cut down tea bushes and use them for firewood,
while others steal tea from the factory and sell it to middlemen.
The management has frequently complained that the theft of tea
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has reached unprecedented levels and has caused the company
serious losses. Increased theft is closely connected with the workers’
interpretation of this criminal offence: it would appear that they
regard this and other illegal activities as an opportunity to take what
is due to them in return for their hard labour, and for reducing the
degree of their exploitation in the labour process (Gordon 1977).
Conclusion
This study of CDC plantation workers presents a more complex
picture of labour responses to the economic crisis and SAPs than
the case studies available of  Nigerian industrial workers. CDC tea
pluckers have employed a variety of strategies to cope with
managerial adjustment measures. A growing number are adopting
an individual survival orientation rather than an oppositional posture
and doing their utmost to make a good impression on management
through hard work and disciplined behaviour in the hope that this
will help them escape the regular retrenchments. Some workers are
relying on the bargaining strength of the state-controlled unions to
protect their interests but many workers are bypassing the unions
and lodging their individual and collective complaints with the
Labour Department, which is still perceived by most workers as a
neutral intermediary between management and labour.
Unexpectedly, the majority of  workers have continued to resort to
sporadic collective actions and frequent informal actions to protest
at their intensified exploitation and subordination.
A number of factors account for the continuing resistance of
many CDC workers. One is their remarkable degree of  solidarity.
The various internal divisions among workers have never impeded
them from regularly resorting to joint actions against their employer
although their solidarity has been weakened somewhat by the present
economic crisis. This solidarity has been promoted by their shared
living and working conditions and a linga franca (Pidgin English),
which allows for easy communication (cf. Ardener et al. 1960;
DeLancey 1973). A second factor is the workers’ persistent belief
in the efficacy of militant action. The illiterate and poorly educated
estate workers have always put less faith in institutionalised
bargaining procedures than the relatively moderate union leadership
that is mainly composed of  clerks and supervisory staff. The regular
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failure of these procedures to achieve workers’ aims and the
establishment of state control over the unions have strengthened
this belief that militant action is the only way of bringing
management to its knees and redressing long-standing grievances.
A growing lack of motivation among workers during the crisis
has also played a role. Increased productivity has not resulted in
increased wages and workers’ real incomes have been seriously
eroded. Most workers, and women in particular, are still reluctant
to resign and lose their regular monthly wage income, however
meagre it may be, but a growing number, mostly men, are no longer
interested in keeping their job at any cost, especially as they have
lost confidence in the corporation eventually recovering
economically. Some workers have already resigned, having collected
their long-service awards and gratuities as well as their voluntary
and compulsory savings. They are using this capital to invest in
farming, trading and other potentially lucrative activities. Others
are contemplating resignation. No longer committed to their jobs
and having worked out alternatives, workers are becoming more
militant and less reluctant to show resistance.
Another factor influencing workers’ attitudes is their daily
exposure to glaring socio-economic inequalities on the estates.
Although the corporation’s adjustment measures have effected a
substantial reduction in the high salaries and fringe benefits of the
managerial staff, there is still a wide gap in incomes and living
standards between them and the workers. Workers’ acute feelings
of exploitation and subordination are undoubtedly reinforced by
the sharp contrast between their own misery and managerial
opulence. Finally, CDC workers’ continuing resistance has also been
influenced by their perceptions of the state. In his comparative work,
Burawoy (1985) used the concepts of ‘productive politics’ and
‘global politics’ to tackle the complex relationship between the
labour process and the state. Like most Cameroonians, CDC workers
attribute the economic crisis primarily to the corruption and
mismanagement of  the ruling regime rather than to the sharp fall in
commodity prices. The majority belong to one of  the opposition
parties, mostly the popular Social Democratic Front (SDF). They
are unwilling to make voluntary sacrifices in the name of economic
recovery as long as the regime in power lacks legitimacy and is only
interested in the ‘politics of the belly’ (Bayart 1989).
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Management has failed dismally to control workers’ resistance
during the crisis and there is no reason to believe that it will succeed
in the near future. On the contrary, there are indications that labour
resistance may increase. The unions have largely regained their
former autonomy and their leadership has become more critical of
the adjustment measures that it had previously agreed upon with
management. CDC workers have always admired militant union
leadership and are inclined to support any union action in defence
of  their interests.
I did not find any evidence to support the widespread assumption
that female workers in developing countries are more amenable to
control than male workers. There was a slight difference in the degree
and modes of  resistance between Ndu male pluckers and Tole female
pluckers: Ndu male pluckers were somewhat more militant because
they enjoy an easier exit option due to their close links with their
local community. On the other hand, Tole female pluckers have
shown themselves to be more inclined to circumventing the state-
controlled unions and engaging in alternative modes of resistance
because of  the union’s patriarchal structure and their own multiple
productive and reproductive responsibilities outside the labour
process.
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4
Trade unions and Pamol’s crisis
and liquidation
Introduction
Trade union formation was more difficult on the Pamol estates than
at the CDC and it was not until independence and reunification in
1961 that a permanent trade union, the Pamol Cameroon Workers’
Union (PCWU), was set up at Pamol. The PCWU proved to be
weaker than the CDCWU. Although it was able to preserve a large
degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the state between 1961 and 1972, its
leadership, both the moderate and the militant elements, found it
hard to represent and defend workers’ interests. Since the leadership
often failed to deliver on promises, workers were inclined to
circumvent the union and defend their own interests by engaging in
collective action. Like the CDCWU, the PCWU was dissolved in
1972 and integrated into state-controlled trade unionism until
political liberalisation in the early 1990s when trade unions regained
a certain measure of  autonomy.
In the first part of this chapter, the role of Pamol trade unionism
is examined from its start until the company’s crisis in 1980. The
second part discusses its role during Pamol’s crisis and subsequent
liquidation (1980-1994).
The birth and development of trade unionism
on the Pamol estates
Trade unionism has a long history on the Pamol estates (Konings
1998a). The first initiatives by senior workers to form a union were
taken in the early 1940s, soon after the British administration passed
legislation permitting trade unionism in West Africa. Confronted
with growing labour militancy and emergent nationalism in their
colonies, the British came to consider the formation of  free but
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responsible trade unions as a more sophisticated strategy for labour
control than outright repression of workers’ organisational efforts
(see Chapters 1 and 3).
Setting up trade unions on the Pamol estates, however, proved
difficult. Like most other employers in West Africa, Pamol’s
management was initially opposed to them, fearing that the rank
and file would be mobilised to militant action. Unilever appears to
have never been in favour of trade unions, preferring instead to
deal directly with workers’ representatives (Berlan et al. 1978).
Moreover, the vast majority of  Pamol’s estate workers were illiterate
and employed on temporary contracts, and a large proportion were
Nigerian. Such groups of workers obviously showed little interest
in joining a local union. There was also the problem of  leadership.
Just as at the CDC, most initiatives regarding union formation then
were taken by clerks and senior technical workers who had the
education, skills and status required to handle the bureaucratic
procedures involved in unionism and play the complex games
involved in collective bargaining. At the same time, they were often
mistrusted by the illiterate workers who were suspicious of  white-
collar workers representing their interests and who had more faith
in militant action than in collective bargaining. In its 1948 report to
the United Nations, the British Trusteeship Authority perceptively
observed:
The development of trade unions is still in the most elementary
stage and the majority of the workers have no conception of the
proper functioning of a trade union. The labourers are very distrustful
of the clerks, and the high percentage of illiteracy among them
constitutes a serious handicap to the understanding of sound trade
union principles. They have little faith in collective bargaining and, in
times of  unrest, they have often repudiated their union’s leadership
which is composed mainly of clerks and resorted to strikes and acts
of violence which seems to them to be the only means of enforcing
their demands.1
One final difficulty was communication between workers on the
various Pamol estates. One of  Pamol’s rubber estates, the Bwinga
Estate, was located in Fako Division, which is relatively far away
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from the Pamol headquarters in the Ndian Division. The other
estates are located in isolated areas and difficult to reach. This
constituted a serious obstacle to setting up a company union.
All the initiatives to establish unions on the Pamol estates either
failed or were short-lived during the British Trusteeship era.2 On
the advice of the Labour Department however, management
introduced consultative committees at the divisional and central
level that allowed joint consultation even though they were clearly
dominated by the management. They often served merely as a means
of  disseminating management information to workers. A 1956
inspection report on the Ndian Estate gives an idea of their
functioning:
There is no trade union membership. The estate is divided into four
divisions and in each there are divisional consultative committees
which meet monthly. There is also a Central Joint Consultative
Committee which meets every two months or more often if
necessary. Examination of  the minutes shows that the meetings have
been called on most occasions by the management. Items by the
workers’ side are usually produced as ‘other matters’. A paternal
attitude seems to prevail, with the workers’ side offering a vote of
thanks to the management at the end of  the meetings.3
In the absence of  any permanent trade union organisation and
adequate consultative machinery, Pamol workers nevertheless
showed a significant capacity to defend their interests by engaging
in sporadic, and usually short-term, collective actions. These were
localised strikes that were restricted to one estate, or even to one
division on an estate, and were motivated by local workers’ specific,
sometimes long-standing, grievances about managerial control and
exploitation, such as white managerial staff members’ racist attitudes
towards workers, an extreme authoritarian exercise of duties, ethnic
discrimination and favouritism by supervisory staff, low
remuneration or increases in task work (Konings 1998a).
Independence and reunification on 1 October 1961 put an end
to any previous attempts to organise Pamol workers in Nigeria and
Cameroon into one union. Senior workers on the Lobe Estate, who
had failed to set up a union during the uncertain, hectic period
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preceding independence, now decided to form a union that would
embrace all Pamol’s estates in Cameroon. Following consultations
with senior workers on other Pamol estates, they announced the
establishment of  the Pamol Cameroon Workers’ Union (PCWU)
on 28 October 1961.
The founders initially saw the union as an organisation that would
defend the interests of Cameroonian workers not only against
management but also against Nigerian workers.4 This attitude is
understandable if one takes into account the strong resentment of
Cameroonian workers to the dominant position of Nigerian workers
on the Pamol estates at the time. The Registrar of  Trade Unions,
however, refused to register a union that was keen to exclude
Nigerian workers from membership, as this would fuel existing
tensions between Cameroonian and Nigerian workers. The founders
then agreed to open up membership to the whole Pamol labour
force, and the union was registered on 4 August 1962.
The Labour Department advised the union leadership on
organisational and administrative matters and helped them to draw
up a constitution that clearly reflected the model of ‘free but
responsible trade unionism’ it had been successfully propagating in
the British Trusteeship era.5 Like other employers in West Cameroon,
Pamol’s management had meanwhile changed its attitude towards
unionism. Trade unions could no longer be opposed as they enjoyed
continued state support and the existing trade unions were generally
behaving responsibly.6
The PCWU gradually increased its membership from 1, 850 in
1963 to over 2,400 in 1970, a figure that included about 75% to
80% of  the total labour force.7 The union’s strategy was to approach
the supervisory staff  first and if  they decided to join, they invariably
became leaders of the different branches and members of the
National Executive Committee (NEC). They would subsequently
try to convince their subordinates of the benefits of unionism and,
when necessary, bring pressure to bear on them to join the union.
Unlike trade unions in most African states (Ananaba 1979;
Freund 1988), the PCWU and other trade unions in Anglophone
Cameroon were able to preserve a large measure of  autonomy vis-à-
vis the state for a considerable period of time. This was due to two
factors. First, the political elite in Anglophone Cameroon still felt a
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strong attachment to British values and institutions and simply took
over the model of free but responsible trade unionism that had
been introduced during the British Trusteeship period. Second, trade
union leadership in Anglophone Cameroon continually assured the
government that it was determined to play a responsible role in
national development and to steer clear of  partisan politics. This
assurance meant that the West Cameroon government did not
interfere in trade union matters and, more importantly, did not try
to establish control over the unions.
It was not until the creation of a one-party state in 1966 (Johnson
1970; Bayart 1979) that growing intervention by the federal state
in the system of  industrial relations could be observed, starting
with the promulgation of  the 1967 Federal Labour Code. This had
two important consequences for trade union action in the Federal
Republic. First, in the matter of collective disputes, it required all
channels available for a peaceful settlement – principally conciliation
and arbitration – be exhausted before a strike was called. Illegal
strike action could be punished with the termination of  strikers’
contracts. Second, it introduced shop stewards, the so-called staff
representatives, into the larger enterprises across the country. This
did not, in fact, involve a complete break with the past but the
local union representatives were given a legal status and their
position was regulated and became protected by law. The Labour
Code assigned a double role to staff representatives: on the one
hand, the representation and defence of workers’ interests at the
local level and, on the other hand, the promotion of  the enterprise’s
output. This role was ambivalent and delicate since staff
representatives were subjected to constant pressures from above
and below. Workers expected them to defend their interests at all
costs, even to the extent of violating the law on strike action while
employers viewed them as the lowest chain in the labour control
structure and continually exhorted them to present any workers’
grievances during joint consultations and help increase labour
productivity.8
Significantly, after the creation of  the PCWU in 1961, there was
a fierce, largely ethnically based struggle for power within the union’s
National Executive Committee (NEC) that was dominated by
southwestern workers. This was particularly manifest in the selection
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of  a suitable candidate for the pivotal function of  general secretary.
Well-qualified candidates could not stand for office or lost elections
simply because they were not acceptable to leaders belonging to
the local ethnic majority groups, especially the Balondo. It is even
doubtful whether the first two general secretaries could be called
‘workers’ and their appointment was obviously the outcome of an
ethnic compromise.
The first general secretary was Prince E.A. Anjeh (1961-1964).
At the time of his appointment, he was a trader based in Kumba
and was well known to Pamol workers because he supplied the
estates with goods. His successor was Mr P.L. Itoe (1964-1968), a
barber on the Lobe Estate who enjoyed great popularity among
workers especially among the Balondo, his own ethnic group. Both
men could be characterised as moderate and responsible union
leaders and came close to being the Labour Department’s ideal type
of  union leader. Their ‘productionist’ and ‘economistic’ conception
of trade unionism (Bates 1971) was clearly reflected in Prince
Anjeh’s welcome address at the first PCWU conference that was
held on the Lobe Estate on 4 August 1962:
I must make it very clear that every worker within your plantation
industry, particularly in Pamol Cameroons Ltd, should learn to work
harder so as to receive the co-operation of the management, in
order to improve the industry and to improve his lot.9
Neither adopted the aggressive bargaining style of  trade union
leaders on the neighbouring CDC estates who were inclined to back
up their demands with strike threats (see Chapter 3). Although
leaders were able to extract concessions from the management, their
moderate style of leadership promptly created the impression among
the rank and file that they were being weak in their defence of
workers’ interests and thus unequal partners in the bargaining
process. This impression was reinforced by the management’s
strategy of  presenting and rejecting union claims as a direct
onslaught on the company’s important role in regional and national
development, supported by the government. Both union leaders
rapidly lost the support of the overwhelming majority of workers
who favoured a more militant style of  leadership. They were regularly
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accused of being ‘under the dictatorship of the management’ or
‘management stooges’.10 Workers’ growing discontent became
manifest when they engaged in collective actions undertaken without
the knowledge of  the union leadership, and even in attempts to
topple the union leadership.
Remarkably, the union’s national executive committee, which
was still dominated by southwestern workers, unanimously
appointed a North Westerner as general secretary following the
October 1968 general strike (Konings 1998a: 93-94). The new
general secretary, Mr J.Y. Tumenta was a senior clerical worker and
had won massive support among the workers during the 1968 strike
because of his increasingly militant attitude towards management.
Immediately after his appointment, he began attacking the
company for dismissing five union leaders after the 1968 strike and
its merciless exploitation and oppression of workers:
The dismissal of five NEC members of PCWU further indicates
that this management is opposed to trade unionism in a Democratic
Republic such as Cameroon. Every union member or leader and all
Staff  Representatives’ future in the Pamol Service is dark because
Pamol management is opposed to any democratic practice that is
going to stop the Pamol management from ‘dictating’ as they are
continuing to do.
The Federal Labour Code of  1967 means nothing to Pamol
management. It would appear as if Pamol said to themselves –
because of  our investments in this country, we should ignore all
national laws in areas controlled by us and suppress and exploit as
speedily as we can. Its policy is tantamount to slavery and/or
apartheid because a white man can flog you and call you ‘black
monkey’ and if you show any sign of annoyance, he can charge you
with rudeness and insubordination and summarily dismiss you.11
Management evidently became worried about the new leadership
and soon adopted an obstructive strategy towards the union. Despite
warnings, Mr Tumenta continued to criticise the company in the
press and in January 1969 the management decided to sever all
relations with him and boycott the union.12 The boycott lasted until
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1 September 1969 when Mr Tumenta informed the company that
the Prime Minister of  West Cameroon had advised him to restore
normal management-union relations. Management then made known
its willingness to resume contact with the union.
Not surprisingly, management continued to mistrust Mr Tumenta
and seldom invited him for consultations or negotiations about
workers’ problems. He too seemed less inclined to expend much time
and energy on representing workers’ grievances to a permanently
hostile management. He was increasingly interested in creating a
union of  agricultural workers across the whole of  West Cameroon.
Tumenta’s pursuit of  his own personal ambitions and his growing
neglect of  workers’ interests disappointed Pamol workers. They had
expected his militant style of leadership to extract more concessions
from management than the moderate styles of  his predecessors.
Workers rapidly lost confidence in their once immensely popular
leader and no one protested when he was dismissed by the union’s
national executive on 28 February 1970.13 His successor was Mr
I.A. Fomukong (1970-1972). Like Tumenta, he hailed from the North
West Province and had previously been a carpenter in the company
before becoming one of  the union’s organising secretaries. He proved
to be an energetic and competent leader and managed to improve
relations between the union and management and negotiate a
number of improvements in workers’ living and working
conditions.14 Both management and the rank and file were satisfied
with Fomukong’s leadership during the difficult transition to state-
controlled trade unionism. His term in office, however, came to an
end in 1972 when the PCWU was dissolved and unionism became
subordinated to the single party, a further step in Ahidjo’s ‘hegemonic
project’ (Bayart 1979).15 Not surprisingly, the establishment of  state
control over trade unionism in the country had similar effects on
the PCWU as on the CDCWU (see Chapter 3) and weakened the
role of  trade unionism on the Pamol estates even further.
First, state control was aimed at transforming unionism from a
vehicle of  labour resistance into an instrument of  labour control.
One should not, however, exaggerate the effects of  state control: it
tended to be more visible at the central level than at regional and
local level. Indeed, the impact of the party on trade unionism in the
isolated Ndian Division seems not to have been very noticeable. In
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public, union leaders were expected to glorify the party and propagate
the party’s new rhetoric about the need for hard work and constant
dialogue with the employer but in practice they often pursued their
own course of action, to the extent of even secretly organising strike
actions. Trade union members were forced to buy party membership
cards, yet there were no party meetings. Local and regional party
leaders only occasionally turned up at the estates, usually when
workers were on strike. They were then apt to strongly condemn
illegal strike actions and advise workers to exercise patience. They
also came for festive occasions and fund-raising purposes. Workers
resented being extorted by the party elite.
Second, trade unionism on the Pamol estates became fragmented.
After the dissolution of  the PCWU, its membership was taken over
by three different agricultural workers’ unions in the South West
Province: the Ndian Agricultural Workers’ Union (NAWU) that was
responsible for workers on the Ndian and Lobe Oil Palm Estates,
and the Meme Agricultural Workers’ Union (MAWU) and the Fako
Agricultural Workers’ Union (FAWU) that were responsible for
organising the Bai and Bwinga Rubber Estates respectively. This
chapter concentrates on the NAWU, which became by far the most
important union on the Pamol estates as it dealt with workers
employed in palm oil production, the company’s main activity.
NAWU’s dominant position was further strengthened in 1986 when
Pamol stopped its rubber activities in Cameroon, which led to the
closure of the Bwinga Estate and experimentation with new crops
on the Bai Estate.
Third, trade unionism on the Pamol estates became paralysed
by a lack of funds due to the introduction of a new system for the
distribution of check-off contributions (see Chapter 3). One of
the gravest consequences of the financial crisis was that the
divisional unions experienced difficulties paying the salaries of its
full-time officers and organising union activities, such as seminars.
Fourth, trade unionism on the Pamol estates virtually became a
one-man affair in the person of the president of the divisional union,
who owed his position more to the party’s selection than to workers’
votes. The presidents of  the divisional unions of  agricultural workers
in the South West Province tended to continue in office after their
initial election. Mr M.I.C. Mokeo, for example, has been president
of  NAWU since its foundation to the present day.
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Case 4.1 NAWU President, Mr M.I.C. Mokeo
Mr Mokeo hails from the Ndian Division. He is a motor mechanic
by profession. He was employed by the Ministry of Interior at
Kumba before joining Pamol in 1969. Being active as a senior skilled
worker in the Lobe Estate garage, he soon became a staff
representative and, following the dissolution of the PCWU in 1972,
he was elected president of  NAWU.
He has a long-standing conflict with the company about his work
performance and occupational category. He has received several
written warnings for poor work performance. Moreover, the
management postponed the implementation of a recommendation
to upgrade him made by the South West Joint Classification Board
in the early 1970s. It was not until 1986 that he was promoted to
Category 7G at a monthly salary of  FCFA 110,000 and immediately
declared redundant. In 1989 he claimed FCFA 60,570,000 in damages
from the company for late promotion and wrongful sacking during
his tenure of office as a Staff Representative.
Compared to some of  his predecessors, like Mr J.Y. Tumenta, he is
poorly educated. As a result, his letters tend to be unintelligible. That
is why the Pamol Personnel Manager, Mr M.Y. Nyenku, has often
invited him to his office for clarifications, but he never responded
to such invitations.16
He is said to be unpredictable, unreasonable and aggressive. He is
therefore a constant thorn in the flesh of Pamol managers and labour
officials. They have used several strategies to deal with him. Their
usual strategy is simply to ignore him. Sometimes they call him to
account for ‘unfounded’ allegations or ‘irresponsible’ actions. And,
above all, they seize any opportunity to get rid of him.17
He runs the union as a one-man affair. He has failed to account for
the use of union dues and has often neglected the representation of
workers’ interests. He is therefore unpopular among the workers
and staff  representatives. To regain workers’ confidence, he has on
occasion threatened the management with strike actions and has
even secretly organised some strike actions.
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He has always been a loyal party member. He has been well rewarded
for his loyalty. The party has maintained him in office and has even
facilitated his trade union career, notwithstanding his unpredictable
and sometimes ‘irresponsible’ trade union leadership. Besides being
president of  the Divisional Union of  Agricultural Workers in the
Ndian Division, he also became president of the Divisional Union
of  Trade Unions in the Ndian Division. This was not yet the end of
his ascendancy in the union hierarchy. In the executive elections of
the CTUC in May 1992, in which the CPDM bribed the delegates
to elect leaders to be sympathetic to the party, he was voted into
office of first vice-president of the central labour organisation. He
used his newly gained power position in 1993 to topple his arch-
enemy, Mr C.G. Mure, the company’s liquidator.
Given their formidable financial and organisational problems,
it is understandable that the new divisional unions were virtually
absent on the Pamol estates during their first years. The union
leadership made no attempt to represent or defend workers’ interests
and Pamol’s management took advantage of  the situation and took
decisions on labour issues without consulting the union leadership.
The apparent atrophy of the union and the intensification of
managerial control over the labour process drove the workers to
resort to collective actions (Konings 1998a: 104-106). In an effort
to regain workers’ confidence, NAWU president Mokeo became more
active and militant in the late 1970s, not only threatening management
with strike actions but even calling workers out on strike.
Pamol started to face an unprecedented financial crisis in 1980.
It weakened even further the bargaining position of the state-
controlled unions vis-à-vis the management.
The role of  trade unionism during Pamol’s crisis
and liquidation
To combat the crisis and save the company from total collapse, the
management felt compelled to implement a series of austerity
measures that severely affected their workers. These involved labour
retrenchment, the non-payment of overtime and drastic cuts in fringe
benefits, including the abolition of  the company’s building and
motorbike loan scheme and its scholarship scheme.
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These measures caused great anxiety among the workers, who
feared losing their jobs and a serious decline in their income. Industrial
relations deteriorated when management initially refused to follow
the rules for retrenchments. Many workers were laid off  without
the required consultation with the union and staff representatives,
and some staff representatives were laid off without the prior
authorisation of the Labour Inspectorate, as demanded by the
Labour Code.18 The workers accused the union president and staff
representatives of  patently neglecting to defend workers’ interests.
Persistent pressure from the workers on the union leadership
had some effect. During the deepening crisis in 1983 the union
president and staff representatives insisted that the management
follow the correct procedures regarding retrenchments.19 Although
they conceded that further redundancies were inevitable in the
company’s struggle for survival, they gave the management to
understand in no uncertain terms that austerity measures should
affect workers and managerial staff alike. In August 1983, they
subsequently proposed remedial measures aimed at reducing the
number of managerial posts and curtailing the fringe benefits enjoyed
by expatriate staff. These included abolishing the posts of plantation
director and chief engineer, replacing the Ghanaian marketing
manager with a Cameroonian national, discontinuing vacation flights
twice a year for the families of expatriate managerial staff,
withdrawing end-of-the-year bonuses for senior staff  in the form
of  an extra month’s pay and drastically cutting the high allowances
given to managerial staff to boost their prestige.20 The management
rejected these proposals outright, claiming they would demoralise
managerial staff.
In 1983 management engaged in another illegal practice when
workers who had been declared redundant were forced to accept
alternative jobs against their will. Anyone who refused to cooperate
was deemed to have terminated their contract of  employment of
their own volition, which made them ineligible for termination
benefits they would have been entitled to. After protests by staff
representatives, the union declared a trade dispute on 10 October.
It was eventually settled by the Provincial Inspector of Labour,
who ordered the management to pay four months’ wages to 22
workers for the time they were (forcibly) idle and to reinstate them.21
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Other measures taken during the crisis provoked the workers as
well and led to mounting labour unrest that was manifest in various
strike threats and sabotage activities. The most important ones are
considered below.
Although well aware that field workers strongly resented working
on religious holidays, management ordered them to work on 21
May 1982 (Ascension Day). The union president, Mr Mokeo,
personally prevented workers at the Kokundu Division of the Lobe
Estate from going to the fields by turning back the lorry and
announcing at muster that workers should return home. He even
tried to elicit the assistance of the police. This was, of course,
rejected. As a result of  Mokeo’s actions, the company lost a full
day’s production in Kokundu Division and the workers lost a day’s
wages. Afterwards, Mr Mokeo was once again severely reprimanded
by management.22
There was an agreement between the union and management
that the company could increase working hours during the peak
season. In the 1983 peak season, factory workers were asked to do
twelve-hour shifts but were vehemently opposed to this as overtime
was no longer paid but compensated for with time off. Following
several complaints, they stopped work on 11 April, threatening to
revert to eight-hour shifts if overtime was not paid. Their
representatives discussed the issue with management on 22 April.
It was agreed that any time workers had to do a twelve-hour shift,
two hours of overtime would be paid and the other two hours would
be compensated for with time off. In addition, workers would be
given more and better food during such a shift. The workers,
however, rejected the agreement and maintained they would not
work more than eight hours. They expressed their discontent in
violent actions. Rather than reporting their actions to the security
forces or terminating their employment, management elected to
transfer them to the fields to avert a further escalation of the dispute.
They were replaced by field workers to keep the mill running23 but
this did not produce the desired results. The factory workers became
increasingly demoralised by the withdrawal of existing incentive
schemes and the inhumane treatment they received from the
technical director, Maurice Buermans. In early 1987 seven instances
of  sabotage were reported in the factory, resulting in a total loss of
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FCFA 25 million.24 There were also strikes in the fields, for example
three instances of attempted strikes at the Lobe Estate in 1984
alone.25
On 16 November 1984 a meeting was held at which the most
important item on the agenda was the end-of-the-year bonus, as
stipulated in the collective agreement. Staff representatives
demanded an extra month’s pay instead of  the company’s traditional
gift of beef for its workers, pointing out that managerial staff had
always received an extra month’s pay. The management rejected
their demands on the grounds that it could not afford an extra month’s
pay for every worker because the company had not yet recovered
from the 1983 financial crisis. Staff  representatives then proposed
that the management convert the value of the beef into cash and
pay that amount to the workers instead. Management claimed it
needed time to study the proposal. When staff representatives
returned to their various estates, they wrongly gave the workers the
impression that they would receive an extra month’s pay in place of
their beef. On 20 December, the company’s managing director
ordered the cash equivalent be paid to workers. When the Lobe
Estate workers were informed of  this by clerical workers in the
Lobe Head Office, they decided to strike the next day to press their
demands for the payment of  a whole extra month’s pay. On 26
December they were joined by Ndian Estate workers who
sympathised with their cause and although the union president
claimed that the strike was organised by the workers themselves,
there were strong indications that he himself was behind it.
Attempts by the party, the administration, management and the
union to persuade workers to call off the strike failed. The
management then set a deadline of 28 December for the resumption
of work and 182 strikers were summarily dismissed for not turning
up for work on that day. After the strike, the management attempted
to dismiss Mr Mokeo as well, alleging that he had masterminded it.
However, the Divisional Inspector of  Labour, Mr M.L. Moto, refused
to authorise his dismissal on the grounds that management had
insufficient evidence to support its allegations.26
Mounting labour unrest during the crisis compelled Pamol’s
management to operate more cautiously. In 1986 it consulted staff
representatives about its restructuring plan and asked them to
109
Chapter 4: Trade unions and Pamol’s crisis and liquidation
sensitise workers to the company’s severe financial problems. It also
informed them of  its intention to lay off  240 workers. To ensure
that the required procedures were strictly adhered to, it consulted
Mr E.K. Lottin, a retired senior labour officer. Following
recommendations by the staff representatives and a thorough
examination of each individual case by Lottin, only 135 workers
were eventually laid off.27
On 2 August 1987 the management told staff representatives
that Unilever intended to sell the company because of the precarious
financial situation. The staff representatives demanded that
termination benefits be paid to workers prior to the sale.28 Faced
with an uncertain future, some workers preferred to be paid off and
leave the company. Most planned to invest their newly acquired
capital in farming, trading or other entrepreneurial activities. And
following its failure to sell the company to the North West consortium
(see Chapter 2), Unilever announced on 13 October 1987 that it
had put the company into voluntary liquidation.
On the day of liquidation, the newly appointed liquidator, Mr
C.G. Mure, served workers with letters of  termination but at the
same time instructed them to continue working until further notice.
Workers had no choice but to comply. From the memorandum they
sent to the President of Cameroon a few days after the liquidation
however, it is clear that most had little faith in the company surviving
after Unilever’s dramatic withdrawal from plantation production in
Cameroon. In the memorandum, they requested that:
• the government give every possible encouragement to
Cameroonian business groups that might be interested in
running the company as an ongoing concern; and
• in the event of  bankruptcy, the company’s industrial,
residential and plantation assets be transferred to the
employees to cover their severance pay.29
Following the liquidation, workers’ employment prospects were
extremely bleak and representation and defence of their interests
by the union leadership and staff representatives was virtually non-
existent. Owing to its financial problems, the company was no longer
able to transfer the required contributions from wages to beneficiary
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bodies, thus accumulating huge debts to the National Social
Insurance Fund, the credit union and the trade unions. Lacking
income, NAWU was (again) not in a position to organise union
activities. After some time, however, the liquidator agreed with the
union president that the company would make some funds available
to the union for special occasions. In 1990 he sold a tractor to the
union at the cost of  FCFA 3 million to enable the union to earn
extra income from agricultural activities. Like his predecessors, he
tried to ignore the union president as far as possible. Their
relationship became strained due to personal animosities. The
French liquidator, who had lived and worked in Cameroon for many
years, once even claimed that he was ‘more Cameroonian than Mr
Mokeo’. The liquidator also rarely consulted staff representatives,
arguing that the company’s survival, recovery and eventual sale was
more important for the time being than representing workers’
interests. In November 1987, the company was exempted from
conducting staff representative elections by the Divisional Inspector
of  Labour ‘until such a time that the company’s future was known’.
It was not until 17 March 1990 that new elections were held on
Pamol’s estates. These elections were organised by the management
and the union without the required assistance of the Divisional
Inspector of  Labour who, in reaction to this breach of  procedure,
nullified the elections. As a result, the staff  representatives elected
in 1982 continued to stay in office. It is no surprise that they faced
legitimacy problems among the workers.30
Initially, the workers did not protest against the union’s failure
to represent their interests since they, like the liquidator, were also
interested primarily in the company’s survival. They regained hope
when the liquidator continued to employ them, pay their wages,
and even recruit new workers to replant the estates. He was soon
hailed as the company’s saviour. A speech delivered by a staff
representative on 22 October 1988, on the first anniversary of the
liquidation, illustrates the high esteem the liquidator enjoyed among
the labour force at the time:
But as God would make it, the saviour Mr C.G. Mure….mobilised
us and urged us to work harder and effective in order to earn a
living till such a time when a buyer would be got. In December
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1987 we began to have hopes when for the first time in the history
of Pamol, the liquidator presented to each of us a Christmas gift of
3,000 francs CFA and 5 litres of  palm oil.31
Their faith in the liquidator meant that workers were prepared
to fight for the corporation’s survival and even to make further
sacrifices. When the parastatals once again began undercutting the
prices of palm oil on the domestic market in 1989 – and thus
threatening the company’s future – staff  representatives sent another
memorandum to the country’s president requesting that ‘the
government should urgently intervene and bring order, discipline
and price stability to the palm oil industry’.32 As soon as it became
clear that the government was unable to find an immediate solution
to the problems in the agro-industrial palm-oil sector, the workers
declared themselves ready for austere adjustment measures. On 21
March 1990, the management and the union presidents signed a
survival agreement that included the introduction of  a compulsory
savings scheme and drastic cuts in workers’ fringe benefits such as
payments for housing, electricity and company health-care services.
From 1990 onwards, however, there was growing dissatisfaction
among workers with the performance of  both the liquidator and
the union president, Mr Mokeo. The company was facing serious
liquidity problems, resulting in the irregular payment of wages and
salaries, and workers began blaming these problems on the
liquidator’s policies. While the company was having trouble selling
its palm oil on the domestic market, he was continuing to invest in
the rehabilitation of  the estates and recruit new labour. Liquidity
problems even forced him to close down the Ndian Estate for a
few days in late November 1990.33 Moreover, the liquidator appeared
arrogant, barring managers and workers from participating in the
decision-making process and bullying both in public. In addition,
being French, he began hiring an increasing number of (better paid)
Francophones to replace Anglophone supervisors and managers,
thus fuelling Anglophone-Francophone tensions within the
company.
Workers also blamed Mr Mokeo for a lack of  concern for
workers’ problems following the company’s liquidation. Their
discontent with the union president’s performance was expressed
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at a central staff representatives’ meeting on the Lobe Estate on 7
September 1991. Staff representatives rebuked him for his persistent
failure to handle workers’ grievances regarding poor medical care,
the liquidator’s erroneous calculation of  termination benefits in
November 1987, the irregular payment of wages and salaries, and
the non-payment of  family allowances. Nor had he ever consulted
with them or attended meetings they had officially invited him to.
He had refused them access to the staff representatives’ office and
equipment at the Lobe Estate, using these facilities instead for his
personal ends. And finally, he had collected union funds from
management without accounting for the money spent. The workers
resolved that the management should stop paying Mokeo any union
dues until he had accounted for the funds he had already received
and that he should hand over the staff representative office and
equipment.34 Two days after this meeting, Mr Mokeo dismissed the
chairman of  the meeting, Chief  Fritz D. Nyassa, from office and
suspended the other 16 staff representatives who had attended the
meeting.35 The staff  representatives unanimously condemned his
action on 4 March 1992, accused him of  one-man rule and
mismanagement and declared they would no longer recognise him
as president.36
In the absence of any representation by the union president,
workers resorted to strike actions. Two local strikes were prompted
by the non-payment of  wages. On 15 October 1991 workers in the
Bulu section of the Ndian Estate went on strike due to the non-
payment of  September’s wages although after negotiations between
management and staff representatives, work was resumed the next
day.37 In the night of  15/16 March 1992, a group of  newly recruited
workers in the Mundemba Camp on the Ndian Estate moved from
camp to camp armed with cutlasses to inform the workers that a
violent strike would take place the following day in response to the
non-payment of  February’s wages. Early in the morning, security
forces moved on to the estate to guard strategic installations and
later in the morning the senior divisional officer of the Ndian
Division met workers in an attempt to calm tempers. He told them
action was being taken to advance FCFA 2,000 to each newly
recruited worker.38
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Largely ignored by the management and strongly derided by staff
representatives, the union president began asserting himself in 1992
when the company was experiencing formidable problems in paying
its workers. This happened at a time when trade unionism in
Cameroon had regained a large measure of  autonomy. In the wake
of the political liberalisation process, the Confederal Bureau of the
CTUC announced on 2 April 1991 that union members were free
to join the party of  their choice. Nevertheless, the ruling party, the
CPDM, was still trying to maintain a certain degree of control,
particularly at the central level. In executive elections for the CTUC
congress in May 1992, which were clearly manipulated by the CPDM,
Etame Ndedi, an alternate member of  the party’s central
committee, was voted in as president of the central labour
organisation (Konings 1995b, 2000). On the same occasion, Mr
Mokeo, who had remained loyal to the party, was elected first vice-
president, which increased his power in both the union and the party
and gave him access to the highest echelons of government. He
intended to exploit this position in his struggles with his arch enemy,
the liquidator. With increasing hostility towards the management and
a militant style of  leadership, he was able to regain a large measure of
support from workers who were being subjected to severe hardship
as a result of  the long-term non-payment of  wages.
Mokeo organised two general strikes in 1992 – one on 18 May
and the other on 15 June – for the following reasons:
• The company’s non-payment of  March, April and May’s wages.
• The company’s violation of  its 1990 survival agreement. While
management had imposed austere adjustment measures on
workers, it had not kept its promise to pay them regularly.
The union president demanded that management immediately
cease deducting certain amounts of money from workers’
wages, including compulsory savings and rents.
• The company’s refusal to transfer workers’ contributions to
the National Social Insurance Fund, the credit union and trade
unions.
The union president threatened anyone who intended to break
these strikes with a severe beating. The 15 June strike was particularly
violent. Infuriated by the managerial elite’s apparent lack of  concern
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for workers’ sufferings, strikers directed their actions at the liquidator
personally and at the top management at Lobe Head Office. They
stormed the building, smashing windows and doors, breaking the
windscreen of  the administrative manager’s car and deflating the
tyres of other cars parked in front of Head Office. Barricades were
erected. The forces of law and order had trouble controlling the
angry workers who were out to mishandle the liquidator and the
deputy general manager. Etame Ndedi, the president of  the central
labour organisation, who happened to be on tour in the area, was
asked to intervene and eventually succeeded in persuading the
workers to halt their violent actions.
It was extremely difficult to get the strike called off so that
negotiations could start. The workers were intransigent, insisting
that they would not resume work until their three months’ of back
wages had been paid. They argued that negotiations would have
absolutely no effect because they had been misled several times in
previous negotiations. It was only after urgent appeals by Mokeo
and Etame Ndedi that they reluctantly called off the strike.
Conciliation was reached the same day. The union agreed on a
renewal of  the survival agreement for a further two-year term.
Management, in turn, promised to observe the terms of  the
agreement as far as possible, in particular the regular payment of
wages. It also promised that workers’ severance pay, estimated by the
liquidator at FCFA 800 million, would be paid out prior to any sale
of  the company. After a statement of  account, a decision would be
taken on how the trade union and credit union dues would be paid.
During negotiations, the divisional officer of the Ekondo Titi
Subdivision warned the management at Pamol not to dismiss any
of  the strikers. However, 28 workers were in fact dismissed, accused
of assaulting fellow workers and damaging company assets on the
day of the strike.39
In the aftermath of  these two strikes in August 1992, the
liquidator reintroduced Joint Consultative Committees (JCCs) that
had been abolished with the introduction of shop stewards in the
1967 Federal Labour Code. These committees were set up to
improve communication between workers and management with
the aim of assisting management to find solutions to the problems
facing the company. They were not meant to replace staff
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representatives, who already had well-defined functions, but the
liquidator would henceforth only consult the JCCs. Thus, instead
of  improving industrial relations in the company, the JCCs became
a new source of conflict, as the staff representatives accused the
liquidator and the JCCs of  undermining their legal position in the
company. Relations deteriorated even further when political motives
began to play an increasingly important role in the company. With
the approach of national presidential elections, which were
scheduled to take place on 11 October 1992, the atmosphere in the
company became tense. Most workers and managers supported the
candidature of  the SDF’s chairman, John Fru Ndi. When he visited
the company during his election campaign, he assured the
northwestern managers, like Dr I.N. Timti, that the company’s
administration would be handed over to them should he win the
elections. Strongly opposed to the liquidator’s policies, they
encouraged the union to topple the liquidator, arguing that he was
arrogant and dictatorial, unconcerned about workers’ problems and,
above all, a staunch supporter of the party in power and its
candidate, Paul Biya.40 During the election period, the liquidator
felt physically threatened by the workers who had tried to ambush
him. Soon afterwards, he proved, once again, incapable of paying
wages on time. The workers alleged that this was because he was
making large contributions to President Biya’s election campaign
from company coffers.
Lack of payment led to a rebellion among Nigerian workers in
February 1993 in the wake of  the government’s announcement on
8 January that aliens living in Cameroon without a valid residence
permit would be expelled from the country with effect from 28
February 1993. Most Nigerian workers had no passports or residence
permits and obtaining these documents posed insurmountable
problems for them: they were expensive – FCFA 18,000 for a passport
and FCFA 60,000 for a residential permit – and, more importantly,
they had received no wages since November 1992. Realising that
they could not meet the deadline of  28 February, they decided to
resign and return to Nigeria. Management accepted their resignations
but was unable to pay their wage arrears, compulsory savings and
end-of-contract benefits estimated at about FCFA 20 million.
116
Crisis and Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
On 14 February, the Nigerian workers’ representatives discussed
the payment of their entitlements with management. The liquidator
behaved arrogantly during these discussions and the Nigerian
representatives lost their tempers and began physically attacking
him and other senior managerial staff. They were later advised to
return for a final decision on 23 February.
However on 23 February, over 200 Nigerian workers invaded
the Head Office. They attempted to set the building on fire but
were prevented from doing so by the timely intervention of  heavily
armed soldiers and gendarmes. A meeting then took place that was
also attended by the Nigerian assistant consul general. The liquidator
was conspicuous by his absence. After deliberations, it was agreed
that the Nigerian workers would be allowed to stay until 4 March
when the liquidator would be present to pay out their final
entitlements. The consul was asked to address his angry countrymen
in the Ibibio language and they dispersed grudgingly while ‘alerting
the forces of law and order to get their guns ready because they
may have to be killed if their money was not paid on the 4th of
March’.41 When they reported back on 4 March, a client had just
purchased oil and the proceeds from this sale were used to discharge
nearly 30 workers. Others were paid off  a few days later. The
payment of other workers’ wages was then suspended as a result of
a two-month strike that started on 9 March.
While the conflict between management and the Nigerian
workers was developing, the union president, Mr Mokeo, declared
a trade dispute on 20 February on the grounds that management
had failed, firstly, to pay wages and salaries for a period of  three
months, trade union dues, family allowances and end-of-contract
benefits to the over 200 Nigerians who had resigned, and, secondly,
to respect the union leaders. At a mass meeting at Lobe football
field on 22 February, Mr Mokeo stressed that the non-payment of
wages was a serious breach of  the survival agreement that had been
renewed in 1992. He then threatened to call a strike on 1 March
should wages not be paid by 27 February, an ultimatum that was
well received by his audience. Workers were particularly embittered
about the liquidator recruiting expensive managerial staff  while they
themselves were starving due to the non-payment of  wages.
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Meetings were organised by the management and the local
administration to avert the impending strike. In a final meeting on
8 March presided over by the senior divisional officer of the Ndian
Division, the liquidator explained at length why Pamol could not
pay its workers, but he failed to convince workers’ representatives.
The atmosphere soon degenerated as tempers were lost. The
liquidator finally agreed to pay workers on 19 April when the newly
created oil syndicate would be coming into operation.42 However
his pledge did not keep workers from embarking on a general strike
the next day that was to last two months. It would prove to be the
longest in Pamol’s history and threatened the company’s survival,
occurring as it did at the beginning of the peak production period
(April-June).
On the first day of the strike, Ndian Estate workers blocked all
the estate roads and the main entrance to the oil mill. Armed with
sticks to ward off  any attempt to disrupt their strike action, they
then paraded around the area carrying placards. The actions by Lobe
Estate workers were even more violent: they cut off electricity and
the water supplies, locked the gate, stopped the mill’s operations,
brought traffic to a standstill and ransacked the liquidator’s house.
They wanted to kill the liquidator, who had taken refuge to the
doctor’s house, but he was rescued just in time by the security forces.
Workers threatened to resume their violent actions should the
military, who were posted on the estate at the company’s cost
throughout the strike, dare to provoke them in any way.
From the very start, it was clear that Mr Mokeo actively supported
the strike. Workers were highly dependent on their union president
to represent their interests to the powers that be. Fully exploiting
his ascendancy in the union and party hierarchy, Mr Mokeo soon
led a union delegation to Yaoundé to inform the Prime Minister
and the Minister of Labour and Social Insurance of the current
situation at Pamol. A government delegation subsequently visited
Pamol and reported back negatively to the government on the
company’s management.
Since the government took no further action, workers gradually
tired of the strike and appealed to the union president to negotiate
a settlement. At a meeting with him at Lobe Estate on 5 April,
staff representatives pointed to the negative consequences of the
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strike, including workers’ financial problems, the high rate of crop
looting, expected crop losses during the peak production period,
the deteriorating condition of estates and estate roads, the
depreciation of the mill and its high maintenance costs, the wide
gap between the workers and the liquidator created by the strike,
and the lack of  intervention by government. They demanded that
the union president seek immediate government intervention
regarding the resumption of work.43 The union president, however,
asked them to be patient and not to become discouraged.
The strike continued until 8 May when the committee of
inspection set up a local management team headed by Dr I.N. Timti
to run the company. Dr Timti’s appointment was probably a result
of his popularity among workers due to his active role in the strike
when he was the only manager who could move around freely. Mr
Mokeo joined the follow-up committee that was supposed to play
an intermediary role between the committee of  inspection and the
local management team. To demonstrate his new power position in
the company, he demanded one of  the company cars.44 After the
strike, the newly appointed Dr Timti managed to obtain an advance
of  FCFA 60 million from the Palm Oil Producers’ Syndicate for
essential services and the payment of  wage arrears.
The company’s financial position remained precarious and
workers had little faith in its survival unless it was taken over by a
reliable enterprise, preferably COMDEV.45 On 16 September 1993,
staff  representatives presented a memorandum to the chairman of
the committee of  inspection about any future sale of  the company,
asking him to take into account the following demands in any
negotiations:
• A prospective buyer should give priority to paying workers’
end-of-contract benefits and compulsory savings in full.
• Convincing proof should be demonstrated of sound financial
backing and adequate investment plans to guarantee the
company’s future.
• The Cameroonian government should be a partner in the new
company and hold nominal shares.
• Workers should be allowed to buy shares in the new company.
• The previous liquidator, Mr C.G. Mure, should be excluded
from any group of prospective buyers in view of his gross
mismanagement of  the company during his term in office.
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Workers warned the chairman that they would resist any buyer
who did not live up to their expectations.46 Although a number of
prospective buyers have come forward, the company has yet to be
sold.
Conclusion
This chapter has documented the emergence and development of
trade union formation on the Pamol estates. After the setting up of
a permanent union in 1961, the union leadership used different
strategies in the era of trade union autonomy (1961-1972) to
promote workers’ interests. However both moderate and militant
strategies failed to bring about any substantial improvement in
workers’ living and working conditions. Dissatisfied with their
leadership’s performance, workers were inclined to bypass the union
and resort to collective action in defence of  their interests.
The evidence presented in this chapter seems to run counter to
the widespread assumption in government and party circles that
state-controlled trade unionism is more effective in controlling
workers than autonomous trade unionism. State-controlled trade
unionism actually helped sharpen the existing contradictions
between the union leadership and workers, as was manifested in
workers’ lack of recognition of the union leadership and their
persistent collective actions.
The union leadership however appears to have never fully
complied with a primary trade union role of labour control. In fact,
it was regularly inclined to identify with workers, even calling strikes
to regain their confidence. The most important union leader, Mr
M.I.C. Mokeo, was not only a long-time skilled worker and staff
representative at the company but also had personal conflicts with
management concerning his own performance and his ranking and
retirement conditions, which were aggravated by his aggressive,
unpredictable behaviour. Largely ignored by management and the
Labour Inspectorate but gradually rising in the union hierarchy, he
capitalised on workers’ growing discontent with their deteriorating
position during the company’s crisis and liquidation. He seized on
the issue of  the non-payment of  wages to organise Pamol’s
discontented workers against his personal enemy, the liquidator,
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and incite them to illegal strike action. The historic 1993 strike
allowed him to topple the liquidator and set himself up as an
intermediary between the committee of  inspection of  the liquidation
and the local management team.
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Chieftaincy and the privatisation
of the CDC
Introduction
Privatisation has been a key instrument in the stabilisation and
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) imposed on Africa by
the Bretton Woods institutions. It is an essential part of  the overall
strategy to open up African economies to market forces and promote
private-sector development. Since public enterprises are considered
to have performed dismally, African governments have been under
considerable pressure from international donors to sell them to
domestic and foreign private capital. Given their troubled economic
condition and acute dependence on foreign financial flows,
governments have officially accepted privatisation so as not to forfeit
the international support that is so crucial for their political survival.
The actual number of privatisations has remained modest in
Africa (cf. Grosh & Makandala 1994; Mkandawire 1994; Tangri
1999) due to technical and financial constraints as well as socio-
political factors. Interestingly, some of  these reflect the same political
concerns that led to the creation of so many public enterprises in
the years after independence: an inability to attract foreign
investment to politically and economically unstable African nations,
the absence of a well-developed domestic entrepreneurial class,
and the pursuit of patron-client relationships by neo-patrimonial
African states (Sandbrook 1985; Tangri 1999). Resistance to
privatisation by civil society, in particular by professional bodies,
student organisations and trade unions, has also been highlighted
because privatisation often involves the sale of public property to
well-placed nationals or foreign enterprises and generally results in
massive lay-offs (Olukoshi 1998; Konings 2002).
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While there is abundant literature on the role of chieftaincy in
African post-colonial states (van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal & Ray
1996; van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal & van Dijk 1999), none examines
the role of  chieftaincy in current privatisation projects. There seems
to be more inerest is the role of chieftaincy in political liberalisation
than in economic liberalisation.
This chapter focuses on the virulent opposition by Bakweri chiefs
in Anglophone Cameroon to the government announcement on 15
July 1994 of the privatisation of the CDC. The chiefs claimed
Bakweri ownership of CDC lands and felt betrayed at not having
previously been consulted about the CDC’s privatisation, warning
the government that the corporation could not be sold to non-natives
without Bakweri consent and compensation. The Bakweri chiefs’
resistance to the CDC’s privatisation is part of  a long-standing
struggle for the return of  their vast lands, which were expropriated
during German colonial rule for plantation agriculture and, in 1946,
leased by the British Trust Authority to the newly created CDC. In
this resistance, they were always assisted by the modern Bakweri
elite who, like their chiefs, felt aggrieved by the loss of  their ancestral
lands. Following the announcement of  the privatisation of  the CDC,
Bakweri chiefs received support from other sectors of Anglophone
Cameroon’s traditional and modern elite, who have seen the
privatisation of the CDC as a renewed onslaught by the
Francophone-dominated post-colonial state on Anglophone identity
and colonial heritage. This alliance of traditional and modern elites
forms a powerful force to ensure that justice will prevail on the
issue of  Bakweri land ownership.  It has forced the government to
repeatedly postpone the privatisation of the CDC and enter into
negotiations with the landowners.
This chapter first describes the protracted struggle by Bakweri
chiefs for a return of the expropriated ancestral lands, which
provides the necessary historical background to the subsequent
discussion on their current resistance to CDC privatisation.
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Bakweri chiefs and the retrieval of CDC lands
The Bakweri are a small ethnic group that live on the slopes of
Mount Cameroon in the Fako Division of  the South West Province
of Anglophone Cameroon (Ardener 1956, 1996; Matute 1990).
Compared to the highly centralised states in the North West Province
of  Anglophone Cameroon that are ruled by powerful, even sacred,
chiefs (cf. Fisyi 1992, 1995; Konings 1999), the social organisation
of the Bakweri, like that of most other ethnic groups in the South
West Province, is segmentary. Chieftaincy tended to be a weak
institution in the various autonomous Bakweri villages, and often a
colonial creation. It was only during British indirect rule that
chieftaincy became rooted in local communities and two paramount
chiefs were installed to act as the district heads of Buea and Victoria
(Mbake 1975; Geschiere 1993; Takougang 1994).
When Cameroon became a German protectorate in 1884, the
Germans saw the Bakweri as an aggressive and savage people who
might create problems for the opening up of the hinterland. In 1891,
the Bakweri of Buea, under the leadership of the legendary Chief
Kuva Likenye who was the only Bakweri chief who had established
a measure of military control over surrounding villages (Ardener
1996: 76-78; Geschiere 2009), defeated a German expedition.
However, it was not until 1895 that their area was truly pacified.
The fertile, volcanic soils around Mount Cameroon proved
suitable for large-scale plantation agriculture and more than 100,000
hectares of  Bakweri land were expropriated by the German colonial
state. The original occupants were expelled and sent to restrictive
native reserves (Konings 1993a: 37; Clarence-Smith 1993: 197) as
German companies rushed to the area in a frenzied bid to get the
best tracts of land (Epale 1985: 23-34). In protest, the Bakweri
showed little enthusiasm about working on the plantations, certainly
not for in menial jobs. They were, as a result, no longer branded as
aggressive and savage by the Germans but as apathetic or downright
lazy, a stereotype that has remained to this day (Courade 1981/82).
To solve the area’s serious labour problems, German planters were
compelled to recruit labour from other areas in Cameroon and while
most migrant workers initially returned to their region of origin after
a short spell of work on the estates, an increasing number decided
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to settle near the plantations when they retired, thus aggravating
the land problem even further (Konings 1993a, 2001). This resulted
in extensive squatting by Bakweri and migrants alike on plantation
lands that were only partly cultivated. Due to the extreme
overcrowding on the reserves, intruders frequently ignored or
resisted eviction notices although planters were sometimes obliged
to surrender some of their land, and the government purchased
areas for the benefit of native communities (Epale 1985: 94-95).
Following British occupation of  the area during the First World
War, the property of  German planters was confiscated and turned
over to the Custodian of  Enemy Property. Shortly afterwards when
the British took over the administration of the area, the plantations
were merged and a government department was set up to manage
them. By 1922, however, the British Mandate Authority had decided
to dispose of them as the administrative costs of maintenance were
excessive. It seriously considered returning plantation lands to the
original owners but eventually abandoned the idea and instead
concluded that it would be in the best interests of the territory and
its inhabitants to return the plantations to the foreign private
enterprises (Fonsah 1993; Fonsah & Chidebelu 1995). According
to Eyongetah & Brain (1974: 103), one of the principal reasons for
the British Mandate Authority handing over the plantations to
foreign planters was:
that it would have been impracticable to split the plantations into
small plots for Cameroonian owners – since without capital backing,
the buildings and machinery would fall into ruins. Moreover, it feared
that the natives’ lack of experience would mean that disease would
be spreading among the crops and the cocoa plots would be
destroyed.
The estates were put up for auction in 1922 but with restrictions
on bidding by German nationals. However there was little interest
shown in the plantations and very few were sold for various reasons
including the considerable capital resources needed to put the
plantations, which had been neglected since British occupation, back
into operation; the problems of  recruiting and controlling labour;
low commodity prices on the world market; and uncertainty about
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the future of the mandated territories (Epale 1985: 79-80). Another
auction was held in London in November 1924 but without
restrictions on German bids this time, and almost all the estates
were bought by their former German owners (Fonsah 1993; Fonsah
& Chidebelu 1995).
At the start of  the Second World War, German estates were
expropriated again by the Custodian of Enemy Property but after
the war, a decision had to be reached once again on how to dispose
of  the properties. In the meanwhile, the young educated Bakweri
elite had founded nationalist and ethnic associations such as the
Cameroon Youth League (CYL) led by P.M. Kale and Dr E.M.L.
Endeley and the Bakweri Improvement Union under the leadership
of  J.A. Kale and D.M.L. Endeley (Ebune 1992: 101-138). This
contributed considerably to a growing awareness of colonial
injustices towards the Anglophone population in general and the
Bakweri in particular, notably the large-scale expropriation of
Bakweri lands by the Germans that had resulted in the subsequent
shortage of land among the Bakweri people. As soon as they got
wind of  ongoing British deliberations about the future of  the former
German plantations, they approached their chiefs demanding action
in defence of  Bakweri interests. This eventually led to the formation
of  the Bakweri Land Committee (BCL) (cf. Molua 1985). The BLC’s
original membership totalled 48, including 25 chiefs, with members
of the Buea chiefly family playing a prominent role in the
organisation. Paramount Chief  G.M. Endeley was its president, his
cousin, D.M.L. Endeley, was its secretary and the latter’s brother,
E.M.L. Endeley, was another of  the driving forces behind it (Matute
1990: 125-28). On 8 June 1946, Chief  Endeley informed the
Resident in Buea of  the BCL’s formation and stated that its major
objective was ‘to take charge of all the land in Victoria Division
which virtually belongs to the natives’. It was his fervent wish that
the committee continue to exist ‘as long as the Bakweri people live’.1
The BLC sent several petitions to the British administration and
the United Nations.2 In a petition addressed to the Secretary of
State for the Colonies on 24 August 1946, the BLC demanded that:
• the former German plantations be handed back to the people
of  the British Trusteeship Territory of  the Southern
Cameroons;
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• the part of the plantations originally belonging to the Bakweri
people be handed over to the Bakweri administration; and
• any profits made on the plantations by the Custodian during
the last five years be paid to the Native Administration
concerned as compensation for the loss of land expropriated
from the Bakweri by the German government.3
After considerable deliberations, the British Trusteeship
Authority declined to surrender the former German plantation lands
to their original owners as they had little faith in the Bakweri
peasantry’s ability to increase agricultural output. They therefore
advocated a continuation of  plantation production in the Trust
Territory because substantial investments had already been made,
and considerable profits had been derived from this form of
production by the German planters. Nevertheless, the administration
was more reluctant this time to hand over the plantations to foreign
private enterprises, being aware that such a transfer would badly
hurt the rising expectations of the Bakweri and would certainly
lead to vehement opposition by the BLC. Instead, it announced in
November 1946 that the former German plantation lands would
be leased to a newly established statutory corporation, the
Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC). It hoped that the
foundation of  a public corporation, which would run the former
German plantations for the benefit of  the people of  the territory,
would reduce Bakweri opposition.
The proposed public corporation, the CDC, eventually came
about with the passage of two ordinances during a special session
of the Nigerian Legislative Council from 9-12 December 1946. The
first, the Ex-Enemy Lands (Cameroons) Ordinance No. 38 (1946),
provided for the acquisition of  the former German plantation lands
that had been vested in the Custodian of Enemy Property for the
duration of  the Second World War. Under the terms of  this
ordinance, the Governor of Nigeria was to declare them ‘native
lands’ and hold them in trust for the common benefit of  all
inhabitants of  the territory. This final acknowledgement by the
British administration that the former German plantation lands were
Bakweri property was subsequently endorsed in a special resolution
on Bakweri lands adopted at the Sixth Meeting of the United
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Nations Trusteeship Council in March 1950. The second ordinance,
the Cameroons Development Corporation Ordinance No. 39 (1946),
provided for the foundation of the proposed corporation, the CDC.
All the lands acquired by the Governor under the first ordinance
would be leased to the corporation, whose main objective was to
develop and manage the lands in the interests of the people of the
trust territory.
Following the passing of  these two ordinances, the Governor of
Nigeria immediately bought the plantation lands from the Custodian
of Enemy Property for a sum of £850,000 and leased them to the
newly established corporation for a period of 60 years that was
renewable for an equivalent term at the corporation’s discretion
(Konings 1993a: 39). The CDC, in turn, was supposed to pay a
monthly rent to the treasury but this was never passed on to the
Bakweri.
Although the first ordinance recognised Bakweri title to the CDC
lands, the Bakweri Land Committee was not satisfied. It complained
bitterly that it was not treated with the courtesy of  being informed
about government intentions regarding these lands. It had lodged
several petitions in 1946 and continued to demand the return of
these lands to the Bakweri people.
Unwilling to give up the struggle, the BLC decided to send a
representative to the United Nations, which had granted it a hearing
after receiving its petition. E.M.L. Endeley was chosen to present
its case. However this move was hampered by the British
administration. While it had given the impression that it would
finance Endeley’s trip to New York, it had actually only paid his
passage as far as Lagos, thus forcing Endeley to return to Cameroon
(Epale 1985: 153).
In reaction to ongoing Bakweri protests, the British
administration asked W.M. Bridges, a senior district officer in the
Southern Cameroons who was well acquainted with Bakweri
society,4 to investigate Bakweri land complaints and recommend
appropriate solutions. Bridges began his investigation in 1948 with
the assumption that 15 acres (6 hectares) of land would be more
than adequate for each Bakweri household and eventually concluded
that a surrender of 25,000 acres of CDC land would satisfy Bakweri
land requirements. He proposed using the land to cultivate food
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crops on a controlled tenancy basis and that the CDC provide
technical advice, social welfare services and market facilities for
approved crops (Konings 1993b: 159). His report was presented to
a visiting UN mission by the British administration with a view to
countering the arguments advanced by the BLC, which stressed
that the Bakweri were not asking for an increase in land ownership
but for a return of  all their lands.
In 1961 the British left the Trust Territory but neither the Bakweri
land problem nor the settlement scheme proposed by the
government had been resolved. The 31 December 1959 agreements
that legalised the secession of the Southern Cameroons from the
newly independent Republic of Nigeria demanded that the CDC
surrender all its rights, titles and interests under the previous leases
and certificates of occupancy to the government of the Southern
Cameroons. It, in turn, agreed to lease all those lands to the CDC
for a period of 99 years as of 1 January 1960. At the end of that
period CDC lands would be transferred to the legitimate owners,
namely the Bakweri.
After the reunification of the British and French Cameroons in
1961, the Bakweri land problem disappeared from the national
agenda as the new political leaders increasingly turned their backs
on regional and parochial issues in their pursuit of national unity
(Konings & Nyamnjoh 1997: 210). Moreover, the post-colonial state
became more interested in the expansion of the agro-industrial
sector for the necessary modernisation and increase of agricultural
production than in a return of plantation lands to their legitimate
owners (Konings 1993a: 17-34). In addition, post-colonial
governments adopted and even extended the policy of the British
Trusteeship Authority of  co-opting leading members of  the
traditional and modern Bakweri elites onto the Board of Directors
and management of the CDC.
On 6 July 1974, the government promulgated law No. 74-1 that
laid down the rules governing land tenure in Cameroon (Fisiy 1992:
34-38). Making a distinction between private and national lands,
this would later serve as the basis for rejecting prior Bakweri claims
to CDC lands on the grounds that they were national lands. This
was a clear violation of the UN-sanctioned 1946 ordinances that
created the CDC and the 1959 agreements between the CDC and
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the government of  the Southern Cameroons.5 This bold rebuff  of
previous ordinances and agreements remained largely unchallenged
because the autocratic rule of  President Ahmadou Ahidjo had, by
this time, silenced all the organisations that were not under
government control. The BLC died a natural death, although
occasional memoranda were presented to the government by its
most dedicated members.
For the Bakweri, however, the land issue continued to be a matter
of  priority, especially as the government was making full use of  the
powers it had been granted by the 1974 land law to confiscate increasing
amounts of native land in the name of ‘the imperative interest and
defence of the economic policies of the nation’.6 Exactly 20 years
later when it announced the privatisation of the CDC, the government
would learn that the BLC, like the legendary phoenix, was merely
lying dormant before rising once again at an appropriate moment.
Bakweri chiefs and the privatisation of the CDC
Privatisation has been put forward by international donors as a magic
formula capable of  curing the ailing Cameroonian economy. At the
start of the economic crisis in the mid 1980s,7 there were some 175
public enterprises in the country that employed around 80,000 people
(Tedga 1990: 125-44; van de Walle 1994b: 152). These enterprises
served both economic and political ends. Besides being avenues to
economic modernisation and growth, they also allowed the
government to engage in prebendal politics and cement a hegemonic
alliance that incorporated the country’s emerging elite into the state
apparatus (Bayart 1979). A patrimonial logic existed in many African
post-colonial states (Chabal & Daloz 1999) but was particularly
strong in Cameroon, a country with stark ethnic and regional
cleavages (van de Walle 1994a; Nyamnjoh 1999; Gabriel 1999). It
is beyond doubt that this logic contributed to the poor performance
of  most public and para-public enterprises (Tedga 1990; van de
Walle 1994b). Prior to the economic crisis, the Cameroonian
government was subsidising parastatal-sector losses to the tune of
some FCFA 150 billion a year. Though most of  oil revenues were
initially kept in secret bank accounts abroad, their primary function
was soon to cover parastatal deficits.
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From the start of  the economic crisis, the World Bank made
parastatal reform the cornerstone of  its lending conditions and, given
growing budgetary constraints, the Biya government officially agreed
to cooperate. In May 1987, it appointed a national commission to
recommend reforms in the parastatal sector. A year later, the
commission reported back to the President, having determined
which institutions should be liquidated, sold to the private sector
or revived. However, few public enterprises were effectively
privatised, only six between 1988 and 1994 (Mama 1996: 175).
Van de Walle (1994b: 162) offered the following reasons for the
slow pace of privatisation:
Although the government is proceeding with care on the politically
sensitive issue of lay-offs, this does not appear to be the major
constraint on rapid implementation of  the reform agenda. Rather,
intra-elite competition and haggling over the rents freed up by
privatisation, along with the lack of technical expertise within the
state, served to slow down the process of  institutional reform.
Dissatisfied with the government’s performance, the World Bank
threatened to suspend credit to Cameroon amounting to US$ 75
million in early 1994 if it did not accelerate the process of
privatisation. Subsequently, on 15 July, the government announced
the privatisation of  15 large public enterprises. Among these were
five agro-industrial parastatals, including the CDC whose announced
privatisation incited commotion in the country, particularly in the
Anglophone region (see Chapter 2).
The government’s announcement of  the privatisation of  this
important agro-industrial enterprise was all the more shocking to
Anglophones since the CDC:
• had been one of the few public enterprises in Cameroon to
perform relatively well until the economic crisis;
• had been able to survive this crisis mainly because the
management and workers had agreed to adopt a series of
drastic adjustment measures aimed at cost reduction and
productivity increase; and
• was on the way to economic recovery following the 50%
devaluation of  the CFA franc in early 1994 (Konings 1995b).
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That the government singled out the CDC for privatisation
despite its bright prospects for recovery and immense contributions
to regional development was regarded by the Anglophone
community as provocation and led to regional protest actions against
what was perceived as a further step in the dismantling of the
Anglophone colonial economic legacy by the Francophone-
dominated state (Konings & Nyamnjoh 1997, 2003).
Unsurprisingly, the most vehement opposition in Anglophone
Cameroon came from landowners. As soon as the CDC’s privatisation
was announced, the Bakweri chiefs and elite mobilised to revive
the moribund BLC and adopt a common position regarding its
privatisation, which had been planned without any consideration
of the Bakweri land problem. Soon afterwards the BLC was renamed
the Bakweri Land Claims Committee (BLCC).
On 23 July 1994, the Bakweri chiefs and elite met in Buea under
the chairmanship of  Paramount Chief  S.M.L. Endeley of  Buea and
Paramount Chief  F. Bille Manga Williams of  Victoria (Limbe) to
discuss the implications of  the government’s decision. They agreed
to oppose in no uncertain terms the announced privatisation on the
grounds that CDC lands were Bakweri property and could thus not
be sold to non-natives without Bakweri consent. After lengthy and
passionate discussions, an ad-hoc committee was elected by
acclamation to assist the BLCC in preparing a detailed memorandum
on the Bakweri position that would be presented to the government
and all other interested parties.8
Over 500 Bakweri chiefs, dignitaries and elite gathered at the
Buea Youth Cultural and Animation Centre on 4 August 1994 and
approved the ad-hoc committee’s memorandum. The Bakweri agreed
that if privatisation had to take place at all, it should be on the
basis of ‘a creative and enlightened partnership between the owners
of the land on which the corporation operates and the providers of
finance capital without which it would not be possible to run a
modern, technologically sophisticated agro-industrial complex like
the CDC’.9 They insisted that any privatisation plan be based on
‘terms which recognise the ownership of  land as a distinct variable
which, together with the cash, make plantation agriculture possible;
consequently, landowners deserve ground rent compensation in
much the same way as the CDC was liable to pay ground rents for
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the use of the land’.10 The memorandum was later presented to the
Provincial Governor for onward transmission to President Biya. At
the end of this historic meeting, the eminent Bakweri scholar, Prof.
Ndiva Kofele-Kale, the secretary of the ad-hoc committee, was
designated counsel for the Bakweri people with instructions to
present their case to the United Nations and other international
forums.
The Bakweri case was strongly supported by Anglophone
movements. A powerfully worded petition to the head of  state, co-
signed by the Anglophone movements and Bakweri chiefs, reiterated
that the Bakweri had never relinquished ownership of the CDC
lands and that the corporation could not be sold without Bakweri
consent. It pointed out that the Bakweri had not received any
royalties for the use of their lands since the creation of the CDC in
1946. It also stressed that the Bakweri were not inclined to renew
the 60-year CDC lease, preferring to repossess the CDC lands after
its expiry in 2007 (Konings 1996b: 213).
Concerned with mounting anger in the Anglophone region in
general and the Bakweri community in particular, the Biya
government decided to send a delegation of high-ranking
Anglophone allies to the South West Province to appease the local
population. The delegation was led by Chief Ephraim Inoni who
was Deputy Secretary General at the Presidency and the Chief of
Bakingili, a village located on the territory of  a Bakweri sub-group,
and met a number of Bakweri representatives in Buea to discuss
the land problem. Though speaking on behalf of the government,
Chief Inoni appealed to Bakweri representatives not to forget that
he was one of them. He acknowledged that there should have been
prior contact between the government and the Bakweri before the
announcement of  the corporation’s privatisation but he denied
widespread rumours in Anglophone Cameroon that the French and
some high-ranking Francophones had masterminded the whole
operation. While admitting that the financial situation of the
corporation had improved after the 1994 devaluation of  the CFA
franc, he argued that privatisation would enable the corporation to
obtain new capital for the investments needed in production and
processing. The Bakweri Paramount Chief, S.M.L. Endeley,11 who
had always been a staunch supporter of the regime until the Bakweri
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land issue arose, then took the floor. Amid thunderous applause, he
declared that he himself, as the custodian of the ancestral lands,
and the Bakweri population as a whole, were against the CDC’s
privatisation. He requested Chief Inoni report this to President Biya:
We are in a country where we like to cheat ourselves, where
government hands decisions through dictatorship (...) We say no, no
[to privatisation], go and tell Mr Biya that he cannot afford to go
down in history as the man who sold the CDC.12
After the government delegation returned to Yaoundé, the
government did not undertake any further action regarding the CDC
privatisation. This apparent victory for Anglophone resistance turned
out to be short-lived and in 1997 rumours of  its imminent
privatisation became more persistent. In compliance with the
agreement with the IMF and the World Bank within the framework
of  the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in
1997, the privatisation of the CDC was expected to be launched
soon. That the government, under severe pressure from the Bretton
Woods institutions, was preparing the ground for the privatisation
could be concluded from the speeches and interviews of  leading
government and CDC officials at the opening ceremony of the
corporation’s golden-jubilee celebrations in Bota-Victoria on 1
December 1997. In his speech, the newly appointed Prime Minister
Peter Mafany Musonge, a Bakwerian who had been the CDC’s
general manager from 1988 to 1997, said:
Since the traditional international funding agencies no longer finance
corporations like CDC, the establishment should be prepared (…)
to foster new business relationships to raise new money while the
state plays the role of  facilitator. (…) Traditional rulers within CDC’s
areas of operation, workers and other Cameroonians must
understand perfectly well and make sure that peace reigns for
conclusive investment.13
The CDC’s chairman, N.N. Mbile, added that ‘privatisation
should not scare us as we are confident that government will protect
the interests of the Cameroonian people, the original landowners,
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the workers, new investors and the state itself ’. The CDC’s deputy
general manager, Richard Grey, then revealed that the reputable
international consultancy firm Coopers and Lybrand had been
selected by the World Bank and the government to carry out a study
into the privatisation of the CDC that would be completed by 30
June 1998. The Bakweri chiefs who attended the ceremony, notably
Chief  S.M.L. Endeley of  Buea, were frustrated by these statements
and revelations and condemned any future privatisation.14
The CDC was put up for sale in January 1999. Few protests
were heard from the almost dormant Anglophone movements
(Konings & Nyamnjoh 2000: 29-30). Their leadership’s only activity
was to make a strongly worded statement on 10 April 1999 warning
prospective CDC buyers to desist from investing in its purchase.
Bakweri chiefs and elite, however, quickly rallied. In a meeting with
southwestern members of parliament and government, they
denounced the privatisation saying that the latter’s acceptance of
the sale of the CDC ‘was tantamount to a betrayal of their people’.15
The BLCC officially wrote to President Biya on behalf of the Bakweri
people on 3 March 1999 requesting that it be included in privatisation
negotiations and that compensation be paid for the use of Bakweri
lands. When rumours spread that various multinational companies
like Fruitiers/Dole, Chiquita and Del Monte were negotiating with
individual government officials about the purchase of the whole or
parts of the CDC at throwaway prices, the Bakweri in the diaspora
once again addressed the head of state on 1 October 1999 in support
of the BLCC position.16
Since no reply was forthcoming from the presidency, the BLCC,
supported by regional organisations of chiefs and the elite, like the
South West Chiefs’ Conference (SWECC) and the South West Elites
Association (SWELA),17 decided to raise national and international
awareness by starting a high-profile public relations campaign on
the Internet and writing open letters, petitions and newspaper
articles. The BLCC was reconstituted and an interim bureau was
set up in the US.
During a BLCC general assembly meeting on 15 April 2000 it
was decided that only chiefs could occupy the positions of president
and vice-president. (There were four vice-presidents representing
each of  the subdivisions in the Fako Division of  the South West
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Province.) Other traditional rulers would constitute the Chiefs’
Advisory Council of  the Board of  Trustees and the modern elite
would occupy positions in the secretariat and act as technical
advisors. This division of  labour was meant to demonstrate that
the chiefs were the leaders of the Bakweri communities and capable
of mobilising and sensitising their subjects, while the modern elite
had the bureaucratic and technical capabilities to operate the
secretariat and provide the organisation with any necessary advice.
In May 2000, the BLCC interim bureau in the US opened to
establish an effective, active and visible presence within the Bakweri
and Cameroonian diaspora and to create permanent lines of
communication with all potential CDC buyers, donor agencies,
NGOs and foreign governments directly or indirectly involved in
the sale of the CDC. BLCC-USA was very vocal and set up its own
website.18 Its first action was to send a memo to the Managing
Director of  the IMF, Horst Köhler, on 16 June 2000 warning him
of growing unrest among the Bakweri and threatening legal action
should the privatisation of the CDC be pursued without BLCC
involvement:
As the current impasse in Zimbabwe and Kenya demonstrates, land
expropriated from African natives by European colonialists a century
ago is the source of  much contemporary unrest and instability. All
Cameroonians of goodwill bear witness that the Bakweri people
have over the years opted for a peaceful resolution of the CDC
Bakweri land problem. However, should the privatisation of the
CDC go ahead without the imput of the Bakweri on whose land
most of  the corporation’s agro-industrial activities are located, we
preserve the right to seek legal redress against the government of
the Republic of  Cameroon, the IMF, the World Bank as well as all
lessees who derive title to the land by whatever means, in any country
of the world where such bodies are located.19
This was followed by massive pro-BLCC demonstrations in New
York and Washington during the United Nations Millennium Summit
in September 2000 that was attended by a large Cameroonian
delegation led by President Paul Biya. As a result of these
demonstrations and a flurry of other pro-BLCC activities, the
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embarrassed Cameroonian delegation, along with leading donor
agencies, were able to gauge the high levels of support for the BLCC
within the Cameroonian diaspora in the US.
In a press release on 5 August 2000, the BLCC revealed that it
was going to take its campaign for land restitution and compensation
a notch higher by seeking consultative status within the United
Nations’ Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).20 It believed
that the granting of consultative status would provide it with a
global platform to proclaim its struggle for land rights, ‘bringing it
into contact with other NGOs which claim to represent the interests
of indigenous groups from around the world as well as with
sympathetic UN members who have championed the cause of
dispossessed people on the floor of the General Assembly and at
the numerous ECOSOC meetings over the years’.21 Soon afterwards,
on 21 August 2000, the United Nations invited the Counsel of the
BLCC, Prof. Ndiva Kofele-Kale, to make a representation on the
Bakweri lands issue to the UN Human Rights Commission in
Geneva.
Following the government’s renewed call for tenders for the CDC
in September 2000, the BLCC cautioned prospective buyers in an
open letter saying that:
it is our duty to advise you to think twice before you commit the
resources of your shareholders in a venture that is still mired in
controversy and whose promised financial and economic rewards
may prove to be illusory in the long run.22
During the late 1990s it had become increasingly evident that
the BLCC was finding it hard to defend Bakweri interests at the
national level. This had been particularly the case in 1996 when
‘their own son’, Peter Mafany Musonge, was appointed prime
minister. Without doubt, one of  the main reasons for his appointment
was that President Biya regarded him, as an ex-CDC general manager
and a Bakweri, as the most suitable candidate to handle the delicate
issue of CDC privatisation.
The appointment of Musonge initially raised high expectations
among the Bakweri. They were convinced that their son would pay
particular attention to the land question and take Bakweri interests
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into consideration in the case of any eventual sale of the CDC.
These expectations appear to have had solid foundations because,
in his previous position, Musonge had publicly declared in a radio
interview in 1994 that any privatisation of  the CDC should be ‘not
only economically effective but also socially equitable’.23 He
expressed his belief that indigenous landowners, workers and
investors would be directly involved in this endeavour. Once
appointed prime minister however, he came under immense pressure
from the IMF and his superior, Paul Biya, to champion the economic
advantages of CDC privatisation and to forget about paying
compensation to Bakweri landowners. Unable to convince his ethnic
group to give up its claim to what could possibly amount to tens of
billions of  CFA francs after more than 50 years of  CDC existence,
Musonge was eventually reported to have resorted to intimidation,
using the Buea Sub-prefect and the Fako Prefect to that end.
In March 2000, Buea Sub-prefect Aboubakar Njikam banned a
BLCC general assembly meeting that he had given his approval for
at an earlier stage. When he learnt that compensation was high on
the agenda, the prime minister quickly called a halt to the meeting
but failed to intimidate the committee that eventually met on 15
April 2000. In June 2000, the Fako Prefect, Jean-Robert Mengue
Meka, accused it of being an illegal organisation and the committee
was ordered to stop its activities. Two of  the newly elected BLCC
executives, Chief Peter Moky Efange (President) and Mola Njoh
Litumbe (Secretary General), responded by telling Mengue Meka
that he was acting illegally by claiming that the BLCC, which was
founded in 1946, was an unlawful association. He was reminded
that the BLCC was a duly incorporated organisation that had been
registered in accordance with the laws of the country and had been
received by the South West Governor in 1994 and thus could not
now have its legality questioned.24
As a result of the high-profile BLCC publicity at home and
abroad, the prime minister could no longer ignore the committee
and its demands. He invited members to his Yaoundé office and on
4 October 2000, the BLCC leadership met with Musonge, Chief
Ephraim Inoni, the Bakweri Deputy General Secretary at the
Presidency and a number of  other government officials. Musonge
conceded at this meeting that the issues of land ownership and the
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payment of ground rents were legitimate demands but urged that
these demands be pursued separately from the issue of privatisation.
He argued that a hostile environment was being created by the BLCC
protest campaign and was scaring off  potential investors.25
The BLCC delegation agreed with the Prime Minister that
privatisation would be successful only in a peaceful atmosphere
but pointed out that the Bakweri protest actions, such as the UN
Millennium Summit demonstrations, stemmed from a lack of
government response to their pleas and representations. It stressed
that Bakweri protest actions would inevitably continue until ‘justice,
equity, and legitimate rights of  the Bakweri were met’. The
delegation then reiterated the main BLCC demands that:
• the government recognise that the lands occupied by the CDC
were private property as defined by Part II of the 1974 Land
Law and that the Bakweri were the legitimate owners of these
lands;
• the Bakweri be fully involved in the CDC privatisation
negotiations to ensure their interests were effectively
protected;
• ground rents be paid into a Bakweri land trust fund; and
• the Bakweri, acting either jointly or individually, be allocated
a specific percentage of shares in each of the privatised sectors
of the corporation.26
While the BLCC was embarking on a dialogue with local and
national authorities, it continued to caution potential CDC buyers
and the Bretton Woods institutions against any privatisation without
the involvement of  the landowners. The latter, in turn, put pressure
on the Cameroonian government to settle the privatisation imbroglio.
In the wake of the reluctance of foreign companies to invest in the
CDC due to the unresolved land issue, the government was
compelled to reissue the CDC bid for tenders on 1 January 2001
and then again on 1 January 2002.
In October 2002, the BLCC filed a complaint about the land
dispute with the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights
‘on behalf  of  the Traditional Rulers, Notables and Elites of  the
indigenous minority peoples of Fako Division against the
Government of  Cameroon’. Three years later, in February 2006,
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the commission made a decision on the issue, which was endorsed
by the African Union. It ruled that ‘the Bakweri had a strong case
backed by history and law, that the BLCC had the mandate to speak
on behalf of the Bakweri and that the BLCC and the Government
of Cameroon should seek an amicable settlement of the land
dispute’. It availed its good offices to both parties in order to
facilitate such a settlement. Unfortunately, this has yet to come about.
Conclusion
This chapter highlighted the powerful resistance of Bakweri chiefs
to the Cameroonian government’s announcement of  the
privatisation of the CDC. It would be wrong to conclude that
Bakweri chiefs are against privatisation per se. In fact, their 1994
petition to the head of state clearly stated that:
In principle, the Bakweri and other Anglophones have no quarrel
with the idea of privatisation or sale of companies in which
government enjoys majority control since we fully understand the
logic behind such an exercise, i.e. the relocation of the management
of  inefficiently managed parastatals in more efficient hands. We
recognise that government, as the controlling shareholder in these
companies, has an obligation to the majority shareholders and the
Cameroonian taxpayer to ensure that their tax revenues are not wasted
in failing parastatals.
The strong opposition by Bakweri chiefs to the privatisation was
partly because they saw it as provocation of the Anglophone
community. They pointed out that the CDC had the reputation of
being one of the few parastatals in Cameroon that had played a
significant role in regional development and performed relatively
well until the economic crisis. They also claimed ownership of  CDC
lands. Since the 1940s they had been engaged in a fierce and
protracted struggle for the retrieval of  the Bakweri lands that were
expropriated by the Germans for plantation agriculture. They
therefore complained bitterly that they, as the custodians of  the
Bakweri lands, were never consulted prior to the announcement of
the corporation’s privatisation and they demanded compensation
for any sale or lease of  CDC lands to multinational companies.
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The opposition of Bakweri chiefs to the establishment and
privatisation of the CDC has had important implications for current
debates on their position in local society and in the national arena.
Geschiere (1993: 165-66) pointed out two reasons for the integration
of  the chieftaincy, which was more or less a colonial creation, into
Bakweri society: chieftaincy was strengthened during British indirect
rule and, even more significantly, it became a potential rallying point
against the ‘strangers’, attracted by the plantation economy created
by the Germans, who invaded Bakweri territory in large numbers.
The persistent struggle of  the Bakweri chiefs since the 1940s for
justice regarding the expropriated Bakweri lands may have been an
even more important factor for integrating chieftaincy into local
society. While chiefs in Anglophone Cameroon have been officially
transformed into auxiliaries of  the state in the aftermath of
independence and reunification and most chiefs maintain close links
with the ruling party (Geschiere 1993: 166-69; Fisiy 1995: 57-59),
my case study demonstrates that Bakweri chiefs cannot be
characterised as mere puppets of the regime (van Rouveroy van
Nieuwaal 1996: 39). As in other parts of Africa (van Rouveroy van
Nieuwaal 1998: 80-87), large-scale state expropriation of the local
community’s land has been a permanent source of  conflict between
the state and Bakweri chiefs.
In their long-standing struggle to retrieve ancestral lands and in
vehement opposition to the current privatisation of the CDC,
Bakweri chiefs have been backed by the Bakweri elite at home and
in the diaspora, irrespective of their political affiliation. The elite
has placed its bureaucratic and technical competence at the disposal
of the BLCC, the legitimate representative of the Bakweri people
who are seeking the restoration of  their ancestral land rights. They
are using modern communication methods, including the Internet,
to caution potential investors and the Bretton Woods institutions
against any privatisation of the CDC without Bakweri consent and
compensation. This has scared off foreign capital and the
government has been unable to control such modern resistance.
The Bakweri chiefs have also been supported by newly created
Anglophone associations that perceive the Bakweri land issue as
part of  their struggle to redress the marginalisation and subordination
of their region within the Francophone-dominated state.
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The combined forces of Bakweri and Anglophone traditional
and modern elites have compelled the government to repeatedly
postpone the privatisation of the CDC and to take Bakweri interests
into consideration in a new privatisation construction.
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Privatisation and labour militancy:
The case of  Cameroon’s tea estates
Introduction
Privatisation is an essential part of  an overall neo-liberal reform
package aimed at creating transparency and accountability in the
management of national affairs as well as a favourable environment
for opening up African economies to market forces and private-
sector development (World Bank 1989, 1992; Sandbrook 2000).
Privatisation calls for a re-evaluation of relations between the
public and private sectors in Africa. Under pressure from
international donors, governments have been urged to reduce state
ownership and enhance private-sector development. International
donors tend to attribute the massive growth of state enterprises
since independence and their generally poor performance to the
bad governance of  Africa’s neo-patrimonial regimes. They claim
that statist conceptions of development have resulted in a
widespread politicisation of economic decision-making and rent-
seeking behaviour among the parasitic political elite (World Bank
1997; Olukoshi 1998; van de Walle 2001). Privatisation would help
cut public-sector inefficiency and waste, solve the problem of rising
budgetary deficits, stimulate private-sector development, attract
more investment and new technology, and revive economic growth.
There is a growing body of literature on privatisation that
discusses the mixed results these practices have had in Africa and
the serious problems and controversy they have encountered (cf.
Mkandawire 1994; Bennell 1997; Campbell White & Bhatia 1998;
Tangri 1999; van de Walle 2001; Pitcher 2002; Rakner 2003).
Privatisation problems in Africa are attributed not only to technical
and financial constraints but also to the fact that privatisation did
not offer the break with the previous dynamics of the post-colonial
state that the Bretton Woods institutions and bilateral donors had
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expected. Cameroon is a clear example of the failure of privatisation
to free the parastatal sector of government neo-patrimonial logic
(van de Walle 1994b; Walker 1998; Konings 2003b, 2007a). There
is considerable evidence that the Biya regime was initially extremely
reluctant to sell state-owned enterprises, which it saw as a threat to
its patronage politics and the maintenance and consolidation of its
power. It was only later that it was prepared to speed up the
programme of privatisation. In addition to persistent pressure from
international donors, the regime realised that privatisation itself
did not necessarily foreclose rent-seeking opportunities for the
parasitic bureaucratic and political elite. Indeed, some members
benefited from it. For politicians responsible for the privatisation
process, privatisation measures have frequently been an opportunity
for corrupt practices. Divestiture has not been a transparent process
and, in return for the payment of substantial kickbacks, public
enterprises have been sold at prices far below their true value amid
reports of  embezzlement of  the proceeds. Moreover, privatisation
has not excluded members of the bureaucratic and political elite
from occupying top positions in former state-owned enterprises.
Some have been re-appointed and others have been newly recruited
(Konings 2007a).
The problems of privatisation in Africa are seen by some as also
being due to the fierce opposition of civil-society organisations (cf.
Olukoshi 1998; Beckman & Sachikonye 2001; Konings 2003a,
2003b, 2007a). Although World Bank studies have recommended
the involvement of  civil society in neo-liberal economic reforms,
arguing that their participation in policy making would ensure
ownership, credibility and sustainability of  the reform process (World
Bank 1992, 1995; Rakner 2001), there is ample evidence that civil-
society organisations tend to be excluded from the decision-making
process because of  their expected resistance to the allegedly harmful
effects of externally imposed privatisation schemes on their
members. Academics, students and ethno-regional movements have
vehemently denounced the sale of national and regional patrimony
to western multinationals and nationals closely connected with
African regimes (Tangri 1999; Konings 2003b, 2007a). They and
various indigenous business groups have criticised the prominent
role of foreign companies in the privatisation process as a
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‘recolonisation of Africa’. Consumer groups have often protested
against the poor and/or expensive services delivered by newly
privatised enterprises. Undoubtedly, the most public, persistent and
organised opposition to privatisation in Africa has come from the
labour movement. Trade unions have, on occasion, succeeded in
blocking or slowing down the privatisation of specific enterprises
or influencing negotiations for a privatisation agreement. At other
times and in response to external pressures, governments have simply
brushed union opposition aside, leaving a legacy of  anger and
political tension (Beckman & Sachikonye 2001; Konings 2006).
Remarkably, hardly any detailed studies have been published on
the responses of  African workers to privatisation in West-Central
Africa.1 This is all the more surprising because privatisations of
large, strategic public enterprises in Cameroon and other African
countries have often been followed by militant protests by workers
against massive lay-offs and deteriorating conditions of  service.
This chapter discusses how the privatisation of  the CDC’s tea
estates generated not only persistent regional protest but also
protracted strikes by estate workers. I focus on workers in the two
privatised tea estates in Anglophone Cameroon, namely the Tole
Tea Estate and the Ndu Tea Estate (see Chapter 3).
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first provides evidence
that the announced privatisation of the CDC tea estates in October
2002 was fiercely opposed by Anglophone and other ethno-regional
organisations, in particular the Bakweri Land Claims Committee
(BLCC), all the more so because it turned out to be engineered by a
few well-connected members of the regional elite who were
conniving with the Cameroonian state. The second part describes
the growing militancy of  Tole and Ndu workers following a dramatic
deterioration in their conditions of  service in the aftermath of  the
privatisation of  their estates.
The privatisation of the CDC tea estates
Attempts to privatise the CDC have been vehemently opposed by
Anglophone and South West associations (see Chapters 2 and 5) as
well as by other regional civil-society organisations. The most
important was the Fako Agricultural Workers Union (FAWU), which
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is responsible for the representation and defence of CDC workers
in Fako Division (Konings 1993a; 1995b). Its president, Cornelius
Vewessee, is one of  the most prominent union leaders in Cameroon,
having played a significant part in achieving a large measure of
union autonomy in 1992. He insisted that the CDC could not be
privatised without consulting the FAWU, arguing that CDC workers
had made personal sacrifices during the economic crisis to assist
the corporation’s recovery. Moreover, he said the union would resist
any mass lay-offs and/or deterioration in workers’ conditions of
service as a result of  privatisation. And finally, the Anglophone
press severely criticised the announced privatisation: it has long
defended the Anglophone cause and informed the Anglophone
population of the issues at stake.
The united Anglophone front was able to prevent the
implementation of  the corporation’s privatisation for some time.
However to the consternation of Anglophones in general and the
Bakweri in particular, it was announced in October 2002 that the
CDC tea estates had been sold to a South African consortium,
Brobon Finex PTY Ltd. Brobon Finex would run the tea sector,
including the Tole Tea Estate in the Bakweri area, under the name
of  Cameroon Tea Estates (CTE).
The privatisation agreement between the Cameroonian
government and Brobon Finex was on the following terms. The
Cameroonian government was to hand over 65% of its shares to
Brobon Finex which, in turn, would sell 5% of its shares to its
personnel. Brobon Finex was to expand tea production area from
about 1,500 to 3,000 ha in fifteen years and invest about FCFA 8
billion over the following ten years. It would also reimburse the
FCFA 1.1 billion owed by the CDC tea estates. In addition, it agreed
not to lay off any workers, improve existing health, education and
accommodation facilities, and continue buying produce from local
contract farmers. Finally, and conforming to the government’s
privatisation policy of agro-industrial enterprises, land would be
excluded from the transaction.
At the signing of the agreement on 18 October 2002, the
Executive Chairman of  Brobon Finex, Derrick Garvie, declared
that his company would demonstrate within a few years that the
government’s act of  confidence had not been misplaced and that
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no effort or expense would be spared in developing Cameroon’s tea
sector. He guaranteed the jobs of  the existing labour force, adding
that more workers would be recruited as a result of  plans for
expansion.2
The BLCC expressed its bewilderment at the sale of  the CDC
tea estates without any consultation or compensation of the
landowners in spite of previous deliberations between the committee
and the government. The Anglophone secessionist movement, the
SCNC, claimed that the Francophone-dominated state had no locus
standi to privatise, sell or transfer CDC tea estates located within
the territorial boundaries of Anglophone Cameroon to South
Africans or any other person (Konings 2003b). In March 2000, the
unions had warned the government that the 1992 Labour Code
provided that workers would be consulted in the event of
privatisation as to whether they would prefer to be paid off before
negotiating new contracts with the new employer.3
The privatisation of the CDC tea estates soon became a national
scandal when it emerged that a handful of politically well-connected
elites were going to benefit at the expense of the public treasury
and the native landowners. From his comments, it became clear
that this privatisation was masterminded by John Niba Ngu, a former
CDC general manager and minister of agriculture, who is known to
be a close friend of President Biya (see Chapter 2). He used both
his technical knowledge and his many connections within the regime’s
highest levels to design the privatisation of  the CDC tea estates.
While experts had estimated the value of the three tea estates at
between FCFA 5 billion and FCFA 10 billion, Ngu managed to
bring the price down to FCFA 1.5 billion. Less than three months
later, the CTE sold stocks worth FCFA 4.6 billion. In return for his
excellent services, the Board of  Brobon Finex appointed Ngu as
general manager on a monthly salary and benefits amounting to
FCFA 4 million. According to Ngu, they allocated him 5% of  the
CTE’s share capital, although this was later contested by the Board
of Brobon Finex.
There were also growing doubts about Brobon Finex’s takeover
when it became clear that the real owner of the CTE was Alhadji
Baba Ahmadou Danpullo, an extremely wealthy Mbororo from the
North West Province of  Anglophone Cameroon who was apparently
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using Brobon Finex as a front. He is a well-known cattle rancher
and businessman in Cameroon with an international network
stretching as far as South Africa and also a member of the central
committee of  the ruling party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic
Movement (CPDM). Interestingly, Danpullo had previously been
involved in another privatisation scandal in Cameroon, namely an
attempt to sell the Société de Développement du Coton (SODECOTON),
a huge parastatal in Northern Cameroon, which was on the same
privatisation list as the CDC in 1994. Danpullo was among the small
group of politically well-connected elite, most of them originating
from Northern Cameroon, who managed to buy the company at a
giveaway price. The deal was eventually cancelled by the government
following a popular outcry and the intervention of  external donors,
in particular France and the World Bank (Takougang & Krieger 1998:
169-80). Apparently, Danpullo had put John Niba Ngu, who was
looking for a South African financier for his privatisation scheme for
the CDC tea estates, in contact with Brobon Finex. Although he
was not a signatory to the convention between the Cameroonian
government and Brobon Finex, he paid the money for the takeover
of the CDC tea estates to the public treasurer, and has since been
engaged in other financial transactions on behalf of the CTE.
Investigations by the BLCC in South Africa found that Brobon
Finex existed in name only and had no office premises. Its chairman,
Derrick Garvie, was indeed known in South African business circles
but not in connection with Brobon Finex. This raised suspicions
that Brobon Finex was merely a straw company. Some of  my
informants alleged that Danpullo made use of  the Brobon Finex
construction because it improved his chance of  acquiring the tea
estates, being well aware that the government would be inclined to
sell large, strategic state enterprises to foreign companies. It enabled
him to whitewash part of his ill-gotten capital. After initially being
designated by the Brobon Finex Board as a major shareholder, he
gradually started to act as chairman of  the CTE Board, as the South
African Brobon Finex board members became less visible in
Cameroon.
In January 2003, the BLCC threatened to sue Brobon Finex in
South Africa for trespassing on Bakweri property without the prior
consent of  its owners. In addition, it called upon the government to
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revoke the controversial privatisation of the CDC tea estates and
to open meaningful discussions with the BLCC with a view to
achieving an equitable resolution of the Bakweri land problem.4
Amid growing evidence of financial malpractice, President Biya
instructed the prime minister and the security forces to investigate
the matter. The outcome of  these investigations has never been
made public but it is widely believed that Danpullo had been using
his political network to help settle the matter and been engaged in
bribing investigators. Moreover, it would appear that President Biya
himself has serious allegations to answer about personally
authorising the transfer of  the CDC tea estates to his friends.
What is more relevant to our discussion here is that the
controversial privatisation scheme was going to have nefarious
consequences for the Tole and Ndu Tea estate workers whose living
and working conditions had already been badly affected by the
economic recession prior to privatisation. This gave rise to an
unprecedented degree of  labour militancy on both estates.
Growing labour militancy on the Tole Tea Estate
Neither the government nor the CDC’s management had felt it
necessary to inform the Tole Tea Estate workers of  the planned
privatisation of their estate so they only came to learn of it through
the media. Being aware that privatisations in Cameroon had usually
led to retrenchments and a deterioration in workers’ conditions of
service, they were worried about their future despite assurances
given by the new owners on the signing of the privatisation
agreement that the existing labour force and their conditions of
service would be maintained. Shortly after the estate’s privatisation
on 18 October 2002, one of the women pluckers expressed the
workers’ widespread anxieties as follows:
I am not sure whether we are going to enjoy similar conditions as
under the CDC. I am rather afraid that we are going to suffer when
the new owners have installed themselves. Nobody appears to be
willing to enlighten us on the effects of privatisation and our new
status. One simply asks us to wait.5
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The workers were even more alarmed when the ‘real’ owner of
the CTE, Alhadji Baba Ahmadou Danpullo, decided in November
2002 to transfer 23 managerial staff from his business enterprises
in Douala to his new company, probably because he thought they
would be more loyal than former CDC staff  members. His decision
created serious problems on the estate. First, these newly appointed
managers were Francophones who all had difficulty communicating
with the Anglophone estate managers and workers. And given the
deepening Anglophone-Francophone divide in the country (Konings
& Nyamnjoh 2003), it was hardly surprising that their appointment
was generally seen on the estate as a highly provocative attempt to
establish Francophone domination of  a former Anglophone
enterprise. As one of these Francophone managers put it:
The Francophones are looked upon here as invaders. The
Anglophones have not digested the fact that the tea sector of the
CDC has come under the control of  French-speaking Cameroonians.
One has therefore the impression that they will do everything to
chase us from the company.6
Second, although lacking any experience in tea production, these
newly appointed managers rapidly usurped the functions of the
former CDC managerial staff  and lorded over them and the workers.
This behaviour fuelled existing tensions and feelings of solidarity
and militancy among the workers. Without the first CTE general
manager’s knowledge, these Francophone managers engaged in
dubious financial transactions that resulted in a lack of funds to
improve estate facilities and workers’ conditions of  service. Their
lack of experience and frequent clashes with Anglophone managers
and workers soon led to a serious drop in tea production.
From 29 December 2002 to 4 January 2003, the estate workers
staged a first strike against the new CTE management.7 They asserted
that their conditions of  service had declined following privatisation.
Their social-security contributions had not been transferred to the
National Social Security Fund since 1996, medical care was not
being provided, ambulances and factory tractors had broken down,
sceptic tanks were not being emptied, and wages for November
2002 had not yet been paid to all the field workers. Many workers
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also protested at the sudden dismissal on 4 January 2003 of the
CTE’s general manager, John Niba Ngu, and his replacement by his
Francophone deputy general manager, Mahamat Alamine Mey. While
the Board of Brobon Finex insisted that Ngu had been fired because
of his unilateral decision to dismiss all the newly hired,
inexperienced and unpopular Francophone managers, the workers
claimed that he had been fired because of his plans to improve
their conditions of  service. At a meeting with some of  the Brobon
Finex board members on the same day, their shop stewards or staff
representatives (Konings 1993a; 1995a) were told not to meddle in
the sacking of  their former general manager and to ensure workers
returned to work, while the CTE management looked into all their
problems. The board members ordered the immediate payment of
any salary arrears and made the following promises: the CTE would
increase workers’ salaries by April 2003, raise their conditions of
service to the standards prevailing on the tea estates in Kenya and
elsewhere, and provide them with toilet and medical facilities as
well as protective clothing and boots. A few days later, the new
CTE general manager, Mahamat Alamine Mey, signed a protocol
agreement with the President of  the FAWU, Cornelius Vewessee,
reassuring workers that all their acquired rights would be honoured.
On 17 June 2003, estate workers staged another strike in protest
at what they termed ‘poor working conditions and humanitarian
neglect’.8 They felt particularly aggrieved by the abrupt cancellation
of certain allowances and bonuses they had been enjoying under
the CDC and the regular lack of medical facilities on the estate.
Although an amount of  FCFA 650 was deducted from their monthly
wages for medical care, they were forced to go to the CDC hospitals
where they were charged the same as other non-CDC personnel.
Apparently representing the feelings of most estate workers, a 52-
year-old widowed tea plucker lamented the fact that:
The abolition of several allowances has drastically reduced my
income. My monthly wage has dropped from FCFA 40,000 to
FCFA 22,000. I am not even sure if  I will get this little amount. They
are always finding pretexts to cut my present wage. One speaks of
taxes to be paid, absenteeism, indiscipline and so on. At present, I
am torn between resigning and revolt. I would like to leave but I
wonder how I could raise my children if  I did so.9
156
Crisis and Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
Despite growing discontent among the workers, the chairman
of  Brobon Finex, Derrick Garvie, still presented an optimistic
picture of  the company’s future during the celebrations to mark the
first anniversary of the CTE on 18 October 2003. He again stressed
that one of the principal managerial objectives was ‘to make CTE
a clear example of the success story of privatisations’.10
Soon after these celebrations, the CTE management
implemented a controversial reorganisation in December 2003.
Staff representatives pointed out how a number of the proposed
measures went against the 1992 deregulated Labour Code, and
they attributed the absence of  any state intervention in the matter
to the close links between top government officials and Alhadji
Baba Ahmadou Danpullo. The reorganisation started with a 50%
slash in workers’ salaries and the withdrawal of any remaining
allowances. When workers reacted to this dramatic decline in their
income by resorting to protracted strike action on 8 January 2004,
management used this illegal strike as a pretext for implementing
two further measures. It immediately dismissed 268 workers
without paying their severance pay, and started recruiting new
workers from outside Anglophone Cameroon. Among those
dismissed were a number of  staff  representatives. The CTE’s
management simply refused to seek authorisation for their
dismissal from the Ministry of Labour as required in the Labour
Code. It then changed almost the entire labour force – with the
exception of  90 workers – from being permanent workers into
casual and temporary workers. These measures were accompanied
by the introduction of a labour regime that became more and more
despotic (Burawoy 1985), the banning of trade unionism on the
estate and the bypassing of  staff  representatives.
Furious about these measures, workers continued to strike until
5 February 2004 when the Minister of  Labour, Prof. Robert Nkili,
decided to intervene. Immediately after his mediation and the
settlement of the dispute, it became evident that management was
unwilling to respect his instructions about refraining from ‘wrongful
terminations of  contracts and unacceptable wages and terms of
employment’. It started introducing new reorganisation measures
that led to a further deterioration in workers’ conditions of  service.
It also notified tea pluckers that their daily task would be increased
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to 32 kg in the slack season and 45 kg in the peak season. The
workers then decided to stay away from work on 10 February. And
in retaliation, management announced an additional cut in wages.
Given these developments, the living and working conditions
on the estate became so deplorable that workers started complaining
that ‘the takeover of the tea estate by Brobon Finex had re-
introduced slavery in this part of the country’.11 While CTE
management was celebrating the company’s second anniversary on
23 October 2004, workers circulated tracts in which they called for
the return of John Niba Nga as general manager to save the company
from total collapse. They deplored their loss of benefits and the
social amenities they had enjoyed under the CDC, the fall in the
quality of their tea, and the abandonment of certain sections of
the plantation which, they said, had fallen into disuse.12
During the course of 2005, workers became increasingly
desperate. They regularly appealed to the government to return
the estate to the CDC, stressing that Alhadji Baba Ahmadou
Danpullo was focusing his attention and capital on his newly
constructed 4,000-hectare tea estate in Ndawara in the North West
Province which, he boasted, was making use of  the latest technology.
Irrespective of its 35% stake in the CTE, the government remained
silent, apparently unconcerned about the decrease in tea production
and workers’ declining conditions of  service. Feeling abandoned by
the government, workers gradually lost faith in any future
improvement in their predicament under CTE management.
Significantly, while many appeared to no longer be interested in
keeping their jobs at any costs, they did not want to resign before
all they were owed had been paid out since this would enable them
to repay their debts and invest in a new future.13 Their growing
realisation of  a common interest in fighting for their accrued rights
became a source of  solidarity. This was clearly manifest in 2006 when
a protracted strike – probably the longest in Cameroon’s labour history
– paralysed all the estate’s activities for almost an entire year.
On 18 January 2006, the workers held a short strike as a warning.
They had been informed that the Minister of  Labour would be
coming on a working visit to Buea and the next day they intercepted
him and informed him that the sale of  their estate to Brobon Finex
had not been a good move. They had been exposed to untold
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hardships following privatisation, and were unable even to send
their children to school. The minister replied that he had refrained
from any earlier intervention on their behalf  because he had expected
their problems to be solved at the company level. He asked them to
go back to work while he tried to solve their problems by meeting
Prime Minister Ephraim Inoni with a view to reconsidering the
privatisation of  the CDC tea estates.14
Nothing more was heard of the minister after he left Buea and
on 26 February 2006 workers announced that they had no other
choice than to go on strike due to ‘the inhuman working conditions
we are subjected to by the CTE management’. They stressed that
they would not resume work until they had been paid the following
benefits:
severance payment from CDC to date; accrued leave allowances
from 2003 to 2006; good separation bonuses, [their] own 5 per
cent shares in the CTE as spelt out in the privatisation agreement;
[their] social insurance dues; [their] credit union contributions which
were never transferred by the CTE to the credit union; and balances
owed to retrenched workers since January 2004.15
By the start of this strike, a new spokesman for the workers,
Blasius Mosoke, had emerged who acted in close cooperation with
existing staff  representatives. He was not a worker but a manager,
being one of  the estate’s field assistants. He told me that two major
factors were responsible for his siding with the workers during the
strike. First, like the workers, he felt he had been badly treated by
the newly recruited Francophone managers after privatisation. His
relationship with the CTE’s management had become particularly
strained after he refused to provide the names of the workers
involved in the first strike in 2006. Just like them, he had considered
resigning after receiving his severance pay. Second, he felt obliged
to fight not only for himself but also for the workers because he
thought that the core of  the estate’s labour force was predominantly
made up of poorly educated women who were incapable of
representing their own interests effectively.16
At a crisis meeting in Limbe on 29 March that was attended by
representatives of the regional administration, management and
workers, the newly appointed French general manager of the CTE,
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Jean-Pierre Croze, disclosed that he intended to close the estate for
three months during the ongoing strike to replace the machines in
the tea factory at a cost of  approximately FCFA 3.5 billion. He
then offered the workers FCFA 14.9 million that, he said,
represented part of  their accrued benefits. Staff  representatives
rejected his offer, however, saying that the workers would prefer
the immediate payment of  all their benefits.17
Not long after this meeting, on 8 April, the strikers started
blockading the Tole to Sasse road. This had the intended
consequence of forestalling the reopening of some local elitist
colleges after the Easter holidays. The workers’ argument was simple:
if they prevented students from going to school, their parents, who
belonged to the cream of the Cameroonian elite, would be likely to
bring pressure to bear on the government to meet their demands.18
Indeed, on 12 April, the Minister of Labour organised another crisis
meeting in Buea but in spite of heated discussions, he failed to
persuade workers’ representatives to accept the CTE management’s
initial offer of  FCFA 14.9 million (with the remainder of  their
accrued benefits being paid progressively). However in the end, he
reached a compromise with both parties agreeing that all the accrued
benefits would be paid out three months later. In the meantime,
each party would calculate the total amount and then compare their
findings with the payment coming in July.19
After this agreement, three significant events occurred. First,
there was an attempt by CTE owners to continue selling tea stocks
during the strike and in the night of 25 April, soldiers tried to remove
bags of  processed tea from the estate’s factory. It soon transpired
that Alhadji Baba Ahmadou Danpullo had hired these soldiers to
transport the tea to one of his lorries that was parked in Buea.
Defying warning shots, incensed workers attacked the soldiers and
damaged their truck and, in revenge, soldiers tried to arrest Blasius
Mosoke, the estate’s field assistant and the workers’ spokesman.
Workers responded by warning the military that they would not
take it lying down if anything happened to Mosoke.20
Second, there was an attempt by the Bakweri elite to buy the
estate. Claiming that it was extremely worried about the ongoing
crisis in one of  the region’s most important enterprises, the
management of the Bakweri transport and shipping company
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Fakoship announced on 14 July its intention to take over the Tole
Tea Estate. However, this offer was immediately dismissed by the
chairman of  Brobon Finex, Derrick Garvie, who said that ‘as the
owner of the estate, his company had the sole right to let it go
fallow, dismiss workers, dismantle machines, close it down and sell
it without the government or anybody else interfering in its affairs’.21
Alhadji Baba Ahmadou Danpullo strongly condemned the offer as
being another expression of  Bakweri opposition to his company.
He repeatedly declared that the crisis on the estate was not due to
managerial lapses but to the political machinations of the Bakweri
elite who continued to incite workers against the management with
the aim of  undermining the company and serving their own
interests.22
Third, the most dramatic event was the workers’ decision to
besiege the CDC’s Head Office in Bota-Limbe. They had been
frustrated by the government’s failure to respect the agreement
reached at the crisis meeting on 12 April and while they had made
their own calculations of  their accrued benefits, the three-month
deadline had passed without any government response. On 26 July,
between 500 and 800 men, women and children from the Tole Tea
Estate occupied the CDC’s Head Office, demanding FCFA 2.3
billion in accrued benefits. The FAWU’s president aptly described
the symbolic meaning of their occupation:
The protesters presently camped at the CDC Head Office have not
behaved violently because they have come back to where they were,
to express that the marriage to which they were given, had not been
successful because the new husband seems to have another wife in
Ndawara [referring to Danpullo’s newly created tea estate in that
locality] and is not taking care of them. So they have come back to
their father. CDC is their father.23
Although the provincial governor and the CDC’s general manager
ordered them to leave, the workers resolved to stay until a definitive
solution to their problems had been found. Only the personal
intervention of  President Biya persuaded the workers to call off
their protest action on 4 August, and Prime Minister Ephraim Inoni
was asked to mediate. He set up an ad-hoc committee composed of
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government, management and workers’ representatives that was
presided over by the Minister of Labour in order to calculate the
amount owed to the strikers and ensure its prompt payment.
The committee started work on 7 August. According to its own
calculations, it did not accept the workers’ ‘exorbitant’ demands of
FCFA 2.3 billion and proposed the meagre sum of  FCFA 169 million.
After recalculation, it agreed to a figure of  FCFA 308 million, which
the workers still considered far below their expectations. Payment
was to take place in the subsequent two weeks but was again
postponed. It was only after mounting labour unrest that the regional
administration announced it would make payments on 30 August.
However when the workers gathered outside the offices of the
Provincial Delegation of Labour in Buea to receive their payments,
they were informed that nothing would happen without an accurate
list. In response, the workers went on the rampage in Buea, erecting
road blocks on the main road to Kumba and Douala and tearing
down billboards along the roadside. Clashes between workers and
the police led to 30 workers being taken to hospital and a passer-by
reportedly being hit by a stray bullet.
A few days later, on 2 September, the regional authorities
summoned the workers to collect their payments. Since the
authorities proved unwilling to publish a list of beneficiaries and
the amount each of them would receive, the workers refused to
turn up. There were two reasons why they finally collected the money
they were owed on 11 September. First, their leaders had been
continuously exposed to death threats by the administration, leaving
them with no choice but to comply. Second, the workers’ united
front had been broken after workers at the Tole Credit Union secretly
collected some FCFA 2.2 million.24 Most of  the workers were
embittered because they had been hoodwinked into accepting miserly
sums and they declared that they were no longer prepared to work
on the estate.
A month later, all the workers who had been paid off had –
either voluntarily or forcibly – left the Tole Tea Estate.25 Some
returned to their villages of origin, while others moved to
neighbouring villages to try to eke out a new existence. Those who
still wanted to work on the estate were told by CTE management
that they had to apply for new contracts. On 1 October, youths
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hired by the management on a contract basis started pruning the
overgrown tea bushes. Tea picking was expected to restart in the
course of 2007.
Growing labour militancy on the Ndu Tea Estate
Given the CTE takeover of  all the former CDC tea estates in
October 2002, it is not surprising that the Ndu Tea Estate workers
faced similar problems to the Tole Tea Estate workers after the
controversial privatisation. These included a drastic deterioration
in their living and working conditions, massive lay-offs, frequent
violations of the Labour Code, the replacement of competent
Anglophone managers with inexperienced Francophones and, above
all, constant delays in the payment of the financial benefits that the
former and present owners, the CDC and the CTE respectively,
owed the workers, such as severance pay, termination benefits,
compensation for sums (for social insurance and credit union dues)
deducted from workers’ wages for over the years without interest
and the workers’ 5% share in the company as stipulated in the
privatisation agreement.
Ndu Tea Estate workers used similar tactics to Tole Tea Estate
workers to protest against growing exploitation and subordination in
the labour process. Faced with the banning of  trade unionism on the
estate, they began to resort to informal, collective actions. And when
they realised that the CTE management was not going to keep its
promise of improving their living and working conditions after
privatisation, some workers decided to stop working on the estate.
In 2004 the Ndu workers showed their profound dissatisfaction
with the estate’s privatisation. In February, they began a sit-in. In
response, CTE management sanctioned them in a similar way as
the Tole workers: and almost the entire Ndu labour force was
transformed from having permanent labour status into contract
labour. In presidential elections on 11 October, Ndu workers refused
to support the incumbent president, Paul Biya, holding him jointly
responsible for the estate’s privatisation and its nefarious effects on
the workers’ living and working conditions. This is evident from a
two-page memorandum that was signed by the local elite and the
chief of Ndu:
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The negative influence on voters for the CPDM in Ndu Subdivision,
among others, was the privatisation of the CDC and the irregular
lay-off  of  hundreds of  workers of  the Ndu Tea Estate by the
CTE.26
In March 2005, Ndu workers threatened to go on strike again to
back their grievances. In a petition to the CTE management, they
lamented the fact that they had been reduced to contract workers under
extremely rigid conditions on the grounds that they had absconded
from work during the previous strike. They also decried the punitive
transfer of some staff representatives and the allegedly intentional
miscalculations on their pay. They claimed that the management
still owed them wages and leave allowances. Curiously, instead of
addressing their grievances, management threatened to sanction them
for their refusal to use the proper channels for seeking redress.27
Inspired by the protracted strike on the Tole Tea Estate in the
same year, Ndu workers embarked upon a four-month strike on 28
August 2006, demanding the immediate payment of their financial
dues. They stressed that they had waited long enough, having sent
numerous petitions to the CTE management and the administration
of the Donga-Mantung Division, and announced that they were
now prepared to fight to the bitter end, even if it cost them their
lives. They cut down hundreds of  eucalyptus trees from the CTE
fuel plantation and blocked the Grassfields ring road, bringing traffic
between Bamenda and Nkambe, the capital of Donga-Mantung
Division, to a standstill. They had been informed by reliable sources
that the CTE management was planning to bring in workers from
the Ndawara Tea Estate in the North West Province in an effort to
break their strike and ignore their legitimate demands. Fearing that
the situation might degenerate into violence, the divisional
administration ordered two trucks of  armed soldiers from the
Nkambe barracks who used force in a number of clashes that resulted
in the hospitalisation of  more than 30 workers.28
Faced with a deteriorating situation, the Senior District Officer
(SDO) for Donga-Mantung Division, Godlive Mboke Ntua, and
the District Officer (DO) for the Ndu Subdivision, John Mkong
Yosimbom, convened a crisis meeting on 1 September. Their
attempts to bring the workers to reason failed as the latter had lost
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all confidence in the divisional administration and CTE
management. They then successfully approached Emmanuel
Ngafeeson, the Secretary of State at the Ministry of Justice in charge
of  the Penitentiary, who was a prominent member of  the local elite
and popular among the masses, being fondly known as the ‘man-at-
the-grassroots’.
The following day, Ngafeeson went from Yaoundé to Tatum, a
village close to Ndu where he was welcomed by the strikers. He
then accompanied them to the CTE Ndu office, a distance of more
than five kilometres, where he subsequently addressed them in their
local languages, appealing to them to calculate all that was owed to
them and to send a delegation to Yaoundé on 4 September to
negotiate with the government and the CTE management.29
During the meeting on 4 September, the Minister of Labour, Prof.
Robert Nkili, tried to solve the problems on the Ndu Tea Estate by
setting up a tripartite committee to calculate workers’ benefits and
define the financial responsibilities of the CTE management and
the government. The committee later proposed an amount of about
FCFA 181 million.30 The workers immediately rejected the offer as
being way below their expectations. They pointed out that the Tole
Tea Estate beneficiaries, who were far fewer in number than they
themselves, had been offered a much higher sum. They also
vehemently disapproved of the fact that only 565 of the 863
permanent and contract workers were on the list for payment. When
the Governor for the North West Province, Koumpa Issa, delivered
the money to Ndu on 5 October, he met stiff resistance from the
workers who simply refused to accept their benefits.31
The divisional administration then called on the Provincial
Delegate of  Labour for the North West Province, Simon Ade Fru,
to mediate in the matter. After a lengthy exchange with the strikers
on 11 October, they were advised to collect the money being offered.
If any of them disagreed with the calculation of his/her personal
benefits, s/he could file a complaint in the law courts.32
Soon afterwards, one of the principal workers’ spokesmen,
Francis Kolle, went to Yaoundé where he handed over a
memorandum to the Minister of Labour listing what the workers
thought was owed to them. A workers’ committee had calculated
this to be a sum of  over FCFA 2.9 billion.33
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In the meantime, it was discovered that seven men and one
woman had betrayed the workers’ cause by secretly collecting their
dues at the Ndu Subdivisional treasury. On 17 October, striking
workers visited the homes of these blacklegs with mock coffins
and crosses, performed burial rites on their door steps and inscribed
‘may your soul rest in peace’ on their doors. They later set fire to
the coffins that contained magic objects, and the workers were
requested to swear an oath over the ashes while vowing not to collect
their money. As a result of  this action, the divisional administration
stated that the strike’s ringleaders were to face trial on charges of
life-threatening behaviour. Subsequently, it intensified its tactics
of intimidation, bringing pressure to bear on them to stop the strike
and accept the amount of financial benefit they had previously
rejected. Their refusal to submit was perceived as an act of
stubbornness, and the administration regularly threatened to call in
troops to crush the strike.34
On 23 November, 16 workers’ representatives, who had been
acting as spokesmen for their colleagues, resigned after the DO for
Ndu Subdivision, John Mkong Yorisombom, banned meetings
between them and the CTE management. Apparently, the DO’s
banning order came in the wake of a meeting between workers’
representatives and CTE management that almost degenerated into
a bloody confrontation.35 A few weeks later, four of them were
arrested and tortured.36
Relations between the strikers and the divisional administration
became more strained when the workers decided to intensify their
strike action until they were paid what they thought rightly belonged
to them. On 28 November, a protest march was organised by the
striking workers, their families and dependents. This was followed
by heavy beehives being brought in to reinforce the road blockade
between Bamenda and Nkambe in an attempt to forestall the
anticipated arrival of some 1,000 workers from the Ndwara and
Djuttitsa tea estates.37
The next day, the SDO for Donga-Mantung Division, Godlive
Mboke Ntua, issued an ultimatum to the strikers. It was broadcast
several times on Donga-Mantung Community Radio and branded
the workers as a group of recalcitrant fellows who had refused to
be brought to reason and were still confronting the divisional
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administration. He urged them to collect their dues before re-
engaging in further negotiations with the CTE management. He
stressed that it was ridiculous to claim, as the workers had previously
done, an amount of  around FCFA 3 billion while the CTE had only
paid FCFA 1.5 billion to purchase the three tea estates.38
The strikers, however, turned a deaf  ear to the SDO’s ultimatum.
While continuing to man their road blockade, they marched in the
night of 29 November to the houses of the CTE estate manager,
Falalou Mohammed, and the Ndu Workers’ Club president, Joseph
Koni, taking both hostage and forcing them to take part in their
nocturnal demonstrations.
Violent clashes took place between the strikers and the forces
of  law and order on 1 and 2 December. The troops first attempted
to protect some eight saw operators who had been charged with
cutting up the eucalyptus trees that had been used by the strikers to
block the ring road. They subsequently attempted to escort
truckloads of  workers from Ndawara and Djuttitsa that were on
the way to the Ndu Tea Estate. Two workers were killed and several
others were injured during these confrontations.39
Following these dramatic developments, the Minister of  Labour
felt once again obliged to intervene to resolve the deepening crisis
on the estate. He organised another tripartite meeting in Yaoundé
on 6 December. After a long and heated debate, it was agreed that
workers would accept that their financial dues had been calculated
in conformity with the labour laws and regulations in force. Any
amounts that were being contested by the workers were to be re-
examined by the SDO for the Donga-Mantung Division, a
representative of the Ministry of Labour and the CTE
management. Since not all the personal financial benefits owed
had been wrongly calculated, workers should begin receiving their
dues individually. Although the usual punishment for illegal strike
actions as stipulated in the Labour Code was the dismissal of the
participant(s), the CTE management agreed to keep on all the
workers for the sake of peace. The Minister of Labour then
requested that all workers resume work immediately, promising
that all outstanding grievances would be handled within a year.40
While the workers’ representatives voiced dissatisfaction with the
outcome of the meeting, they eventually felt compelled to agree
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to it due to the state’s persistent intimidating tactics, arbitrary
arrests, torture and killings. Payment of  the financial dues started
on 29 December.41
It took some time before work resumed on the Ndu Tea Estate
since those workers, who had expressed their willingness to continue
working for the CTE had to wait to sign permanent contracts.
However many strikers refused to resume work because of the
maltreatment they had suffered at the hands of the CTE
management. Others feared going back because of the desecration
inflicted on the estate by the strikers in the form of  sorcery and
witchcraft.
In January 2007, the Ndu elite held their first meeting after the
crisis on the Ndu Tea Estate. They stressed that bringing in workers
from other areas was tantamount to provoking local workers and
held that the chiefs’ right of cleansing and purifying the land could
only be effectively carried out in the presence of the workers who
had desecrated the estate. In addition, they called on the
administrative authorities to release the financial data on the
workers’ payments to facilitate reconciliation and to set up an ad-
hoc committee to review any contested financial data. They
successfully persuaded the divisional administration and the CTE
management to release detainees and withdraw the ‘imported’
workers from the estate. However, the divisional administration
ignored their request to remove the forces of law and order from
the estate in order to ‘facilitate dialogue and enable the workers to
resume work’.42
Conclusion
This study of the privatisation of the CDC estates in Anglophone
Cameroon illustrates how externally imposed privatisation schemes
have often been opposed by African governments, civil-society
organisations and workers alike. Cameroonian government officials
have regularly attempted to postpone and manipulate the
implementation of schemes that challenge the stabilising and uniting
patronage systems in the weak nation state, undermine their limited
popular legitimacy and provoke ethno-regional and workers’ protests.
Although heavy dependence on western donors for continued
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financial assistance eventually forced them to comply, they attempted
to sell state corporations, like the CDC, to foreign companies and
nationals closely allied with the regime at giveaway prices in return
for considerable kickbacks.
Having been excluded from the decision-making process, civil-
society organisations in Anglophone Cameroon strongly contested
attempts to privatise the CDC. Ethno-regional organisations feared
losing control of their ancestral lands and regional economic heritage,
whilst trade unions feared retrenchments and a deterioration in
workers’ conditions of  service.
There is ample evidence that the most militant opposition to the
privatisation of  the CDC estates came from the workers. Chapter 3
explained the main reasons for their remarkable solidarity and
militancy in spite of  their internal divisions. It would be wrong to
conclude that the Tole and Ndu workers’ militant actions against
the privatisation of the CDC derived from their opposition to
privatisation per se. Their leaders told me that workers would support
privatisation if  it was expected to improve the company’s efficiency
and workers’ conditions of  service. They stressed that workers had
become vehemently opposed to the privatisation of the CDC for
the following reasons:
• They disapproved of  the CDC’s privatisation because the CDC
continued to have the reputation of being one of the few
relatively well-managed parastatals. This helps explain their
frequent demands during the disastrous privatisation exercise
for a return to the mother company.
• They strongly condemned the secretive and corrupt nature
of the CDC privatisation as well as the blatant absence of
any consultation of  workers and trade unions in the process.
• Above all, they quickly discovered that the new owners’
promise to safeguard and even improve workers’ rights and
benefits was not going to be respected. Confronted with
unbearable living and working conditions after privatisation,
they gradually lost interest in keeping their jobs at any cost
and resumed informal collective actions. Determined to
receive all their accrued benefits before resigning, they
engaged in protracted strike actions that paralysed all the
estate’s activities.
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In sharp contrast to popular resistance to neo-liberal reforms in
some African countries (cf. Zeilig 2002), Tole and Ndu workers
received little support from civil-society organisations in the region
that claimed to be equally opposed to the privatisation of the CDC,
in particular the trade unions and various Anglophone associations.
Management banned trade unionism from the estates and the
Anglophone associations seemed to be first and foremost
preoccupied with their own specific grievances. Given these
circumstances, the militant actions of  the Tole and Ndu workers
were bound to remain local expressions of anger and outrage.
There was only one notable example in Cameroon of a broader
coalition of  popular forces against privatisation practices. This
occurred after the takeover of La Société Nationale d’Electricité (Sonel)
in 2001 by the American multinational AES-Sirocco, which dismally
failed to keep its promise of  guaranteeing an uninterrupted supply
of  electricity. Various parts of  the country suffered from electricity
rationing and regular power cuts, which resulted in a reduction in
economic output and hardship for consumers. This, together with
excessive increases in the price of electricity and massive lay-offs,
led to strikes and boycotts by workers and numerous demonstrations
and court cases by consumers. Although workers and consumers
eventually failed to achieve the departure of the Americans, they
were able to gain important concessions from the privatised
company, including the recruitment of  new workers, better
conditions of  service, increased investments in regular power
supplies and the replacement of American top managers by
Cameroonians (Konings 2007a).
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7
CDC smallholder development
and the agro-industrial crisis
Introduction
In some post-colonial states there has been a shift from plantation
production to smallholder production. This is clearly the case in
Kenya where the area devoted to tea by smallholders increased by
about 250% during the 1970s, while the area under tea on estates
displayed only a slight increase (cf. Swainson 1985). This shift is
quite remarkable as it had often been assumed that large-scale,
‘modern’ estates were more likely to meet the imperatives of
increased output and capital accumulation than ‘archaic’, low-
production peasant agriculture. One of the main reasons for this
shift seems to be that a growing number of the predominantly
foreign-dominated agro-industrial enterprises have been determined
to withdraw from plantation production in response to the changing
political and economic situation in the post-colonial era. Confronted
in newly independent states with difficulties over the ownership of
land and problems concerning recruitment and controlling an
increasingly costly labour force, they usually prefer to abandon their
risky plantation operations and concentrate instead on potentially
more lucrative activities like supplying the technical, managerial
and marketing skills required to produce, process and sell plantation
products (Kirk 1987; Konings 1993a). Consequently, these
enterprises are opting for contract farming schemes as an attractive
alternative to plantation production (cf. Glover 1984; Goldsmith
1985; Clapp 1988).
Contract farming is a way of  organising agricultural production
whereby smallholders or out-growers supply produce to agro-
industrial enterprises in accordance with the conditions specified
in a written or oral contract. These enterprises, in turn, may supply
inputs, credit and technical advice as well as undertaking processing
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and marketing (cf. Minot 1986). A growing number of governments
in developing countries and international aid and lending
organisations such as COMDEV and the World Bank are actively
supporting these schemes, which they see as an important
contribution to the local peasantry’s (further) integration into the
capitalist system and a way of helping increase in their productivity
and raise their standard of living (cf. Stryker 1979; Payer 1980; van
de Laar 1980; Williams 1981; Ellman 1986). Watts (1986: 4-5)
estimates that more than 60 contract farming schemes involving
16 commodities are currently operating in Africa.
Cameroon constitutes a notable exception to this current trend.
The government has regularly stated that the established agro-
industrial enterprises should play an important intermediary role in
the further integration of the local peasantry into the capitalist mode
of production:
The systematic integration of the peasantry into the agro-industrial
chain will result in the diversification of its production and the
modernisation of  its production techniques. It will give rise to the
establishment of  a class of  well-to-do and dynamic farmers,
committed to their jobs, and anxious to extend and improve their
activities. It may also create gainful employment for the rural youth
and motivate them to stay in the rural areas.1
In practice, however, it has continued to stimulate the expansion
of agro-industrial and, of late, medium-sized plantations without
paying any serious attention to the creation of  contract farming
schemes associated with agro-industrial enterprises (Konings 1993a).
The CDC is one of the few (plantation-based) agro-industrial
enterprises in Cameroon that have been encouraged by the
government to set up various forms of  contract farming schemes
since its foundation in 1946/47. In 1968 it was transformed into a
‘development corporation’ by the government (Tchala Abina 1989)
and charged with the responsibility of ‘assisting smallholders or
groups of them engaged in the cultivation of crops similar to those
cultivated by itself in the collection area of the mills it managed’.2
In 1973 President Ahidjo reminded the CDC’s management of  the
role it was expected to play in the ‘encadrement’ of the peasantry
near its estates:
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The CDC is an important agro-industrial complex. It must stand
out as an example to, and stimulate progress within, the population
in the vicinity of  its plantations. The local people, in turn, should
aspire to establish satellite smallholdings around these plantations
where they could learn and implement modern farming methods
and techniques.3
And in 1977/78, the government ordered the corporation to
implement a limited contract farming scheme that had been planned
by the corporation’s international financiers, particularly the World
Bank.
There are different views in the literature of the development
potential of  contract farming schemes. Modernisation theorists tend
to be strong advocates of  contract farming, seeing it as a significant
trajectory of  capital accumulation in the rural areas as it effectively
combines agro-industry’s management capacity, capital resources,
modern technology and marketing facilities with the smallholders’
control of land and labour (cf. Morrissy 1974; Kusterer 1981, 1982;
Williams & Karen 1984). Morrissy (1974) claimed that contract
farming could lead to the development of  a stable and politically
conservative class of  well-to-do farmers in the rural areas.
Dependency theorists, on the contrary, are highly critical of  contract
farming and view it as one of  those evil schemes devised by foreign
capital and a comprador elite that will inevitably result in a deepening
dependency of developing countries on the capitalist core and an
increasing exploitation and immiseration of  the rural poor (cf. Feder
1977a, 1977b; Lappé & Collins 1977; Dinham & Hines 1983).
Scholars who have studied contract farming schemes in Kenya have
attempted to create a synthesis between the modernisation and
dependency perspectives (cf. Buch-Hansen & Marcusen 1982;
Cowen 1981; Currie & Ray 1986). They assert that contract farming
can give rise to a growing subsumption   of the peasantry to capital
and state, and still produce the conditions for the emergence of
either a rich or middle peasantry.
These conflicting views can be helpful in evaluating the impact
of  the CDC’s various smallholder schemes but they also have some
serious shortcomings. First of  all, they tend to concentrate on the
relations of exchange between the two parties, ignoring the process
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of production itself. This largely explains why they fail to discuss
one of the most essential preconditions for capital accumulation in
contract farming schemes: the establishment of  managerial control
over the labour process. Agro-industrial enterprises try to procure a
reliable supply of high-quality and relatively cheap agricultural
commodities. This objective is unlikely to be achieved unless
management is capable of gaining control of the processes of
production and exchange. And secondly, these theories treat
smallholders as the passive victims or beneficiaries of capital and
state and deny them an active role in shaping their own destiny. I
will instead show that (i) CDC smallholders have never resigned
themselves to their control and exploitation in the labour process,
and (ii) even intensified their modes of resistance during the agro-
industrial crisis when their chances of capital accumulation were
seriously threatened.
This chapter evaluates the role of CDC smallholders in two
separate periods. The first was when the old scheme was in operation
from the corporation’s foundation in 1946/47 until the World Bank’s
introduction of a new scheme in 1977/78. The second period was
that of the new scheme from 1977/78 until 1994/95 when the
corporation began to recover from its economic crisis.
Smallholder development at the CDC, 1946/47-1977/78
The first attempts to plan and execute a smallholder scheme attached
to the CDC were made soon after the corporation’s foundation in
1946/47. This scheme, which was closely connected to the Bakweri
land problem, was proposed by W.M. Bridges, one of  the British
administrators in the Southern Cameroons (see Chapter 5).
However, his proposals were never implemented as the Bakweri
Land Committee (BLC) refused to cooperate with the government
and the CDC management until its claims regarding CDC lands had
been recognised.4
Another attempt followed in the wake of the expansion of banana
production in the area in the early 1950s (Bederman 1971). Initially,
its chances of  success appeared bleak. Although the former German
owners used to purchase bananas grown on smallholdings near their
estates and export them along with their own produce, the CDC
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management refused to give in to frequent requests for such
assistance on the part of  local producers. According to Epale (1978:
76-77), it tended to justify its unfavourable response on the
following grounds: (i) the previously limited size of peasant banana
production; (ii) the absence of any strong organisation among
producers that could act as a broker between the corporation and
producers in the process of exchange, and (iii) its fear that
encouraging the production of  peasant cash crops might aggravate
the already existing shortage of locally produced foodstuffs, a
problem which was responsible for persistent labour unrest on the
corporation’s own estates. Underlying these official reasons was the
belief prevalent in government and management circles that Bakweri
peasants were lazy, unproductive and incapable of  taking
entrepreneurial initiatives (Courade 1981/82).
This conflict between the CDC management and the smallholders
was finally settled following the personal intervention of  Dr E.M.L.
Endeley, one of  the outstanding Bakweri and nationalist leaders
and a member of the CDC Board of Directors at the time (Chiabi
1982). The latter was eventually able to enlist the support of the
government and the CDC management for a bold plan that aimed
at an increased commercialisation of peasant banana production.
To this end, he founded the Bakweri Co-operative Union of  Farmers
(BCUF) in August 1952 and concluded a market agreement with
the corporation (cf. Ardener 1958; Epale 1978). Under the terms
of that agreement, the CDC was prohibited from making profit on
transactions with the BCUF but it was allowed to recover handling
charges from the cooperative. Due to uncertainty about the quality
of  the cooperative’s bananas, it was agreed that the CDC would
pay the BCUF, on delivery of  its crop, two-thirds of  the price that
the corporation itself  had obtained for its carefully graded fruit.
However, if  the cooperative’s supplies turned out to be of
satisfactory quality, the difference, less handling charges, was to be
paid out by the corporation to the cooperative in the form of  an
annual bonus, which would serve as working capital for the BCUF’s
further expansion. The corporation marketed BCUF supplies
between 1952 and 1957, when it was compelled to hand over the
business to Elders & Fyffes due to its inability to handle the growing
supplies of produce (cf. Heinzen 1984). During this period, the
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scheme gave rise to rapid capital accumulation among Bakweri
banana producers. It proved without any doubt that the local
peasantry was capable of raising production and undertaking
entrepreneurial activities (see Ardener 1970; Geschiere 1988).
A renewed attempt to plan and execute a smallholders’ scheme
attached to the CDC was made after reunification in 1961. In 1964,
the CDC management invited a mission from COMDEV headed
by R.J.M. Swynnerton to draft a long-term development plan for
the corporation. In its report, it advised the corporation to set up a
variety of  smallholder rubber, oil palm and tea schemes and to
extend its role in smallholder development from exchange to
production: the regular supply of inputs, credit and technical advice
as well as strict supervision of  the labour process (Swynnerton et
al. 1964; see also Epale 1985: 183-85). COMDEV played a
pioneering role in promoting this so-called nucleus/core-satellite
contract farming model in developing countries (cf. Rendell 1976;
Ellman 1986) and Swynnerton himself was prominent in
introducing it in several countries, including Kenya (cf. Sorrenson
1967; Heyer 1981).
The 1964 Swynnerton Mission Report proposed that the CDC
not only establish smallholder schemes attached to its own estates
and factories but that it should also assist in the setting-up of
‘nucleus satellite’ schemes in remoter areas. It also recommended
the installation of a Smallholder Development Authority by the
West Cameroonian government that would be responsible for the
planning and execution of  smallholder schemes in the territory. Its
arguments for the encouragement of smallholder development sound
familiar to anyone acquainted with the modernisation theory on
contract farming:
CDC and the government would in this way secure further
development of land at present lying idle and they would create a
type of middle-class farmer growing crops and earning incomes at a
level well above the general level of  farming in West Cameroon.
This should act as an example and incentive to the large number of
peasant farmers whose farming is at present relatively unproductive.5
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Apparently, it preferred recruiting potential participants for the
scheme from among the more privileged sections of  the rural
population: ‘selection of settlers should be based on their being
married men, preferably having had some education and some
previous experience with the crop and having some initial capital’.6
In October 1964, a special committee of  West Cameroonian
government representatives and the CDC management discussed
the Swynnerton Mission Report’s recommendations. It claimed that
the proposed smallholder schemes would ensure the emergence of
an agrarian middle class that could contribute to political stability:
It stressed that the stability of the country would require the evolution
of  an independent middle class. The present situation when a white-
collar civil service was emerging was considered to be unsatisfactory.
The projected Smallholder Scheme would ensure the emergence of
an agrarian middle class and was therefore commendable.7
In 1965 the West Cameroonian government appointed a
Smallholder Development Committee under the chairmanship of
V.C. Nchami, then Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of
Development and Internal Economic Planning, pending the
formation of  a Smallholder Development Authority (SDA). Between
1965 and 1967/68 this committee tried to implement one of the
smallholder schemes recommended by the Swynnerton Mission
Report, the Mbonge Smallholder Rubber Scheme, and set up the
Smallholder Development Authority.8 Unfortunately, these projects
had to be postponed indefinitely when the federal government
refused to grant the financial support needed.9 By then the federal
government had come to the conclusion that an expansion of agro-
industrial estate production was more likely to meet the imperatives
of increased agricultural output and capital accumulation than
smallholder development (Konings 1993a: 28-31).
It is interesting to observe that, despite the indefinite
postponement of  the Swynnerton Mission’s proposals, the CDC
became increasingly involved in smallholder development. By 1967/
68 its assistance was requested for a smallholder oil palm and rubber
scheme that had been initiated by the producers themselves and
come into existence during the rapid decline of banana production
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after the achievement of independence and reunification (cf.
Bederman 1971). On the BCUF’s advice, a number of  banana
growers started to diversify production and invest their accumulated
capital in crops like rubber and oil palms. The only advice they
received on crop cultivation was from the government of  West
Cameroon, in particular the Departments of Agriculture and Co-
operatives. When some of  the established oil palm and rubber farms
reached maturity in 1967/68, these departments arrived at an
agreement with the CDC management that the corporation would
transport, process and market the smallholders’ produce (for their
output, see Table 7.1).10
The vast majority of these smallholders were peasants who grew
oil palms and rubber in addition to other crops and their holdings
tended to be quite small. It is estimated that the approximately 3,000
members of  the South West Province Oil Palm Smallholders’ Co-
operative cultivated no more than a total area of  4,000 hectares.11
They predominantly used family labour but for heavy farm
operations, like land development, they either called on mutual work
groups called njangis (cf. Kleis 1975; DeLancey 1977) or employed
casual labour. Their farms were scattered across the South West
Province and the CDC management found it an arduous, expensive
and time-consuming undertaking to provide them with effective
assistance in the form of  inputs, technical advice and transport. 12
In addition to these small producers, there were a few bigger
producers who owned farms varying from about 10 ha to 150 ha in
size. The largest among them belonged to various sections of the
Anglophone elite including well-known politicians, chiefs, top civil
servants, CDC managers and directors, and businessmen such as
Dr E.M.L. Endeley, E.K. Martin, E.A. Mbiwan, Chief  V. Mukete
and Chief  S.O. Ebanja. They tended to be absentee farmers who
left the day-to-day running of  their farms to farm managers, usually
their own sons. They employed permanent and casual workers, with
the actual number depending on the size of  their farms. Generally
speaking, they maintained their farms better than small producers
and sold higher quality produce to the CDC.
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Table 7.1 Output of  CDC estates and smallholders, 1971-1995 (M.T.)
_____________________________________________________________________
 YEAR                CDC RUBBER           CDC PALM OIL                  CDC PALM KERNELS
                         Estate         Small-                 Estate         Small-                  Estate                Small-
                                              holder                                    holder                                             holder
1971                8,231                 64                 10,129               63                    2,457                       19
1972                8,894               106                 11,611               72                    3,007                       22
1973                9,738               122                 13,094               41                    3,233                       13
1974              10,205               172                 18,286             516                    4,617                     154
1975              10,154               169                 18,488             747                    3,955                     162
1976              10,545               151                 21,618             507                    4,294                     101
1977              11,631               146                 22,263             264                    3,602                       42
1978              12,062               183                 24,565             469                    3,557                       67
1979              11,460               207                 18,886             285                    2,825                       38
1980              12,413               243                 21,453             443                    3,261                       70
1981              12,831               221                 23,315             544                    3,231                       78
1982              12,182               180                 22,000             501                    2,479                       64
1983              11,575               152                 20,671             515                    3,528                       77
1984              11,409               313                 17,914             579                    3,307                       95
1985              13,262               434                 22,735             929                    3,841                     151
1986              13,860               350                 26,520          1,691                    4,453                     289
1987              16,694               298                 25,155          1,546                    4,914                     303
1988              17,851               354                 21,428          2,283                    4,252                     454
1989              19,227               711                 20,062          1,464                    4,126                     296
1990              18,944               749                 21,373          1,414                    4,122                     271
1991              19,157               734                 18,080          1,286                    3,565                     253
1992              23,249               975                 14,335          1,238                    2,887                     247
1993              22,682               924                 21,354          1,394                    4,490                     297
1994              24,197            1,283                 12,897          1,407                    2,500                     282
1995              22,590            2,148                   7,821          1,177                    1,437                     225
__________________________________________________________________________________
Source: CDC Annual Reports and Accounts, 1971-1995
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Relations between bigger and smaller producers were not always
without conflict. The bigger producers managed to appropriate vast
lands in areas suitable for oil-palm production with the aid of the
traditional authorities and the state but at the expense of the local
peasantry. There was one famous case in 1966 when E.A. Mbiwan,
the former general manager at the West Cameroon Electricity
Corporation, acquired a vast area of land from the Victoria
Traditional Council in Batoke, a village on the West Coast. In 1968,
peasant cultivators were subsequently driven from the land and, in
spite of relentless peasant protest, Mbiwan started his Bonanza
Estate on this land growing various crops, including 135 ha of oil
palms.13 Nevertheless it would appear that these internal
contradictions did not prevent the smallholders from pursuing
common interests, namely achieving more assistance and, above all,
a higher producer price from the corporation. It is therefore not
surprising that smaller producers were willing to join a regional
cooperative formed and led by big producers. The South West
Province Oil Palm Smallholders’ Co-operative was founded in the
early 1970s and claimed to represent and defend the interests of all
smallholders against the CDC management and the state.
From the very start, there was conflict between the CDC
management and producers about producer prices. Both the larger
and smaller producers constantly claimed that their incomes were
not high enough to compensate for increasing production and transport
costs. As the CDC management declined to guarantee smallholders
regular transport facilities,14 most of them experienced serious
difficulties in transporting their produce to the CDC’s mills. Hire
charges of private transport often proved to be exorbitant and delays
in procuring transport resulted in considerable losses among
perishable fruit crops.15 Smallholders were obliged to pay at least CDC
rates to hire labour and even the largest producers were often unable
to pay their workers, including Chief Victor Mukete, who became
the largest smallholder in the South West Province during his time as
Chairman of  the CDC.  His workers, estimated to number about 400
in 1982, frequently resorted to strike action in protest at delays in the
payment of  wages.16 The following case study of  the former chairman
of  the South West Province Oil Palm Smallholders’ Co-operative,
Chief  Ebanja, illustrates the predicament facing larger smallholders.
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Case No. 7.1 A large oil-palm producer and cooperative leader
Chief  Ebanja served as a senior civil servant in the Governor’s Office
in Buea before becoming the Paramount Chief  of  the Balong. He
lives in Mukonje in Meme Division and owns several farms, one of
which is a relatively large oil palm plantation in Malende, a Balong
village near Muyuka in Fako Division.
He acquired the land in Malende in 1961. Belonging to the Balong
royal family and as a civil servant, he was allocated more than 40 ha
of forest land in this village in spite of a serious shortage of land
there. He first grew food crops and vegetables but then switched to
oil palm cultivation. Between 1970 and 1980 he planted 25 ha of oil
palms with the help of  family labour and nine permanent workers.
His eldest son, who lives in Malende, manages the farm.
In 1975 he decided to sell his produce to the CDC. His farm was
subsequently surveyed by CDC technical staff  who also gave him
technical advice during his first three harvests. However, he remained
responsible for transporting his produce to the nearest CDC mill,
the Mondoni mill, some 30 km from Malende.
His oil palms have not been very profitable so far. In fact, he incurred
a loss of  about FCFA 1 million, between 1971 and 1980 which he
attributed to high production and transportation costs, and low yields
and prices. He used savings from when he was a senior civil servant
to cover this loss.
While President of  the South West Province Oil Palm Smallholders’
Co-operative, he forwarded several petitions to the CDC’s
management in which he complained about its lack of assistance to
smallholders and the low remuneration it offered for their labour.
He claimed that the CDC management has victimised him because
he champions the smallholders’ cause. The corporation seized part
of his land, denied him transport facilities and regularly rejected his
produce.17 Along with the large majority of smallholders, he often
‘regrets having embarked on oil palm cultivation in answer to
government directives’.18
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Dissatisfied with the producer price offered by the corporation,
smallholders have frequently engaged in collective informal protest
actions. The South West Province Oil Palm Smallholders’ Co-
operative has petitioned the state and the CDC management,
complaining bitterly about its members’ predicament and demanding
an increase in producer prices. Its leadership has sometimes been
victimised for these actions, as the case study of Chief Ebanja
demonstrates.
The cooperative’s leaders tried to capitalise on their long-
established contacts within the regional state apparatus. When the
regional authorities were informed of  the precarious situation of
the smallholders, they tried to mediate on their behalf. However
the CDC management refused to give in to their requests to negotiate
with smallholders on producer prices. This is evident from the
following report written by the economic adviser to the Governor
of  the South West Province in 1979:
The Oil Palm Smallholders have for a long time been fighting a
battle with the CDC on the price they receive for their palm nuts
which they consider low at any given moment. In studying this
problem we have often found them justified and have pleaded with
the CDC to review their stand. The rate of price increases from the
CDC has been at such piece meal that it has never seemed to satisfy
the smallholders as they claim that they can hardly break even. On
the other hand, the CDC has proved to be rather dictatorial,
admitting no dialogue whatsoever in their dealings implying that
either the smallholders take it or leave it. Thus defeating the provisions
whereby they pledged to assist the small farmers around their
plantations.19
The CDC management continued to claim that its smallholder
and price policies were backed by the government and that it was
paying producers a fair price. For example, at a meeting with the
Governor of  the South West Province on 7 July 1975, the CDC
General Manager, J.N. Ngu stated that:
the corporation had to operate in accordance with the terms of
reference defined by the government. It was required to cooperate
with government’s policy of  smallholder development.
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Consequently, it was not out to make any profit on the smallholders
but to pay them the full value of their oil after deducting necessary
expenses. On the other hand, it had to operate on commercial lines
and not to dash out or lose money unnecessarily. Therefore, it would
not increase any prices to the smallholders unless it was economically
possible.20
And again, on 27 July 1983, he wrote the following to the
Secretary of  the South West Province Oil Palm Smallholders’ Co-
operative:
While I sympathise with the difficulties you are facing in running
your various plantations, it is not possible for the corporation to
pay you more money than it realises from the processing and
marketing of  your produce. We produce each year a statement of
the actual amount the corporation realises on the marketing of both
CDC and smallholder produce and the price you are paid is the
actual average price obtained for local and export sale of palm produce, less
processing, administrative and depreciation costs.21
As soon as it became clear that the CDC management was simply
ignoring the cooperative’s demands, smallholders resorted to a
variety of  informal actions in protest. They neglected farm
maintenance, refused to make any further investments in expanded
production, and supplied low-quality produce to the corporation’s
factories. Some even stopped delivering produce to the corporation,
processing the palm fruit themselves in the traditional way – an
undertaking that is quite tedious and results in low extraction rates
(cf. Tjeega 1973) – and selling the oil at the local markets. A few
completely withdrew from the scheme. CDC management, in turn,
interpreted these actions as evidence of the smallholders’ lack of
entrepreneurship and their unwillingness to follow its instructions
concerning production and exchange. For this reason, it decided to
exclude these smallholders from a new scheme that was to be
implemented within the framework of a CDC development
programme financed by the Cameroonian government, the World
Bank, COMDEV and the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation
(CCCE), the so-called CAMDEV II project (1978-1982) (see
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Konings 1993a: 42-44). This scheme was planned by the World
Bank to strengthen management control of the processes of
production and exchange. It should, however, be noted that the
previous scheme continued to operate alongside the new scheme.
Smallholder development at the CDC, 1977/78-1994/95
In its 1977 Appraisal Report of  the CAMDEV II project,22 the World
Bank recommended the corporation take a more active role in
smallholder development. It advocated the introduction of a
smallholder scheme based on the 1964 Swynnerton Mission Report’s
contract farming model, with considerable managerial control of
the processes of production and exchange. However, contrary to
the report, it insisted on focusing on rural low-income groups rather
than on richer and more progressive peasants.
The report proposed that the corporation assist in setting-up
about 1,000 ha of  smallholder rubber and 1,000 ha of  smallholder
oil palms during the CAMDEV II period (1978-1982). The
programme was to be funded by the financiers of the CAMDEV II
project as follows: the Cameroonian government was to contribute
US$ 1 million, the World Bank US$ 1.1 million; and COMDEV
and CCCE US$ 0.6 million each. The allocated funds were to be
channelled through the National Fund for Rural Development
(FONADER) to the CDC, with the latter acting as the transmitting
agent between FONADER and the scheme’s participants. The CDC
was also charged with setting up a Smallholders’ Unit that would
manage the scheme.
Any candidate who wanted to join the scheme was requested to
sign a contract with the CDC,23 which laid down the conditions for
participation and the obligations of  the contracting parties. It aimed
at correcting the shortcomings of the old scheme and enhancing
managerial control over the processes of production and exchange.
The most important conditions for participation were that
candidates have Cameroonian nationality and derive at least 75%
of  their income from farming. They had to be between 25 and 40
years of  age and fit enough physically to set up a farm, although
older persons who had access to (family) labour might also qualify.
As stipulated in the contract, they had to own land that was suitable
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for either oil palm or rubber cultivation within a 30 km radius of  a
CDC oil mill or rubber factory and that was less than 500 m from a
road accessible to CDC vehicles. There also had to be a land-use
right of  a minimum of  24 years. And finally, they had to have the
corporation’s official approval for participation in the scheme.
The mutual obligations of the two contracting parties were as
follows. Participants in the scheme should (i) carry out punctually
all instructions given by the CDC management in the labour process,
(ii) attend all meetings called by the CDC management for training
and farm management purposes, (iii) sell all their produce to the
corporation, and (iv) settle ‘scrupulously’ all their debts with the
corporation. The CDC’s management, in turn, would provide
participants with the necessary inputs, technical advice and
supervision. These services were to be offered on credit and had to
be repaid in instalments after the plants had started to produce.
Repayment was to be deducted from the participants’ sales to the
corporation. In addition, CDC management had to transport
participants’ output for a fixed price to the factories and process it.
Producers were to be paid monthly for their deliveries.
The contract was for a period of 27 years from the year when the
land was first cleared. The ultimate sanction for non-compliance with
the terms of  the contract was the seizure of  the farm of  any defaulting
debtor by FONADER, the scheme’s creditor. Following the repayment
of all debts incurred, participants were to receive a land certificate
from the Survey Department for the area under cultivation.
The scheme’s participants were prohibited from developing more
than 1 to 2 ha of land in the first year on the assumption that this
would be the maximum they could reasonably handle. Depending
on their performance, however, they might later be encouraged to
expand this to a total of  5 ha of  oil palms and 4 ha of  rubber,
respectively. The World Bank believed this scheme would help create
a stable middle peasantry: the amount of land to be cultivated with
modern production techniques would be sufficient to provide
participants with a higher income than non-participants, thus making
them more liable to management control. During the initial
maturation period, producers were to receive a non-refundable cash
grant of  FCFA 56,900 for oil palms and FCFA 108,106 for rubber
as compensation for their labour input.24
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Compared to the old scheme, the new scheme would appear to be a
more promising effort on the part of the ‘development coalition’ (Bates
1981) – the Cameroonian post-colonial state, international finance
capital and agro-industry – to incorporate the local peasantry into the
capitalist system and subsume it to the imperatives of increased
output and capital accumulation. It allowed CDC management to
greatly extend its control over the both the means of production and
the processes of production and exchange. These and similar schemes
have resulted in a substantial loss of peasant autonomy and the
virtual emergence of  a peculiar form of  proletarianisation: they
transform the producer into a kind of  task worker for agro-industry
on his own land (cf. Bernstein 1979; Konings 1986a, 1986b). As
Clapp (1988: 16) observed in this respect:
Contract farming is a form of  disguised proletarianisation: it secures
the farmer’s land and labour, while leaving him/her with formal
title to both. The control exercised by the company is indirect but
effective; the farmer’s control is legal but illusory. In this sense s/he
is a ‘propertied labourer’ – on the one hand a landlord, and on the
other a labourer who cares for corporate plants.
The new scheme greatly benefits the corporation with its
potential to supply agricultural commodities to the corporation’s
oil mills and rubber factories at relatively little cost and on a regular
basis. On the one hand, almost all the production costs are transferred
to the producers because inputs and agricultural services are
provided on credit and have to be repaid with interest after delivery
of  a crop. On the other hand, the corporation is exempted from
controlling and paying a large wage-labour force. Moreover, it shifts
some of  the production risks to the producers as they bear the brunt
of  poor harvests and price fluctuations on national and international
markets. And finally, the new scheme has provided management
with the opportunity to present itself as a champion of regional
development and establish a group of local allies among those who
are directly involved in smallholder schemes (cf. Bates 1981).
Management has always claimed that the new scheme would
benefit producers as well. It initially emphasised that the scheme
would allow them to diversify their production and obtain inputs,
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credit facilities, technical advice, a guaranteed market, a regular
monthly income throughout the year and substantial improvements
in their living standards compared to those of  non-participants.
Wyrley-Birch et al. (1982: 90) estimated the annual net income of
participants in the oil palm scheme in 1982 at FCFA 250,000 per
hectare of  mature palms. This income compared favourably with
the wage levels of skilled and unskilled CDC workers, which were
estimated at an annual rate of  FCFA 240,000 and FCFA 180,000
respectively, and the average peasant income of  approximately
FCFA 100,000-150,000. Without doubt, if  these estimates were
correct, any participant with a few hectares of oil palms was likely
to become a member of  the middle peasantry.
A public announcement was made in the Cameroon Tribune of 19
July 1978 that peasants in the vicinity of CDC estates and factories
could apply to participate in the scheme. Samuel Ndum, a technical
adviser to the Ministry of Agriculture, was subsequently seconded
to the CDC to head the newly established Smallholders’ Department
at Tiko and assumed his duties on 27 November 1978. He
immediately held meetings with the more than 100 candidates, over
90% of whom were full-time peasant cultivators who had applied
for the scheme. At these meetings it emerged that the scheme was
‘poorly understood’. Some applicants had been eager to apply
because they thought that participation would facilitate obtaining
loans and cash grants but when they realised that loans were to be
in the form of  inputs and technical advice and that the cash grants
were only to be allocated after the completion of certain tasks,
they often withdrew their applications (see Table 7.2).
Following an inspection of  the remaining applicants’ farm lands,
approved candidates were registered and organised in groups similar
to the traditional njangi work groups to promote cooperation on
certain arduous farm activities. However, it was also hoped that
these groups would function as organs of control over the
membership. It was decided that any legal action was only to be
considered after the group had failed to discipline and correct the
actions of  defaulting members. Each group was asked to elect a
president, secretary and treasurer. The groups were to be reorganised
in the future into a cooperative that could present the interests of
all participants to the project management.25
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Table 7.2 CDC smallholders’ development scheme, 1978/79-1994/95
_____________________________________________________________________
YEAR             AREA UNDER                          NUMBER OF                    TOTAL GRANTS
                    CULTIVATION (HA)       SMALLHOLDERS                 & LOANS (FCFA)
                Oil palm   Rubber   Total     Oil palm   Rubber                Total
___________________________________________________________________________________
1978/79           25                57             82                  15              37           52                        11,851,785
1979/80         170           214           384                 101         136         237                        37,656,609
1980/81         350           430           780                 143         190         333                        60,631,644
1981/82         383           528           911                  n.k.         n.k.        378                        21,572,000
1982/83         383           526           909                  n.k.         n.k.        378                        19,000,000
1983/84         383           526           909                  n.k.         n.k.        378                        26,000,000
1984/85         467           527           994                  147         224        371                          7,500,000
1985/86         557           737        1,294                  187         245        432                          9,700,000
1986/87         557           737        1,294                  187         245        432                        17,000,000
1987/88         557           730        1,287                  186         245         431                       12,800,000
1988/89         557           730        1,287                  186         245         431                         4,700,000
1989/90         557           730        1,287                  186         245         431                         8,600,000
1990/91      557         730      1,287               186       245       431
1991/92      750         730      1,480               187       245       432
1992/93      750         730      1,480               187       245       432
1993/94   1,405      1,990      3,395              187       245        432
1994/95   1,832      1,990      3,822              187       245        432
__________________________________________________________________________________
Source: CDC Smallholders’ Development Scheme, Annual Report: Summary 1980/
81, in File MINEP/ED/SWP/A/554, Small Palm Holders Scheme; CDC Annual
Reports and Accounts, 1978-1995.
Despite all the plans and organisation, the scheme never got off
the ground and its performance in the CAMDEV II period (1978-
1982) did not meet expectations. By 1982 it had attracted fewer
than 378 participants (see Table 7.2) and had failed to reach its
cultivation targets: only 38.3% of the planned 1,000 ha of oil palms
and 52.8% of  the anticipated 1,000 ha of  rubber had been achieved.
In addition, a large proportion of the cultivated area had been poorly
maintained. These disappointing results can be attributed to a
number of important factors:26
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(i) The restrictions imposed on cultivation. From an efficiency angle,
the CDC’s management could be justified in restricting
cultivation to lands within a 30 km radius of a CDC mill or
factory and close to a passable road. However, this
drastically reduced the area available for cultivation and these
restrictions were further reinforced in 1982 when the CDC
decided to change ‘passable’ roads to ‘tarred’ roads.
(ii) Regular delays in the delivery of  agricultural inputs. There were
delays in delivering inputs as the corporation often gave
priority to its own estates. For example, in May 1979,
participants in the scheme had to postpone planting because
the CDC refused to supply any seedlings to the scheme before
all its estates had been served. Following this setback, the
project started considering the possibility of setting up its
own oil palm and rubber nurseries to reduce its dependence
on CDC supplies. In the 1983/84 crop year, it finally
succeeded in establishing a small oil palm nursery at Tiko.27
(iii) Serious land shortages in the area. There was a shortage of land
because of  the very presence of  the CDC’s estates and the
increased settlement of immigrants in the area. Land prices
have been constantly on the increase: 1 ha of land sold in
1985/86 for about FCFA 250,000-350,000. As a result, the
scheme tended to attract the section of  the rural population
that was privileged enough to own its (reserve) lands or
capital resources, rather than the target group, namely the
rural poor. This seems to be substantiated by a survey that I
carried out among smallholders in the Balong area of
Muyuka Subdivision in 1985/86 when I found that the large
majority of participants were the male heads of immigrant
families (90%), 65% of whom originated from the
Grassfields. This is not surprising if  one takes into account
the fact that these elders have become the largest and richest
peasants in the area. Their almost exclusive participation in
the scheme has exacerbated contradictions in the area. There
is, first of all, the conflict between the Balong and immigrants
about control over land. The Balong have become very
resentful of the large-scale immigrant occupation of their
ancestral lands, which has given rise to numerous disputes
about land rights and has led to serious confrontations
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between the groups. The Chief  of  Malende has become one
of the main leaders of local opposition. Being at the same
time the president of  the local smallholders’ group, he has
refused to supply land to various large-scale Bamileke
farmers for rubber cultivation and barred them from joining
the scheme. During my interviews, I discovered that some
immigrants had joined the scheme with a view to settling
and reinforcing their rights to land rather than to developing
oil palm and rubber farms.28 And secondly, there is the
conflict between the elders on the one hand and young men
and women on the other. The elders do not usually allocate
land to young men and women who want to join the scheme
but instead employ all the available household members on
their own rubber and oil palm farms. This is a continuous
source of friction as the young men are anxious to earn an
income of their own and the women prefer to work on their
own food farms (cf. Carney 1987). Some of  the women were
very annoyed when their husbands started to create rubber
farms on part of  their food farms.
(iv) The obstruction of the scheme by local chiefs. Quite a number of
chiefs demanded large sums of money before signing the
required land-use attestations, even though they knew very
well that the applicants were land owners in their villagers.
Between 1978 and 1980 the scheme seems to have lost 80
potential candidates because of this bottleneck.29
(v) Participants’ financial strains. All the smallholders interviewed
complained that the financial assistance offered by the project
management did not cover the costs of developing,
maintaining, and expanding their farms. The majority (75%)
hired labour from time to time. However, the cash grants
they received were not sufficient to cover their own labour
input during a farm’s development, let alone for employing
expensive labour. They were often forced to invest their
savings in the development and expansion of  their farms
and to raise loans.
(vi) Relatively low producer prices. Initially, the scheme attracted
peasants who expected to earn good monthly incomes from
rubber and oil palm cultivation. However when producer
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prices remained far below expectations, potential candidates
became hesitant about joining the scheme. Those who had
already joined became frustrated but found it difficult to
withdraw from the scheme as they had to pay back their
loans and lacked the capital necessary to invest in other crops.
This general frustration among smallholders is manifest in
the following case study.
Case No. 7.2 A participant in the new scheme
This participant is one of  many former CDC workers who joined
the scheme. He is 45 years old and from Menchum Division in the
North West Province. He worked as a rubber tapper on various
CDC estates for 15 years. In 1978 he decided to resign in order to
join the new scheme. He acquired 2 ha of land from the Chief of
Malende and started to develop a rubber farm. He had saved about
FCFA 500,000 during his time at the CDC but the amount left after
he bought the land was not sufficient to cover the costs of developing
his rubber farm. Still, he was able to raise some capital for investment
purposes from three sources: his receipt of cash grants from the
project management, his regular employment as a casual worker on
local cocoa and coffee farms, and his membership of  a local rotating
credit association (njangi).
When he first started tapping in 1985, he was confronted with a
drastic fall in the price of  rubber. His monthly income has, therefore,
never been sufficient to support his family. He deeply regrets resigning
from the CDC and joining the scheme. During his time at the CDC,
he enjoyed a higher monthly income and a number of benefits
including free accommodation and medical care. He claims that the
CDC exploits smallholders since it offers low returns on his
substantial investments in the scheme and his labour. Moreover, he
sees himself as a ‘prisoner’ of the scheme who is unable to escape
because of  his investments and debts.
Following an evaluation of  the scheme in 1982, international
financiers expressed concern about its lack of headway during the
CAMDEV II period (1978-1982).30 Nevertheless, they did not lose
faith in the scheme’s viability and even recommended expanding
the scheme during the subsequent CAMDEV II Oil Palm and
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Rubber Consolidation Project between 1982/83 and 1986/87. An
additional 500 ha of smallholder oil palms and 1,000 ha of
smallholder rubber was planned at an estimated cost of  FCFA 1,159
million.
The adverse climate conditions between 1982 and 1984 hindered
the planned expansion of the scheme.31 The number of participants
even declined during the 1984/85 crop year from 378 to 371 due
to ‘abandonments’ (see Table 7.2). Dissatisfied with the scheme’s
slow progress and the deplorable conditions of a number of the
participants’ farms, the newly appointed expatriate project manager
recommended concentrating on expanding the cultivated area by
the most committed participants and progressive new recruits with
lands adjacent to the existing farms, and developing relatively large
lands on project costs. Similar to the tenant purchase schemes
proposed by the 1964 Swynnerton Mission Report, these project
lands were later to be subdivided into blocks of five ha maximum
and sold on credit to selected smallholders.32 He then presented a
new smallholder development programme covering the 1985/86-
1987/88 period that aimed at expanding 700 ha of  rubber: 500 ha
on project account in the village of Ikiliwindi in the Kumba-Mamfe
area and 200 ha by committed participants and new recruits. An
expansion of 550 ha of oil palms was also planned: 300 ha on
project account in the Bakweri village of Ikata near Muyuka, and
250 ha by committed participants and new recruits.
However the severe crisis that affected the CDC from 1986
onwards formed a formidable obstacle to this initiative, and to
smallholder development in general. It frustrated any hopes of  a
substantial expansion of the scheme and the creation of a stable
middle peasantry. During the crisis, CDC management found it hard
to assist smallholders and, even worse, could not avoid reducing
producer prices, especially in the oil palm sector.
Like the participants in the old scheme, members of the new
scheme have continued to protest individually and collectively
against the fluctuating, and often low, producer prices. For example,
in 1986, smallholders in Muyuka Subdivision sent a strongly worded
petition to the CDC General Manager protesting at the drastic 50%
cut in producer prices during the crisis in the domestic agro-industrial
oil palm sector (see Chapter 2). In the petition they stated that:
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They believed that the Smallholders’ Development Scheme created
by the government and placed under the CDC was aimed at uplifting
the living standards of  the peasant farming families in Cameroon.
But the recent slash in the price of their produce had come to them
as a surprise… It would appear that they were becoming victims of
price cuts in agricultural produce in a country where salaries of
workers are regularly increased and the prices of other crops are
increased annually with high bonus.33
They also demanded the introduction of a price stabilisation
fund for rubber and palm oil production.
In addition to collective actions, members also resorted to
informal actions to protest against their control and exploitation in
the labour process. First of  all, they declined to adhere strictly to
the production rules set by management. For example, contrary to
the scheme’s regulations, a substantial number of  oil palm
smallholders decided to grow food crops on their own oil palm farms
to compensate for the depletion of  their capital reserves. Such
practices were difficult for management to control. In 1985 the
project management complained:
Eighty-five hectares of palms were planted in 1984/85. Although it
was stipulated at the outset that no intercropping would be allowed
and the leguminous cover crops must be established, this in many
cases was not done by the farmers of  whom it had not been
demanded previously. The only sanctions left were to (i) withhold
delivery of planting material and (ii) withhold the payment of cash
grants. If  palm seedlings were not delivered, there was the risk that
the project would be left with substantial quantity of such seedlings
in the nursery and in consequence it was decided to go ahead with
the planting and to withhold the payment of cash grants until these
two conditions had been met.34
Second, they tended to neglect farm maintenance and
increasingly withdrew from the scheme. The 1994 CDC Annual
Report mentioned that 77 of the 432 smallholders were ‘inactive’
(45 in rubber and 32 in oil palms). It also reported that 16 oil palm
growers had started felling their trees for tapping palm wine.
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And third, they, and especially oil palm growers, tried to evade
the terms of  exchange imposed by the corporation by either selling
their fruit at the local market or processing them at local mills.35 Of
course, such activities were aimed at realising a higher rate of return
on their labour. Contrary to oil palm growers, rubber growers are
more locked into exchange relations as they lack processing and
marketing facilities.
Rendell (1976: 219) rightly observed that informal protest actions
are more likely to occur if smallholders are not fully dependent on
income derived from participation in the scheme. He asserted that
the tea contract farming schemes created by the Commonwealth
Development Corporation in Uganda and Mali performed below
expectation because the growing of other cash crops made
smallholders less dependent on tea for income, less committed to it
in periods when prices were low, and less willing to subordinate
themselves to the management’s authority and discipline in the
labour process. There is no doubt that CDC smallholders’ informal
protest actions were also prompted by the fact that the scheme’s
participants had additional sources of  income too, with most
producing other cash crops such as cocoa and coffee.
Fortunately, the situation started to improve in 1994. Increasing
world market prices allowed the CDC’s management to pay its
smallholders higher prices, which, in turn, motivated smallholders
to increase output.36
Conclusion
This chapter presents a serious challenge to modernisation theorists
who assumed that the creation of  contract farming schemes would
inevitably result in the maximisation of capital accumulation and
the emergence of  a stable middle peasantry. In fact, I have
demonstrated that the various CDC smallholder schemes have been
largely unsuccessful, particularly during the corporation’s
unprecedented economic crisis. I have also highlighted some of  the
main reasons for their relative failure.
There was, first of all, the rather ambiguous attitude of the
government and CDC management towards smallholder
development. In its policy statements, the government regularly
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expressed its firm commitment to the agro-industrial ‘encadrement’
of  the local peasantry.37 In practice, however, it seems to have been
more interested in the expansion of agro-industrial estates and
medium-sized plantations, mainly for the possibilities that the
modernisation strategy offers the political elite for private capital
accumulation. Its ambiguous attitude towards smallholder
development may have been reinforced by the relative failure of
the few contract farming schemes that were implemented under
pressure from the international financiers of agro-industrial
expansion, particularly the World Bank. This failure should not,
however, be attributed to the local peasantry’s inherent
traditionalism, lack of entrepreneurship or unwillingness to join the
scheme, but rather to the serious problems that participants faced
from the very start of  contract farming schemes. In the absence of
any determined and consistent smallholder policy, CDC management
continued to render assistance only reluctantly to smallholder
schemes. It has tried to remain faithful to its historical mission of
estate development and to look upon smallholder development as
a matter of  secondary importance. And, even more importantly, it
has never been challenged as to its priorities. The government seems
to have supported its smallholder and price policies, and the
corporation has never been dependent on the supply of smallholder
produce, which has always only accounted for a tiny proportion of
total CDC output (see Table 7.1).
Secondly, there has been, as the dependency theorists have
correctly observed, a precarious dependence on commodity prices
on domestic and international markets. The banana scheme
flourished in the days before independence, primarily because of a
trade preference for the agricultural commodities of Commonwealth
countries in the United Kingdom, but it collapsed following the
withdrawal of preferential treatment after independence and
reunification (cf. Epale 1985: 190-91). Unlike the banana scheme,
the rubber and oil palm schemes never experienced a real boom
period as they immediately became subject to fluctuating, and often
low, prices. The sharp fall in commodity prices on the world market
in the 1980s brought both the CDC and smallholders to the verge
of  bankruptcy.
198
Crisis and Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
And finally, there has been the problem of  establishing control over
these schemes. Feeling exploited, participants have continued to oppose
managerial efforts to gain control over the processes of production
and exchange. They have been regularly engaged in a variety of collective
and informal modes of  resistance that have seriously impeded the
progress of  the schemes, notably during the corporation’s economic
crisis. These forms of  protest, which have been largely ignored by
both the modernisation and dependencia-theorists, have been manifest
in their common struggle against the low producer prices offered by
the corporation, their defiance of management authority over the
labour process reflected in their persistent violation of production
rules and refusal to maintain their farms, and their withdrawal from
relations of exchange and, in the last resort, from the scheme itself.
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Pamol’s contract farmers and cooperatives:
Their development in response to
the agro-industrial crisis
Introduction
Like the CDC, Pamol has played a pioneering role among the agro-industrial
enterprises in Cameroon regarding contract farming. Soon after
independence and reunification, it began a contract farming scheme
near its oil palm estates in response to government requests to agro-
industrial enterprises to play an intermediary role in regional development.
This chapter shows how the Pamol contract farming scheme
was characterised by weak managerial control and supervision over
the labour process and a large degree of social differentiation. A
small group of large producers with close links to management and
the state formed the core group of  Pamol’s contract farmers,
producing by far the largest and highest-quality output. They have
proved, however, to be more dependent on the company’s transport
and milling facilities than smaller producers who are often capable
of processing their limited amounts of produce themselves if
management fails to buy it for one reason or another.
In this chapter I argue that large producers felt more threatened
than the smaller ones during Pamol’s crisis and liquidation. They
then decided to form a cooperative, claiming that it was going to
protect not only their own interests but also those of smaller
producers. However, it soon emerged that this cooperative lacked
the bargaining power required to hold the management to the terms
of the contract in a situation of severe marketing and liquidity
problems. Faced with growing dissatisfaction among members who
began looking for alternative milling facilities, the cooperative’s
executive board tried to establish a larger measure of autonomy for
the cooperative vis-à-vis the company by setting up transport and
milling facilities of its own.
202
Crisis and Neoliberal Reforms in Africa
The first part of this chapter describes the emergence and
development of  Pamol’s contract farming scheme up until the start
of  the company’s crisis. And in the second part, I assess the role
played by the newly established cooperative in defending its
members’ interests during Pamol’s financial crisis and liquidation.
The emergence and development of  Pamol’s contract
farming scheme
Unilever was already seriously contemplating the implementation
of  contract farming schemes in Africa by the end of  the Second
World War. In a memorandum to the Nigerian colonial administration
in 1944 (Fieldhouse 1994: 211-12), the United Africa Company
(UAC), Unilever’s most important subsidiary in Africa, proposed
establishing oil palm contract farming schemes in Nigeria and British
Cameroon based on the highly successful Gezira settler cotton
scheme in Sudan (Gaitskell 1959). However after extensive
discussions, no more was ever heard of this proposal.
It was not until the early 1960s that Pamol made a renewed
attempt to implement contract farming schemes in response to the
federal government’s urgent request to existing agro-industrial
enterprises to play an intermediary role in setting up contract farming
schemes near their estates.1 During his ‘get to know the people tour’
in December 1963, J.N. Lafon, the Secretary of  State for Local
Government in the Federated State of  West Cameroon, discussed
the possibility of company assistance to smallholder oil palm
producers in Ndian Division with divisional authorities and Pamol’s
management.2 Pamol assured the Secretary of State that the
company was ready ‘to assist the local population in the cultivation
of  this permanent crop of  long-lasting value’. All the participants
had high expectations for future Pamol contract farming schemes:
The opportunity to establish such projects is favourable as Pamol
has got good plant material, will provide advice freely, and is willing
to buy the produce. Good land is available around the estates. All
factors are present to make smallholder projects a success provided
that the communities have sufficient interest.3
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Following these discussions, a meeting was arranged with
representatives from villages close to the Pamol estates. Mr Evans,
the Pamol management’s representative, explained the purpose of
contract farming schemes and the village representatives hailed the
introduction of such schemes, saying that ‘they saw these schemes
as excellent opportunities for economic development’. They added
that they were in favour of  the communal farming of  oil palms and
that the proceeds of their communal efforts would be used to set
up village development projects. Both parties then agreed on their
mutual obligations in the establishment of  communal farms.4
Communal farming was undertaken not only by villages near the
Pamol estates but also by various schools and churches.
Despite initial enthusiasm, communal farming soon ran into
difficulties. First, there were conflicts between communal farmers
and the owners of  selected plots. For instance, the Divisional Officer
of Ekondo Titi Subdivision reported on the plot selected by Lobe
village as follows:
This plot is the old Native Authority School site with kolanut trees,
palms and mangoes. It is said to belong to the family of  Ajia Mambo.
Strangers had been given plots on this land to cultivate farms of
cassava. On selection of this plot, the natives cut down stands of
cassava and destroyed some young palms. The family sued the town
to the Native Court asking them to quit and pay damages. The
work came to a standstill. A settlement was finally reached with the
family by the District Officer.5
Communal ownership also gave rise to internal conflicts among
communal farmers. Some hard-working farmers felt frustrated by
those who either refused to work or were lazy, which resulted in a
lack of  farm maintenance. Asked to intervene, the Director of
Agriculture recommended dividing communal farms into individual
plots, claiming that this was the only way to produce satisfactory
results. His recommendation was rejected, however, on the ground
that communal land could not be owned by individuals. The
communities concerned then agreed that communal farming would
be made compulsory and that an annual fine of  FCFA 1,000 would
be imposed on anyone failing to work on these farms. This resolution
proved ineffective.6
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Alongside these communal farms, one can also see the emergence
of  an increasing number of  individual farmers (see Table 8.1). In
contrast to other schemes in Cameroon and elsewhere,7 the Pamol
scheme has the following three main characteristics.
Table 8.1 Pamol contract farmers: Number, cultivated area and output,
1980-1993
YEAR                      NUMBER             CULTIVATED AREA              OUTPUT
                                                                                    (HA)                              (M.T. of  FFB)1
1980                               231                             1,979                                          5,904
1981                               246                             2,144                                          8,420
1982                               268                             2,323                                          9,187
1983                               282                             2,409                                          6,625
1984                               301                             2,487                                          9,911
1985                               313                             2,700                                          7,993
1986                               322                             2,779                                        10,234
1987                               349                             2,946                                          5,682
1988                               345                             2,946                                          2,821
1989                               345                                                                                8,525
1990                               349                             3,689                                          8,730
1991                               350                             4,077                                          6,599
1992                                                                                                                     8,522
1993                                                                                                                     4,723
Source: Data supplied by Pamol Head Office, Lobe.
Note 1: FFB stands for Fresh Fruit Bunches.
First, the vast majority (90%) of  the scheme’s participants were
immigrants, 65% of  whom came from the North West Province.
They were mostly Pamol workers and managerial staff who had
bought land from local peasants during their working lives and then
settled in neighbouring villages when they retired. In the past, this
never posed a problem: land was not in short supply in this sparsely
populated area and was extremely cheap. Local villagers welcomed
any outsider who wanted to settle in their community, provided s/
he respected local customs and authority. It was not until the
liberalisation process that the regime and its South West allies began
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to exploit and exacerbate the divisions between ‘indigenous’ people
and ‘strangers’ in the South West Province for political ends. Many
immigrants, especially from the North West, belong to the country’s
main opposition party, the North West-based Social Democratic
Front (SDF). As a result, some local villagers have become resentful
of the large-scale occupation of their ancestral lands by immigrants
and the almost exclusive participation of immigrants in the scheme.
Second, the contract between the company and the scheme’s
participants is quite ‘loose’, with little managerial control over
participants’ production (and exchange). Pamol usually supplies
participants with seeds and technical advice, often even free of
charge to boost production, but there is hardly any on-going
managerial control and supervision of  the labour process. Since the
company is often unable to transport participants’ produce to its
mills, especially during the rainy season, it cannot force them to sell
their produce to Pamol alone. Moreover, participants have full legal
authority over their land and do not have to adhere to the terms of
the contract in order to retain their plots. The company’s principal
sanctions are to refuse to process low-quality produce, and to expel
participants from the scheme if they regularly sell part or all of
their produce on the open market.
Third, there is a high degree of social differentiation among the
scheme’s participants, especially because the company has never
set any limits on the area under cultivation. Approximately 60% of
participants have small farms, varying in size from less than 1 ha to
5 ha. The majority are Pamol workers who grow oil palms in their
spare time. Given their familiarity with agro-industrial oil palm
cultivation, it is understandable that the management has never
devoted much time or energy to extension services and regular
supervision. The remainder of  the small producers are local peasants
who are simultaneously engaged in cocoa, coffee and food
cultivation. Generally speaking, the latter have shown little interest
in joining the scheme, partly because they lack sufficient capital
since the cultivation of oil palms yields no income in the first four
years. This financial aspect, together with the high demand for locally
produced foodstuffs, encourages food production instead, which
offers quick returns. With few exceptions, maintenance levels on
oil palm farms are thus inadequate.
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These small producers predominantly make use of family labour,
but for heavy farm operations, such as land development, they either
call upon mutual work groups called njangis (DeLancey 1977) or
employ casual labour. Chronic labour problems are another factor
accounting for poor maintenance practices. Small producers cannot
afford to pay casual labour on a regular basis but their own sons
tend to leave the isolated and marginalised Ndian Division and
migrate to the coastal towns in search of employment. They therefore
mostly have to rely on female labour. Women are traditionally not
entitled to land – which is why very few women participate in the
scheme – but are responsible for food production. Work on their
household’s oil palm farm places an additional burden on women’s
extensive productive and reproductive responsibilities, while the
proceeds from such cultivation go to the male head. Although male
heads are traditionally not obliged to reward women for their
additional labour input, they usually try to avoid potential conflicts
by giving them a share of  the proceeds in the form of  presents or a
small sum of  money.
Small producers account for only a very limited proportion of
contract farmers’ total output. They are therefore of  little importance
to the company. This is manifest in management policies towards
contract farming: they usually give the lowest priority to small
producers in the allocation of inputs, technical advice and transport.
On the other hand, small producers see oil palm cultivation as a
supplementary source of income, since they already enjoy other
income from wage labour or agricultural production. Not fully
dependent on oil palm cultivation, they tend to be less committed
to it when prices are low, and less willing to subordinate themselves
to managerial control over the labour process. Owing to their
relatively limited output, they are able to process at least part of
their output themselves if management is unable, for whatever
reason, to provide transport for their produce. They process it either
in the traditional way or with the help of small presses, and then
consume part of it themselves and sell the remainder at the local
market.
Approximately 25% of  participants have medium-sized farms,
cultivating between 5 ha and 10 ha. This middle stratum consists
mainly of  clerical and supervisory staff  at Pamol and richer local
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peasants who appear to be more interested than small producers in
expanding production. These producers often employ a few
permanent and casual workers in addition to family labour. This
group is not, however, very stable as members either succeed in
joining the group of large producers or, particularly in times of crisis,
may find themselves sliding into the category of  small producers.
Approximately 15% of the participants are large producers
cultivating between 10 ha and 100 ha. They are mainly former
managerial staff  at Pamol, local chiefs, civil servants and
businessmen, and have usually maintained close relations with
Pamol management and the state apparatus, and some even have
important positions in the ruling party. A few are absentee farmers
who have left the actual running of  their farms to farm managers,
usually their sons. Large producers employ a number of  permanent
and casual workers depending on the size of  the farm but often
have trouble hiring steady, efficient and reliable workers. These
contract farmers cannot compete in their labour recruitment efforts
with the Pamol estates that offer higher wages and better social
amenities and benefits. Moreover, the company strictly forbids
contract farmers from hiring estate workers on a casual basis at
peak production periods, with breaches of  this rule being punished
by eviction from the scheme.8 Generally speaking, the large
producers maintain their farms better than the small ones and sell
higher-quality produce to the company.
Two former northwestern managerial staff  members, A.N. Gana
and A.B. Nzams, belong to the group of  successful, pioneering
contract farmers. After retiring from the company in 1964, they
each bought 100 ha of land from the local chiefs and gradually
expanded their oil palm farms. In 1984, Gana was cultivating 50 ha
of  oil palms at Lipenja and employed about 30 workers. He sold
464 tonnes of  fresh fruit to the company that year for a total of
FCFA 11.5 million.9 He was also engaged in business and animal
husbandry. With more than 50 workers, Nzams has been cultivating
almost 100 ha at Lobe. His farm has attracted numerous high-
ranking national and foreign visitors as it shows what contract
farmers can accomplish if  they follow technical advice on fertiliser
and maintenance.
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For Pamol management, the large producers are the most
important group of  contract farmers, as they supply by far the largest
and best-quality produce. They are consequently given privileges
when it comes to the allocation of inputs, technical advice and
transport facilities, a position that is strengthened by the close
contacts between large producers and management and state. These
contacts are also beneficial for large producers in securing substantial
bank loans for expanded production. Despite this privileged position,
they nevertheless appear to be more vulnerable than small producers
as they lack the means to process their substantial output and are
thus more dependent on Pamol for transport and milling facilities
than small producers are. It is little wonder then that, having made
considerable investments in the scheme, they felt the most
threatened when management could no longer provide these
facilities when the company’s financial problems started and it
subsequently went into liquidation. They then took the initiative
of setting up a cooperative. While they claimed it would defend the
interests of  all contract farmers, they were primarily concerned with
protecting their own interests.
Contract farmers’ cooperatives and Pamol’s crisis
and liquidation
Even at the start of the crisis in 1980, large producers were already
giving serious consideration to forming a cooperative. They feared
that Pamol would no longer be able to provide services to contract
farmers or to compensate them for their rising production costs by
regularly increasing the producer price. They became more
determined to form a cooperative when the management actually
refused to discuss their demands for a review of the producer price
in early 1980. In this particular case, they felt strongly that this
demand was justified, since Pamol’s price of  FCFA 11,000 per tonne
compared unfavourably with the neighbouring CDC that was paying
FCFA 22,000. The management, for its part, claimed that it was
offering its farmers a fair price because they had lower production
costs than the CDC farmers.10 Interestingly, some large producers
had already suggested that the new cooperative should aim at
constructing a mill of  its own in the longer term and take over
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transporting produce from its members’ farms to the mill. They
perceived the cooperative as a means both of strengthening their
bargaining position with management and reducing their dependence
on the company for transport and processing facilities.
Since cooperatives were then still subordinated to state control,
the large producers approached the state for approval and to register
their cooperative. The request was granted in March 1980 and led
to the inauguration of the Ndian Division Oil Palm Smallholders’
Cooperative. Pamol management did not oppose this newly created
cooperative, seeing it as presenting a channel for passing information
on to contract farmers, an auxiliary body of  control over the contract
farmers’ production and exchange, and an intermediary organ for
settling disputes between contract farmers and the company. The
management did, however, express misgivings about the motives
behind the cooperative as it felt that bigger farmers would obviously
dominate the cooperative and would be ‘more concerned with
following their own interests to a conclusion than the interests of
the cooperative society as a whole’. It also warned that, after investing
so heavily over the years in establishing a viable contract farming
scheme near its estates, the company would never allow the newly
created cooperative to construct milling facilities of  its own.11
The activities of the newly created cooperative were largely
restricted to contract farmers around the Ndian Estate. However it
proved incapable of  defending its members’ interests when Pamol’s
deepening crisis threatened the very survival of  the contract farming
scheme. In June 1984 and again in April 1986, Pamol’s management
was obliged to announce that the company could no longer purchase
produce from contract farmers due to marketing and liquidity
problems. It was in this precarious period, that the large producers
near the Lobe Estate decided, on 4 September 1986, to form a
cooperative of their own: the Ekondo Titi Oil Palm Smallholder
Cooperative Society Ltd (Ekoscoop Ltd). Its leadership was likewise
monopolised by big farmers and small producers were never given
the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. None
of  them were ever invited to attend the cooperative’s regular
meetings and although they sometimes resented their inferior
position in the cooperative, they never seem to have challenged its
leadership. Small producers often maintain a clientelistic relationship
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with large producers, who request certain favours for them with the
management and the state. They, in return, provide the large
producers with labour services. They usually acknowledge the
superior bargaining power of the large producers and benefit from
the cooperative’s achievements, such as increased producer prices.
Soon after it was established, the power of the new cooperative
was put to the test. Pamol’s management informed the executive
board on 23 May 1987 that it could no longer guarantee payment
for produce supplied by contract farmers and suggested two
alternatives:
• Contract farmers could try to deliver their produce to
SOCAPALM and the CDC. Since these parastatals were
desperately short of  cash, it would be in the farmers’ interests
not to supply fruit before obtaining prior confirmation of
payment. This option, of course, would involve extremely
high transport costs since these parastatals’ mills were a long
way from Ndian Division and the connecting roads were
usually in bad shape.
• Contract farmers could continue delivering their produce to
Pamol and they would be paid as soon as cash became
available.12
• Since the management was not prepared to negotiate on this
issue, the cooperative’s leadership tried to make use of  its
contacts in the state apparatus. An emergency board meeting
at Ekoscoop on 19 June 1987 resolved to send a delegation
to Yaoundé to argue for immediate government intervention
on the contract farmers’ behalf. The cooperative’s problems
took on an even greater urgency eight days later when Pamol’s
management decided to stop purchasing produce from
contract farmers altogether. The Minister of  Agriculture, J.B.
Yonke, then intervened, appealing to management to do
everything possible to buy the farmers’ fruit, but Pamol simply
ignored this appeal.13 The Ekoscoop board thus had no other
option but to advise its members to sell to the CDC’s Mondoni
Oil Mill. However, most contract farmers refused to do so in
view of the high transport costs involved. Since the large
producers were capable of processing only a tiny proportion
of their produce themselves, the remainder of their perishable
crops was left to rot, which resulted in major financial losses.
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Following Pamol’s liquidation, the newly appointed liquidator
told the Ekoscoop executive that he would not start purchasing
produce from contract farmers until there were signs of  the
company’s recovery. In these circumstances, some of  the larger
producers with the necessary capital resources began to invest in
mechanical presses to process their own and others’ produce.
Increasingly, even people without oil palm farms were coming to
own milling facilities. They bought fruit from contract farmers, Pamol
workers and local villagers who were involved in large-scale theft
of company produce.
It was not until 23-24 June 1988 that the liquidator, C.G. Mure,
arranged a meeting of  Pamol contract farmers to announce that the
company would distribute oil palm seedlings to registered contract
farmers free of  charge, pay all their arrears and start purchasing
fruit from them on 1 July 1988. Significantly, he informed them
that the company had drawn up a new contract farming policy on
the advice of the Commonwealth Development Corporation
(COMDEV), which at that time was showing great interest in taking
over the company. Pamol was going to focus on contract farming.
Production would therefore be reorganised to such an extent that
by the early 21st century, 60% of  produce would be supplied by
contract farmers and only 40% by the company’s estates. To achieve
this, the company would make a special effort to bring an increasing
number of  local peasants into the scheme. Furthermore, contract
farmers would be offered shares in the company after
reorganisation.14 In line with this new policy, Itoe Sylvestor Imbea
was appointed special projects manager as of 1 April 1989. Imbea,
who hailed from Dikome Balue in Ndian Division and was thus
well acquainted with the local situation, would be responsible for
local peasants’ participation in the contract farming scheme and
for providing them with technical advice.
Contract farming activities, which had been at a virtual standstill
since 1987, were once again being promoted. In 1989/90, the
company supplied over 33,000 oil palm seedlings free of charge to
contract farmers and started offering technical advice again. The
results of these new efforts were, however, disappointing as very
few peasants joined the scheme. This was mainly due to continuing
transport problems and the fall in producer prices from FCFA 24,000
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to FCFA 20,000 per tonne in Ekondo Titi Subdivision. Between
1989 and 1992 the number of participants in the scheme only rose
from 345 to 350. Contract farmers produced about 9,000 tonnes
of  FFB worth FCFA 225 million in 1990 (see Table 8.1).
From 1990 onwards, relations between Ekoscoop Ltd and
management began to deteriorate again. Imbea, the newly appointed
special projects manager, was dismissed for allegedly not managing
the contract farming scheme efficiently and there was less focus on
contract farming after COMDEV’s withdrawal of  its takeover bid,
which manifested itself in the liquidator investing all available
financial resources in the replanting of  the estates. The low producer
price weakened the Ekoscoop board’s control over its members
who, understandably, were starting to look for alternative processing
facilities and markets for their produce. There were also persistent
transport problems, especially during the rainy season, and a regular
shortage of  oil palm seedlings. Above all, the company was not
paying its contract farmers on a regular basis.
On 25 January 1991, the Annual General Meeting of Ekoscoop
Ltd was held at Bekora, and was attended by the liquidator and
several managers. The cooperative’s board and members recounted
their numerous problems at the meeting and the liquidator appeared
annoyed by the cooperative’s criticism of  the scheme. He announced
that the oil palm seedlings would now be sold at FCFA 500 each,
since he had noticed that most farmers were not attaching any value
to these seedlings if they were supplied free of charge. Moreover,
he berated cooperative members for selling their produce to
alternative markets in spite of  the various forms of  (free) assistance
provided by the company. He explained that the irregular payments
were to be blamed on the company’s liquidity problems, which were
caused by a renewed undercutting of prices by the two major agro-
industrial parastatals. However, he stressed that liquidity problems
were not confined to Pamol but had become a common phenomenon
in Cameroon during the economic crisis and he warned that if the
theft of  fruit continued, the company would stop buying produce
from contract farmers. He then informed his audience that the
producer price would be increased from FCFA 20,000 to FCFA
25,000 with effect from 1 February 1991.15
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There were no apparent improvements in the contract farmers’
situation after this meeting. On the contrary, the company’s
deepening crisis prevented management from paying the contract
farmers more regularly and providing them with assistance.
Experiencing difficulties in surviving, the large producers
approached the cooperative’s board, exhorting it to bring more
pressure to bear on Pamol to adhere to the terms of  the contract.
The board, in turn, claimed it lacked the bargaining power to improve
the farmers’ situation as long as the marketing and liquidity problems
affecting the agro-industrial oil palm sector remained. Dissatisfied
with the responses from Pamol’s management and the cooperative’s
board, a rapidly growing number of  contract farmers began selling
at least part of their produce to the new group of local press owners
who were able to pay them promptly.
To regain the loyalty of  its members, the board decided to
implement previous plans to establish a larger measure of autonomy
for the cooperative vis-à-vis the company. This move was facilitated
by the enactment of a new cooperative law by Parliament on 14
February 1992 that reflected the country’s ongoing liberalisation
process. It freed the existing cooperatives from state control and
gave them more leeway for autonomous action. In its pursuit of
autonomy, the board took the following measures:16
• it attempted to create milling facilities of its own. Land was
acquired from the Chief  of  Bongongo I, one of  the bigger
contract farmers, and the board procured two mechanical
presses and applied for foreign assistance to help set up a mill;
• it attempted to solve the chronic transport problems by buying
a tractor and a four-wheel drive vehicle from Pamol; and
• it began buying seeds to establish nurseries of its own.
Obviously, this drive for autonomy formed a potential challenge
to Pamol’s substantial investments in its contract farming scheme
as well as to its market monopoly. Although management had
previously warned the cooperative that the company would never
allow it to engage in milling activities of its own, it nevertheless
adopted an attitude of wait and see. It found it difficult to prohibit
the cooperative outright from implementing its new measures
because the company had failed to provide the necessary assistance
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to contract farmers and to pay them regularly. In addition, it soon
became clear that the cooperative would not be able, at least in the
short term, to realise its plans. For instance, its various requests for
international funding for a mill have not yet yielded any results.
Moreover, its newly procured means of transport have proved not
only insufficient in coping with its members’ output but also
unsuitable for local road conditions in the rainy season. Its members,
and in particular the big producers, thus continue to be largely
dependent on the company for transport and milling services.
The cooperative’s very survival has remained precarious ever
since. The two-month labour strike in 1993 brought untold hardship
to members as no produce was bought at all by the company during
this period. Following the appointment of  a local management team
after the strike, the company started purchasing produce again but
payments remained irregular until 1994. In that year, the 50%
devaluation of  the CFA franc opened up brighter prospects for an
economic recovery.
Conclusion
This chapter has documented the pioneering but pivotal role Pamol
has played in developing contract farming in Ndian Division. This
role is all the more significant if one considers that, unlike the agro-
industrial parastatals, the company never received any financial
assistance from the post-colonial state for it.
I have tried to show how a group of large contract producers
began organising into cooperatives when deteriorating market
conditions for palm oil endangered Pamol’s continued existence,
and thus producers’ opportunities for capital accumulation. The
company’s economic crisis, however, soon exposed the cooperative’s
weakness, namely the large producers’ high degree of dependence
on the company for transport, processing and marketing. When
management was no longer able to provide these services, the
cooperative lacked the power to compel it to abide by the terms of
the contract. Increasingly disillusioned with the cooperative board’s
performance, the large producers were, for the first time, obliged to
seek alternative processing and marketing facilities. Such informal
protest actions by contract farmers have been widespread in Africa
and elsewhere (Konings 1993b; Little & Watts 1994).
215
Chapter 8: Pamol’s contract farmers and cooperatives
After Pamol went into liquidation in 1987, there were some initial
indications that the cooperative’s bargaining position would improve.
The liquidator informed its executive that he intended to shift from
estate production to smallholder production, which would have
considerably boosted the cooperative’s membership. As was already
the case in the Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) (Lamb
& Muller 1982), the cooperative’s board was to be represented in
Pamol’s management, and cooperative members would own shares
in the company. Unfortunately, nothing ever came of  all this, and
the period of  relative harmony and cooperation was brief.
Unable to pressurise management into improving its members’
situation during the deepening crisis, the large producers eventually
forced the cooperative’s board to pursue a greater measure of
autonomy in relation to the company by developing nurseries and
transport and milling facilities of  its own. The cooperative’s new
policies, however, never posed any serious challenge to the
company’s market monopoly as the cooperative failed to implement
its autonomy measures, at least in the short term. It is therefore
little wonder that a growing number of large producers began to
circumvent the cooperative once again, either investing in
mechanical presses themselves or selling some or all of their produce
to a new group of press owners who had grown up in the area during
the company crisis, and who were capable of  paying promptly.
The relatively poor performance of  the Pamol cooperative is by
no means exceptional among the handful of cooperatives that exist
in contracting schemes in the developing world. Clapp (1994: 82)
has concluded that ‘cooperatives may coordinate the interests of
large growers when they coincide with the company’s, but when
conflict arises between growers and company, they have been largely
helpless’. One of the rare examples of relative success in Africa is
the KTDA cooperative in Kenya, which wields considerable power
by virtue of  its vast membership. According to Grosh (1994: 254),
the KTDA cooperative has, for this very reason, continued to be
strongly represented at various levels in the KTDA governance
structure, and the parastatal has modified its practices over time in
response to the cooperative’s priorities.
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Notes
  1. République Unie du Cameroun (1980), Bilan Diagnostic du Secteur Agricole
de 1960 à 1980, Yaoundé: Ministère de l’Agriculture, 97-98.
  2. See letter from District Officer, Ekondo Titi Subdivision, to
Honourable J.N. Lafon, dated 6 July 1964, in BNA, File Cd (1963) 1,
Administrative Reorganisation: Ekondo Titi Sub-District.
  3. See Pamol News, 1 January 1969, p. 2.
  4. See letter from District Officer, Ekondo-Titi Subdivision, to
Honourable J.N. Lafon, dated 8 July 1964, in BNA, File Cd (1963) 1,
Administrative Reorganisation: Ekondo Titi Sub-District.
  5. Ibid.
  6. Economic and Social Report of Ekondo Titi Quarter Ending, 30
September 1970, in BNA, File Cd (1964) 2, Periodical Intelligence
Report: Ekondo Titi.
  7. For instance, a recently created contract farming scheme associated
with the CDC has a more homogeneous contract farming group and
strict managerial control over participants’ production and exchange.
See Chapter 7.
  8. See letter from W.N. Kimbeng, Manager of  Lobe Estate, to all
smallholders, dated 10 November 1980, in File G 4002/49, Vol. 2,
Pamol Cameroon Ltd – General Correspondence.
  9. See letter from District Officer, Ekondo Titi, to the Honourable
Minister of  Finance, Yaoundé, dated 6 November 1985, in ibid.
10. Minutes of the General Meeting of Oil Palm Smallholders in Ndian
Division, dated 18 April 1980, in File MINEP/ED/SWP/A/54, Small
Palm Holders Scheme.
11. See letter from D.J. Lucking, Managing Director of  Pamol, to T.A.N.
Elad, Provincial Head of Economic Division, Buea, dated 11 July
1980, in File ECOPLAN/516, Plantations Pamol du Cameroun Ltd.
12. See letter from B.J.R. Mack, Managing Director of  Pamol, to Senior
Divisional Officer, Mundemba, dated 23 May 1987, in File G 4002/
49, Vol. 2, Pamol Cameroon Ltd – General Correspondence.
13. See letter from J.B. Yonke, Minister of  Agriculture, Yaoundé, to Pamol,
Douala, dated 26 June 1987, in ibid.
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14. See letter from C.G. Mure, Liquidator of  Pamol, to Senior District
Officer, Mundemba, dated 22 June 1988, in ibid.
15. Minutes of the Ekondo Titi Oil Palm Smallholder Cooperative Ltd
(Ekoscoop Ltd) Annual General Meeting held at Bekora on 25 January
1991, Archives of Ekoscoop Ltd, Lobe.
16. See Opening Address by the President of Ekondo Titi Oil Palm
Cooperative Society (Ekoscoop), Chief Esoh Itoh, at the Annual
General Meeting held at Bekora on 18 September 1993, Archives of
Ekoscoop Ltd, Lobe.
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